add a comment #1

ranj063 · 2019-10-20T00:02:42Z

Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan [email protected]

Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]>

This patch fixes the lock inversion complaint: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.3.0-rc7-dbg+ #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u16:6/171 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000035c6e6c (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: rdma_destroy_id+0x78/0x4a0 [rdma_cm] but task is already holding lock: 00000000bc7c307d (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: iw_conn_req_handler+0x151/0x680 [rdma_cm] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/u16:6/171: #0: 00000000e2eaa773 ((wq_completion)iw_cm_wq){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x472/0xac0 #1: 000000001efd357b ((work_completion)(&work->work)thesofproject#3){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x476/0xac0 #2: 00000000bc7c307d (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}, at: iw_conn_req_handler+0x151/0x680 [rdma_cm] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 171 Comm: kworker/u16:6 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7-dbg+ #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8a/0xd6 __lock_acquire.cold+0xe1/0x24d lock_acquire+0x106/0x240 __mutex_lock+0x12e/0xcb0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 rdma_destroy_id+0x78/0x4a0 [rdma_cm] iw_conn_req_handler+0x5c9/0x680 [rdma_cm] cm_work_handler+0xe62/0x1100 [iw_cm] process_one_work+0x56d/0xac0 worker_thread+0x7a/0x5d0 kthread+0x1bc/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 This is not a bug as there are actually two lock classes here. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: de910bd ("RDMA/cma: Simplify locking needed for serialization of callbacks") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>

A user reported a lockdep splat ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.2.11-gentoo #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/711 is trying to acquire lock: 000000007777a663 (sb_internal){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 but task is already holding lock: 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}: kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f/0x1c0 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x1f/0x260 alloc_inode+0x16/0xa0 new_inode+0xe/0xb0 btrfs_new_inode+0x70/0x610 btrfs_symlink+0xd0/0x420 vfs_symlink+0x9c/0x100 do_symlinkat+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (sb_internal){.+.+}: __sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150 start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110 btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0 evict+0xbc/0x1f0 inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100 list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50 prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0 do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320 shrink_node+0xf7/0x380 balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640 kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0 kthread+0x147/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/711: #0: 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30 #1: 000000004a5100f8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}, at: shrink_node+0x9a/0x380 #2: 00000000f956fa46 (&type->s_umount_key#30){++++}, at: super_cache_scan+0x35/0x1d0 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 PID: 711 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.2.11-gentoo #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT, BIOS 2.4.2 09/29/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc7 print_circular_bug.cold.40+0x1d9/0x235 __lock_acquire+0x18b1/0x1f00 lock_acquire+0xa6/0x170 ? start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 __sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150 ? start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110 btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0 ? var_wake_function+0x20/0x20 evict+0xbc/0x1f0 inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190 ? discard_new_inode+0xc0/0xc0 __list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100 ? discard_new_inode+0xc0/0xc0 list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50 prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0 do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320 shrink_node+0xf7/0x380 balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640 kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0 ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x90/0x90 kthread+0x147/0x160 ? balance_pgdat+0x640/0x640 ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x160/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 This is because btrfs_new_inode() calls new_inode() under the transaction. We could probably move the new_inode() outside of this but for now just wrap it in memalloc_nofs_save(). Reported-by: Zdenek Sojka <[email protected]> Fixes: 712e36c ("btrfs: use GFP_KERNEL in btrfs_alloc_inode") CC: [email protected] # 4.16+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

Call uart_unregister_driver() conditionally instead of unconditionally, only if it has been previously registered. This uses driver.state, just as the sh-sci.c driver does. Fixes this null pointer dereference in tty_unregister_driver(), since the 'driver' argument is null: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI RIP: 0010:tty_unregister_driver+0x25/0x1d0 Fixes: 238b872 ("[PATCH] serial uartlite driver") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

When using virtual engines, the rq->engine is not stable until we hold the engine->active.lock (as the virtual engine may be exchanged with the sibling). Since commit 22b7a42 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy") we may retire a request concurrently with resubmitting it to HW, we need to be extra careful to verify we are holding the correct lock for the request's active list. This is similar to the issue we saw with rescheduling the virtual requests, see sched_lock_engine(). Or else: <4> [876.736126] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff8883f931a1f8), but was dead000000000100. (prev=ffff888361ffa610). <4> [876.736136] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70 <4> [876.736137] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915] <4> [876.736154] CPU: 2 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G U 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1 <4> [876.736156] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019 <4> [876.736157] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70 <4> [876.736159] Code: c3 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 20 33 0e 82 48 89 c2 e8 4a 4a bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 c1 4c 89 c6 48 c7 c7 70 33 0e 82 e8 33 4a bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c0 33 0e 82 e8 <4> [876.736160] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018bd30 EFLAGS: 00010082 <4> [876.736162] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000104 <4> [876.736163] RDX: 0000000080000104 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff <4> [876.736164] RBP: ffffc9000018bd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 <4> [876.736165] R10: 00000000aed95de3 R11: 000000007fe927eb R12: ffff888361ffca10 <4> [876.736166] R13: ffff888361ffa610 R14: ffff888361ffc880 R15: ffff8883f931a1f8 <4> [876.736168] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4> [876.736169] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4> [876.736170] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 <4> [876.736171] PKRU: 55555554 <4> [876.736172] Call Trace: <4> [876.736226] __i915_request_submit+0x152/0x370 [i915] <4> [876.736263] __execlists_submission_tasklet+0x6da/0x1f50 [i915] <4> [876.736293] ? execlists_submission_tasklet+0x29/0x50 [i915] <4> [876.736321] execlists_submission_tasklet+0x34/0x50 [i915] <4> [876.736325] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x47/0xb0 <4> [876.736328] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x4ae <4> [876.736332] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x23/0x280 <4> [876.736334] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x6b/0x280 <4> [876.736336] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50 <4> [876.736338] smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d3/0x280 <4> [876.736341] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 <4> [876.736343] kthread+0x119/0x130 <4> [876.736345] ? kthread_park+0xa0/0xa0 <4> [876.736347] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [876.736353] irq event stamp: 2290145 <4> [876.736356] hardirqs last enabled at (2290144): [<ffffffff8123cde8>] __slab_free+0x3e8/0x500 <4> [876.736358] hardirqs last disabled at (2290145): [<ffffffff819cfb4d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd/0x50 <4> [876.736360] softirqs last enabled at (2290114): [<ffffffff81c0033e>] __do_softirq+0x33e/0x4ae <4> [876.736361] softirqs last disabled at (2290119): [<ffffffff810b815b>] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50 <4> [876.736363] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70 <4> [876.736364] ---[ end trace 3e58d6c7356c65bf ]--- <4> [876.736406] ------------[ cut here ]------------ <4> [876.736415] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff888361ffca10, but was ffff88840ac2c730 <4> [876.736421] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5490 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90 <4> [876.736422] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915] <4> [876.736433] CPU: 2 PID: 5490 Comm: i915_selftest Tainted: G U W 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1 <4> [876.736435] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019 <4> [876.736436] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90 <4> [876.736438] Code: 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 30 34 0e 82 e8 ae 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 68 34 0e 82 e8 97 49 bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 c7 c7 a8 34 0e 82 e8 86 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 <4> [876.736439] RSP: 0018:ffffc900003ef758 EFLAGS: 00010086 <4> [876.736440] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000002 <4> [876.736442] RDX: 0000000080000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff <4> [876.736443] RBP: ffffc900003ef780 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 <4> [876.736444] R10: 000000001418e4b7 R11: 000000007f0ea93b R12: ffff888361ffcab8 <4> [876.736445] R13: ffff88843b6d0000 R14: 000000000000217c R15: 0000000000000001 <4> [876.736447] FS: 00007f4e6f255240(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4> [876.736448] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4> [876.736449] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 <4> [876.736450] PKRU: 55555554 <4> [876.736451] Call Trace: <4> [876.736488] i915_request_retire+0x224/0x8e0 [i915] <4> [876.736521] i915_request_create+0x4b/0x1b0 [i915] <4> [876.736550] nop_virtual_engine+0x230/0x4d0 [i915] Fixes: 22b7a42 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy") Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111695 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Auld <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 37fa0de) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>

Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption enabled. From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled, despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned. This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping" message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger: | sysrq: Trigger a crash | Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148 | show_stack+0x14/0x20 | dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4 | panic+0x140/0x32c | sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20 | __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190 | write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88 | proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8 | __vfs_write+0x18/0x40 | vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8 | ksys_write+0x64/0xf0 | __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168 | el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78 | el0_svc+0x8/0xc | Kernel Offset: disabled | CPU features: 0x0002,24002004 | Memory Limit: none | ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]--- | Ping 2! | Ping 1! | Ping 1! | Ping 2! The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n, otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'. Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reported-by: Xogium <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Russell King <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]> Cc: Feng Tang <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

@done

finish_writeback_work() reads @done->waitq after decrementing @done->cnt. However, once @done->cnt reaches zero, @done may be freed (from stack) at any moment and @done->waitq can contain something unrelated by the time finish_writeback_work() tries to read it. This led to the following crash. "BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000002" #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC CPU: 40 PID: 555153 Comm: kworker/u98:50 Kdump: loaded Not tainted ... Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1) RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x30 Code: 48 89 d8 5b c3 e8 50 db 6b ff eb f4 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 9c 5b fa 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 05 48 89 d8 5b c3 89 c6 e8 fe ca 6b ff eb f2 66 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc90049b27d98 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff889fff407600 R11: ffff88ba9395d740 R12: 000000000000e300 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bfdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000002409005 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: __wake_up_common_lock+0x63/0xc0 wb_workfn+0xd2/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x1f5/0x3f0 worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 kthread+0x111/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fix it by reading and caching @done->waitq before decrementing @done->cnt. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5b9cce4 ("writeback: Generalize and expose wb_completion") Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Debugged-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [5.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…not disabled In kdump kernel, memcg usually is disabled with 'cgroup_disable=memory' for saving memory. Now kdump kernel will always panic when dump vmcore to local disk: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ab8 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 598 Comm: makedumpfile Not tainted 5.3.0+ thesofproject#26 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/02/2018 RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath+0x38/0x140 Call Trace: __set_page_dirty+0x52/0xc0 iomap_set_page_dirty+0x50/0x90 iomap_write_end+0x6e/0x270 iomap_write_actor+0xce/0x170 iomap_apply+0xba/0x11e iomap_file_buffered_write+0x62/0x90 xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xca/0x320 [xfs] new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0 vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0 ksys_write+0x59/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 And this will corrupt the 1st kernel too with 'cgroup_disable=memory'. Via the trace and with debugging, it is pointing to commit 97b2782 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") which introduced this regression. Disabling memcg causes the null pointer dereference at uninitialized data in function mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath(). Fix it by returning directly if memcg is disabled, but not trying to record the foreign writebacks with dirty pages. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924141928.GD31919@MiWiFi-R3L-srv Fixes: 97b2782 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

A customer reported the following softlockup: [899688.160002] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [test.sh:16464] [899688.160002] CPU: 0 PID: 16464 Comm: test.sh Not tainted 4.12.14-6.23-azure #1 SLE12-SP4 [899688.160002] RIP: 0010:up_write+0x1a/0x30 [899688.160002] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [899688.160002] RIP: 0010:up_write+0x1a/0x30 [899688.160002] RSP: 0018:ffffa86784d4fde8 EFLAGS: 00000257 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12 [899688.160002] RAX: ffffffff970fea00 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [899688.160002] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: ffffffff970fea00 [899688.160002] RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [899688.160002] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b59014720d8 [899688.160002] R13: ffff8b59014720c0 R14: ffff8b5901471090 R15: ffff8b5901470000 [899688.160002] tracing_read_pipe+0x336/0x3c0 [899688.160002] __vfs_read+0x26/0x140 [899688.160002] vfs_read+0x87/0x130 [899688.160002] SyS_read+0x42/0x90 [899688.160002] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x160 It caught the process in the middle of trace_access_unlock(). There is no loop. So, it must be looping in the caller tracing_read_pipe() via the "waitagain" label. Crashdump analyze uncovered that iter->seq was completely zeroed at this point, including iter->seq.seq.size. It means that print_trace_line() was never able to print anything and there was no forward progress. The culprit seems to be in the code: /* reset all but tr, trace, and overruns */ memset(&iter->seq, 0, sizeof(struct trace_iterator) - offsetof(struct trace_iterator, seq)); It was added by the commit 53d0aa7 ("ftrace: add logic to record overruns"). It was v2.6.27-rc1. It was the time when iter->seq looked like: struct trace_seq { unsigned char buffer[PAGE_SIZE]; unsigned int len; }; There was no "size" variable and zeroing was perfectly fine. The solution is to reinitialize the structure after or without zeroing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>

syzbot got a NULL dereference in bond_update_slave_arr() [1], happening after a failure to allocate bond->slave_arr A workqueue (bond_slave_arr_handler) is supposed to retry the allocation later, but if the slave is removed before the workqueue had a chance to complete, bond->slave_arr can still be NULL. [1] Failed to build slave-array. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Modules linked in: Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:bond_update_slave_arr.cold+0xc6/0x198 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4039 RSP: 0018:ffff88018fe33678 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc9000290b000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82b63037 RDI: ffff88019745ea20 RBP: ffff88018fe33760 R08: ffff880170754280 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88019745ea00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88018fe338b0 FS: 00007febd837d700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004540a0 CR3: 00000001c242e005 CR4: 00000000001626f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82b5b45e>] __bond_release_one+0x43e/0x500 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1923 [<ffffffff82b5b966>] bond_release drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2039 [inline] [<ffffffff82b5b966>] bond_do_ioctl+0x416/0x870 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3562 [<ffffffff83ae25f4>] dev_ifsioc+0x6f4/0x940 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:328 [<ffffffff83ae2e58>] dev_ioctl+0x1b8/0xc70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:495 [<ffffffff83995ffd>] sock_do_ioctl+0x1bd/0x300 net/socket.c:1088 [<ffffffff83996a80>] sock_ioctl+0x300/0x5d0 net/socket.c:1196 [<ffffffff81b124db>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline] [<ffffffff81b124db>] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:501 [inline] [<ffffffff81b124db>] do_vfs_ioctl+0xacb/0x1300 fs/ioctl.c:688 [<ffffffff81b12dc6>] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:705 [inline] [<ffffffff81b12dc6>] SyS_ioctl+0xb6/0xe0 fs/ioctl.c:696 [<ffffffff8101ccc8>] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 [<ffffffff84400091>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 Fixes: ee63771 ("bonding: Simplify the xmit function for modes that use xmit_hash") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

A long time ago we fixed a similar deadlock in show_slab_objects() [1]. However, it is apparently due to the commits like 01fb58b ("slab: remove synchronous synchronize_sched() from memcg cache deactivation path") and 03afc0e ("slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink}"), this kind of deadlock is back by just reading files in /sys/kernel/slab which will generate a lockdep splat below. Since the "mem_hotplug_lock" here is only to obtain a stable online node mask while racing with NUMA node hotplug, in the worst case, the results may me miscalculated while doing NUMA node hotplug, but they shall be corrected by later reads of the same files. WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ cat/5224 is trying to acquire lock: ffff900012ac3120 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8 but task is already holding lock: b8ff009693eee398 (kn->count#45){++++}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x44/0xf0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (kn->count#45){++++}: lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360 __kernfs_remove+0x290/0x490 kernfs_remove+0x30/0x44 sysfs_remove_dir+0x70/0x88 kobject_del+0x50/0xb0 sysfs_slab_unlink+0x2c/0x38 shutdown_cache+0xa0/0xf0 kmemcg_cache_shutdown_fn+0x1c/0x34 kmemcg_workfn+0x44/0x64 process_one_work+0x4f4/0x950 worker_thread+0x390/0x4bc kthread+0x1cc/0x1e8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #1 (slab_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360 __mutex_lock_common+0x16c/0xf78 mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50 memcg_create_kmem_cache+0x38/0x16c memcg_kmem_cache_create_func+0x3c/0x70 process_one_work+0x4f4/0x950 worker_thread+0x390/0x4bc kthread+0x1cc/0x1e8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #0 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: validate_chain+0xd10/0x2bcc __lock_acquire+0x7f4/0xb8c lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360 get_online_mems+0x54/0x150 show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8 total_objects_show+0x28/0x34 slab_attr_show+0x38/0x54 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x198/0x2d4 kernfs_seq_show+0xa4/0xcc seq_read+0x30c/0x8a8 kernfs_fop_read+0xa8/0x314 __vfs_read+0x88/0x20c vfs_read+0xd8/0x10c ksys_read+0xb0/0x120 __arm64_sys_read+0x54/0x88 el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_svc+0x8/0xc other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem --> slab_mutex --> kn->count#45 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(kn->count#45); lock(slab_mutex); lock(kn->count#45); lock(mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by cat/5224: #0: 9eff00095b14b2a0 (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: seq_read+0x4c/0x8a8 #1: 0eff008997041480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x34/0xf0 #2: b8ff009693eee398 (kn->count#45){++++}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x44/0xf0 stack backtrace: Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0xd0/0x140 print_circular_bug+0x368/0x380 check_noncircular+0x248/0x250 validate_chain+0xd10/0x2bcc __lock_acquire+0x7f4/0xb8c lock_acquire+0x31c/0x360 get_online_mems+0x54/0x150 show_slab_objects+0x94/0x3a8 total_objects_show+0x28/0x34 slab_attr_show+0x38/0x54 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x198/0x2d4 kernfs_seq_show+0xa4/0xcc seq_read+0x30c/0x8a8 kernfs_fop_read+0xa8/0x314 __vfs_read+0x88/0x20c vfs_read+0xd8/0x10c ksys_read+0xb0/0x120 __arm64_sys_read+0x54/0x88 el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240 el0_svc+0x8/0xc I think it is important to mention that this doesn't expose the show_slab_objects to use-after-free. There is only a single path that might really race here and that is the slab hotplug notifier callback __kmem_cache_shrink (via slab_mem_going_offline_callback) but that path doesn't really destroy kmem_cache_node data structures. [1] http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1101.0/02850.html [[email protected]: add comment explaining why we don't need mem_hotplug_lock] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 01fb58b ("slab: remove synchronous synchronize_sched() from memcg cache deactivation path") Fixes: 03afc0e ("slab: get_online_mems for kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink}") Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

Daniel Vetter uncovered a nasty cycle in using the mmu-notifiers to invalidate userptr objects which also happen to be pulled into GGTT mmaps. That is when we unbind the userptr object (on mmu invalidation), we revoke all CPU mmaps, which may then recurse into mmu invalidation. We looked for ways of breaking the cycle, but the revocation on invalidation is required and cannot be avoided. The only solution we could see was to not allow such GGTT bindings of userptr objects in the first place. In practice, no one really wants to use a GGTT mmapping of a CPU pointer... Just before Daniel's explosive lockdep patches land in v5.4-rc1, we got a genuine blip from CI: <4>[ 246.793958] ====================================================== <4>[ 246.793972] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4>[ 246.793989] 5.3.0-gbd6c56f50d15-drmtip_372+ #1 Tainted: G U <4>[ 246.794003] ------------------------------------------------------ <4>[ 246.794017] kswapd0/145 is trying to acquire lock: <4>[ 246.794030] 000000003f565be6 (&dev->struct_mutex/1){+.+.}, at: userptr_mn_invalidate_range_start+0x18f/0x220 [i915] <4>[ 246.794250] but task is already holding lock: <4>[ 246.794263] 000000001799cef9 (&anon_vma->rwsem){++++}, at: page_lock_anon_vma_read+0xe6/0x2a0 <4>[ 246.794291] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4>[ 246.794307] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4>[ 246.794322] -> thesofproject#3 (&anon_vma->rwsem){++++}: <4>[ 246.794344] down_write+0x33/0x70 <4>[ 246.794357] __vma_adjust+0x3d9/0x7b0 <4>[ 246.794370] __split_vma+0x16a/0x180 <4>[ 246.794385] mprotect_fixup+0x2a5/0x320 <4>[ 246.794399] do_mprotect_pkey+0x208/0x2e0 <4>[ 246.794413] __x64_sys_mprotect+0x16/0x20 <4>[ 246.794429] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794443] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794456] -> #2 (&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem){++++}: <4>[ 246.794478] down_write+0x33/0x70 <4>[ 246.794493] unmap_mapping_pages+0x48/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_revoke_mmap+0x81/0x1b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_unbind+0x11d/0x4a0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_vma_destroy+0x31/0x300 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] __i915_gem_free_objects+0xb8/0x4b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] drm_file_free.part.0+0x1e6/0x290 <4>[ 246.794519] drm_release+0xa6/0xe0 <4>[ 246.794519] __fput+0xc2/0x250 <4>[ 246.794519] task_work_run+0x82/0xb0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_exit+0x35b/0xdb0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_group_exit+0x34/0xb0 <4>[ 246.794519] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10 <4>[ 246.794519] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794519] -> #1 (&vm->mutex){+.+.}: <4>[ 246.794519] i915_gem_shrinker_taints_mutex+0x6d/0xe0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_address_space_init+0x9f/0x160 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_ggtt_init_hw+0x55/0x170 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_driver_probe+0xc9f/0x1620 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] i915_pci_probe+0x43/0x1b0 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120 <4>[ 246.794519] really_probe+0xea/0x3d0 <4>[ 246.794519] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120 <4>[ 246.794519] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50 <4>[ 246.794519] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0 <4>[ 246.794519] bus_add_driver+0x13f/0x210 <4>[ 246.794519] driver_register+0x56/0xe0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4>[ 246.794519] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f6 <4>[ 246.794519] load_module+0x25bd/0x2a40 <4>[ 246.794519] __se_sys_finit_module+0xd3/0xf0 <4>[ 246.794519] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4>[ 246.794519] -> #0 (&dev->struct_mutex/1){+.+.}: <4>[ 246.794519] __lock_acquire+0x15d8/0x1e90 <4>[ 246.794519] lock_acquire+0xa6/0x1c0 <4>[ 246.794519] __mutex_lock+0x9d/0x9b0 <4>[ 246.794519] userptr_mn_invalidate_range_start+0x18f/0x220 [i915] <4>[ 246.794519] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x85/0x110 <4>[ 246.794519] try_to_unmap_one+0x76b/0x860 <4>[ 246.794519] rmap_walk_anon+0x104/0x280 <4>[ 246.794519] try_to_unmap+0xc0/0xf0 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_page_list+0x561/0xc10 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_inactive_list+0x220/0x440 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_node_memcg+0x36e/0x740 <4>[ 246.794519] shrink_node+0xcb/0x490 <4>[ 246.794519] balance_pgdat+0x241/0x580 <4>[ 246.794519] kswapd+0x16c/0x530 <4>[ 246.794519] kthread+0x119/0x130 <4>[ 246.794519] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4>[ 246.794519] other info that might help us debug this: <4>[ 246.794519] Chain exists of: &dev->struct_mutex/1 --> &mapping->i_mmap_rwsem --> &anon_vma->rwsem <4>[ 246.794519] Possible unsafe locking scenario: <4>[ 246.794519] CPU0 CPU1 <4>[ 246.794519] ---- ---- <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&anon_vma->rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&anon_vma->rwsem); <4>[ 246.794519] lock(&dev->struct_mutex/1); <4>[ 246.794519] *** DEADLOCK *** v2: Say no to mmap_ioctl Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111744 Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111870 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit a431174) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>

Both multi_cpu_stop() and set_state() access multi_stop_data::state racily using plain accesses. These are subject to compiler transformations which could break the intended behaviour of the code, and this situation is detected by KCSAN on both arm64 and x86 (splats below). Improve matters by using READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to ensure that the compiler cannot elide, replay, or tear loads and stores. In multi_cpu_stop() the two loads of multi_stop_data::state are expected to be a consistent value, so snapshot the value into a temporary variable to ensure this. The state transitions are serialized by atomic manipulation of multi_stop_data::num_threads, and other fields in multi_stop_data are not modified while subject to concurrent reads. KCSAN splat on arm64: | BUG: KCSAN: data-race in multi_cpu_stop+0xa8/0x198 and set_state+0x80/0xb0 | | write to 0xffff00001003bd00 of 4 bytes by task 24 on cpu 3: | set_state+0x80/0xb0 | multi_cpu_stop+0x16c/0x198 | cpu_stopper_thread+0x170/0x298 | smpboot_thread_fn+0x40c/0x560 | kthread+0x1a8/0x1b0 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 | | read to 0xffff00001003bd00 of 4 bytes by task 14 on cpu 1: | multi_cpu_stop+0xa8/0x198 | cpu_stopper_thread+0x170/0x298 | smpboot_thread_fn+0x40c/0x560 | kthread+0x1a8/0x1b0 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 | | Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: | CPU: 1 PID: 14 Comm: migration/1 Not tainted 5.3.0-00007-g67ab35a199f4-dirty thesofproject#3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) KCSAN splat on x86: | write to 0xffffb0bac0013e18 of 4 bytes by task 19 on cpu 2: | set_state kernel/stop_machine.c:170 [inline] | ack_state kernel/stop_machine.c:177 [inline] | multi_cpu_stop+0x1a4/0x220 kernel/stop_machine.c:227 | cpu_stopper_thread+0x19e/0x280 kernel/stop_machine.c:516 | smpboot_thread_fn+0x1a8/0x300 kernel/smpboot.c:165 | kthread+0x1b5/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:255 | ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 | | read to 0xffffb0bac0013e18 of 4 bytes by task 44 on cpu 7: | multi_cpu_stop+0xb4/0x220 kernel/stop_machine.c:213 | cpu_stopper_thread+0x19e/0x280 kernel/stop_machine.c:516 | smpboot_thread_fn+0x1a8/0x300 kernel/smpboot.c:165 | kthread+0x1b5/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:255 | ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 | | Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: | CPU: 7 PID: 44 Comm: migration/7 Not tainted 5.3.0+ #1 | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

There are three places where we access uninitialized memmaps, namely: - /proc/kpagecount - /proc/kpageflags - /proc/kpagecgroup We have initialized memmaps either when the section is online or when the page was initialized to the ZONE_DEVICE. Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING. For example, not onlining a DIMM during boot and calling /proc/kpagecount with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING: :/# cat /proc/kpagecount > tmp.test BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffffe #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 114616067 P4D 114616067 PUD 114618067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 469 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004+ thesofproject#11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4 RIP: 0010:kpagecount_read+0xce/0x1e0 Code: e8 09 83 e0 3f 48 0f a3 02 73 2d 4c 89 e7 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d ab 51 01 01 74 1d 48 8b 57 08 480 RSP: 0018:ffffa14e409b7e78 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: fffffffffffffffe RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f76b5595000 RDI: fffff35645000000 RBP: 00007f76b5595000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 00007f76b5595000 R15: ffffa14e409b7f08 FS: 00007f76b577d580(0000) GS:ffff8f41bd400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffffffffffffe CR3: 0000000078960000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: proc_reg_read+0x3c/0x60 vfs_read+0xc5/0x180 ksys_read+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe For now, let's drop support for ZONE_DEVICE from the three pseudo files in order to fix this. To distinguish offline memory (with garbage memmap) from ZONE_DEVICE memory with properly initialized memmaps, we would have to check get_dev_pagemap() and pfn_zone_device_reserved() right now. The usage of both (especially, special casing devmem) is frowned upon and needs to be reworked. The fundamental issue we have is: if (pfn_to_online_page(pfn)) { /* memmap initialized */ } else if (pfn_valid(pfn)) { /* * ??? * a) offline memory. memmap garbage. * b) devmem: memmap initialized to ZONE_DEVICE. * c) devmem: reserved for driver. memmap garbage. * (d) devmem: memmap currently initializing - garbage) */ } We'll leave the pfn_zone_device_reserved() check in stable_page_flags() in place as that function is also used from memory failure. We now no longer dump information about pages that are not in use anymore - offline. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]> Cc: Toshiki Fukasawa <[email protected]> Cc: Pankaj gupta <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.13+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…pagetypeinfo Uninitialized memmaps contain garbage and in the worst case trigger kernel BUGs, especially with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING. They should not get touched. For example, when not onlining a memory block that is spanned by a zone and reading /proc/pagetypeinfo with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS and CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING, we can trigger a kernel BUG: :/# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory40/online :/# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory42/online :/# cat /proc/pagetypeinfo > test.file page:fffff2c585200000 is uninitialized and poisoned raw: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff raw: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PagePoisoned(p)) There is not page extension available. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1107! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Please note that this change does not affect ZONE_DEVICE, because pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print() is called from mm/vmstat.c:pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount() only for populated zones, and ZONE_DEVICE is never populated (zone->present_pages always 0). [[email protected]: move check to outer loop, add comment, rephrase description] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f1dd2cd ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") # visible after d0dc12e Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <[email protected]> Cc: Miles Chen <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.13+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

…pointer release Karsten reported the following panic in __free_slab() happening on a s390x machine: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000000017d4007 R3:000000007fbd0007 S:000000007fbff000 P:000000000000003d Oops: 0004 ilc:3 Ý#1¨ PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: tcp_diag inet_diag xt_tcpudp ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack ip6table_nat ip6table_mangle ip6table_raw ip6table_security iptable_at nf_nat CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-05872-g6133e3e4bada-dirty thesofproject#14 Hardware name: IBM 2964 NC9 702 (z/VM 6.4.0) Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 00000000003cadb6 (__free_slab+0x686/0x6b0) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 00000000f3a32928 0000000000000000 000000007fbf5d00 000000000117c4b8 0000000000000000 000000009e3291c1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 0000000000000008 000000002b478b00 000003d080a97600 0000000000000003 0000000000000008 000000002b478b00 000003d080a97600 000000000117ba00 000003e000057db0 00000000003cabcc 000003e000057c78 Krnl Code: 00000000003cada6: e310a1400004 lg %r1,320(%r10) 00000000003cadac: c0e50046c286 brasl %r14,ca32b8 #00000000003cadb2: a7f4fe36 brc 15,3caa1e >00000000003cadb6: e32060800024 stg %r2,128(%r6) 00000000003cadbc: a7f4fd9e brc 15,3ca8f8 00000000003cadc0: c0e50046790c brasl %r14,c99fd8 00000000003cadc6: a7f4fe2c brc 15,3caa 00000000003cadc6: a7f4fe2c brc 15,3caa1e 00000000003cadca: ecb1ffff00d9 aghik %r11,%r1,-1 Call Trace: (<00000000003cabcc> __free_slab+0x49c/0x6b0) <00000000001f5886> rcu_core+0x5a6/0x7e0 <0000000000ca2dea> __do_softirq+0xf2/0x5c0 <0000000000152644> irq_exit+0x104/0x130 <000000000010d222> do_IRQ+0x9a/0xf0 <0000000000ca2344> ext_int_handler+0x130/0x134 <0000000000103648> enabled_wait+0x58/0x128 (<0000000000103634> enabled_wait+0x44/0x128) <0000000000103b00> arch_cpu_idle+0x40/0x58 <0000000000ca0544> default_idle_call+0x3c/0x68 <000000000018eaa4> do_idle+0xec/0x1c0 <000000000018ee0e> cpu_startup_entry+0x36/0x40 <000000000122df34> arch_call_rest_init+0x5c/0x88 <0000000000000000> 0x0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: <00000000003ca8f4> __free_slab+0x1c4/0x6b0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The kernel panics on an attempt to dereference the NULL memcg pointer. When shutdown_cache() is called from the kmem_cache_destroy() context, a memcg kmem_cache might have empty slab pages in a partial list, which are still charged to the memory cgroup. These pages are released by free_partial() at the beginning of shutdown_cache(): either directly or by scheduling a RCU-delayed work (if the kmem_cache has the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag). The latter case is when the reported panic can happen: memcg_unlink_cache() is called immediately after shrinking partial lists, without waiting for scheduled RCU works. It sets the kmem_cache->memcg_params.memcg pointer to NULL, and the following attempt to dereference it by __free_slab() from the RCU work context causes the panic. To fix the issue, let's postpone the release of the memcg pointer to destroy_memcg_params(). It's called from a separate work context by slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(), which contains a full RCU barrier. This guarantees that all scheduled page release RCU works will complete before the memcg pointer will be zeroed. Big thanks for Karsten for the perfect report containing all necessary information, his help with the analysis of the problem and testing of the fix. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: fb2f2b0 ("mm: memcg/slab: reparent memcg kmem_caches on cgroup removal") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Reported-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Tested-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]> Cc: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

mount.ocfs2 failed when reading ocfs2 filesystem superblock encounters an error. ocfs2_initialize_super() returns before allocating ocfs2_wq. ocfs2_dismount_volume() triggers the following panic. Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: On-disk corruption discovered.Please run fsck.ocfs2 once the filesystem is unmounted. Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_read_locked_inode:537 ERROR: status = -30 Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes:458 ERROR: status = -30 Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_init_global_system_inodes:491 ERROR: status = -30 Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_initialize_super:2313 ERROR: status = -30 Oct 15 16:09:27 cnwarekv-205120 kernel: (mount.ocfs2,22804,44): ocfs2_fill_super:1033 ERROR: status = -30 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 11753 Comm: mount.ocfs2 Tainted: G E 4.14.148-200.ckv.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Sugon H320-G30/35N16-US, BIOS 0SSDX017 12/21/2018 task: ffff967af0520000 task.stack: ffffa5f05484000 RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x20 Call Trace: flush_workqueue+0x81/0x460 ocfs2_shutdown_local_alloc+0x47/0x440 [ocfs2] ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x84/0x400 [ocfs2] ocfs2_fill_super+0xa4/0x1270 [ocfs2] ? ocfs2_initialize_super.isa.211+0xf20/0xf20 [ocfs2] mount_bdev+0x17f/0x1c0 mount_fs+0x3a/0x160 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yi Li <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

Connecting a vCPU to a XIVE KVM device means establishing a 1:1 association between a vCPU id and the offset (VP id) of a VP structure within a fixed size block of VPs. We currently try to enforce the 1:1 relationship by checking that a vCPU with the same id isn't already connected. This is good but unfortunately not enough because we don't map VP ids to raw vCPU ids but to packed vCPU ids, and the packing function kvmppc_pack_vcpu_id() isn't bijective by design. We got away with it because QEMU passes vCPU ids that fit well in the packing pattern. But nothing prevents userspace to come up with a forged vCPU id resulting in a packed id collision which causes the KVM device to associate two vCPUs to the same VP. This greatly confuses the irq layer and ultimately crashes the kernel, as shown below. Example: a guest with 1 guest thread per core, a core stride of 8 and 300 vCPUs has vCPU ids 0,8,16...2392. If QEMU is patched to inject at some point an invalid vCPU id 348, which is the packed version of itself and 2392, we get: genirq: Flags mismatch irq 199. 00010000 (kvm-2-2392) vs. 00010000 (kvm-2-348) CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ thesofproject#38 Call Trace: [c000003f7f9937e0] [c000000000c0110c] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf4 (unreliable) [c000003f7f993820] [c0000000001cb480] __setup_irq+0xa70/0xad0 [c000003f7f9938d0] [c0000000001cb75c] request_threaded_irq+0x13c/0x260 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e7ac] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x104/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 xive-kvm: Failed to request escalation interrupt for queue 0 of VCPU 2392 ------------[ cut here ]------------ remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/199', leaking at least 'kvm-2-348' WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 88176 at /home/greg/Work/linux/kernel-kvm-ppc/fs/proc/generic.c:684 remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ thesofproject#38 NIP: c00000000053b0cc LR: c00000000053b0c8 CTR: c0000000000ba3b0 REGS: c000003f7f9934b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000029033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48228222 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000131a50 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000053b0c8 c000003f7f993740 c0000000015ec500 0000000000000057 GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 000049fb98484262 0000000000001bcf GPR08: 0000000000000007 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 9000000000001033 GPR12: 0000000000008000 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 c000003f863758b0 c000003f86375870 0000000000000006 GPR24: c000003f86375a30 0000000000000007 c0002039373d9020 c0000000014c4a48 GPR28: 0000000000000001 c000003fe62a4f6b c00020394b2e9fab c000003fe62a4ec0 NIP [c00000000053b0cc] remove_proc_entry+0x1ec/0x200 LR [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 Call Trace: [c000003f7f993740] [c00000000053b0c8] remove_proc_entry+0x1e8/0x200 (unreliable) [c000003f7f9937e0] [c0000000001d3654] unregister_irq_proc+0x114/0x150 [c000003f7f993880] [c0000000001c6284] free_desc+0x54/0xb0 [c000003f7f9938c0] [c0000000001c65ec] irq_free_descs+0xac/0x100 [c000003f7f993910] [c0000000001d1ff8] irq_dispose_mapping+0x68/0x80 [c000003f7f993940] [c00800000d44e8a4] kvmppc_xive_attach_escalation+0x1fc/0x270 [kvm] [c000003f7f9939d0] [c00800000d45013c] kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu+0x424/0x620 [kvm] [c000003f7f993ac0] [c00800000d444428] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x260/0x448 [kvm] [c000003f7f993b90] [c00800000d43593c] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x154/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000003f7f993d00] [c0000000004840f0] do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc30 [c000003f7f993db0] [c000000000484d44] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000003f7f993e00] [c000000000484d88] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68 Instruction dump: 2c230000 41820008 3923ff78 e8e900a0 3c82ff69 3c62ff8d 7fa6eb78 7fc5f378 3884f080 3863b948 4bbf6925 60000000 <0fe00000> 4bffff7c fba10088 4bbf6e41 ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d1 ]--- BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000010 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00800000d44fc04 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm dm_mod vhost_net vhost tap xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter squashfs loop fuse i2c_dev sg ofpart ocxl powernv_flash at24 xts mtd uio_pdrv_genirq vmx_crypto opal_prd ipmi_powernv uio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 linear sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ahci libahci libata tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks [last unloaded: kvm] CPU: 24 PID: 88176 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Tainted: G W 5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+ thesofproject#38 NIP: c00800000d44fc04 LR: c00800000d44fc00 CTR: c0000000001cd970 REGS: c000003f7f9938e0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (5.3.0-xive-nr-servers-5.3-gku+) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24228882 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c0000000001cd9ac DAR: 0000000000000010 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00800000d44fc00 c000003f7f993b70 c00800000d468300 0000000000000000 GPR04: 00000000000000c7 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd06d8 GPR08: 0000000000000000 c000003ffacd0738 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffffd GPR12: 0000000000000040 c000003ffffeb800 0000000000000000 000000012f4ce5a1 GPR16: 000000012ef5a0c8 0000000000000000 000000012f113bb0 0000000000000000 GPR20: 000000012f45d918 00007ffffe0d9a80 000000012f4f5df0 000000012ef8c9f8 GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000003fe4501ed0 c000003f8b1d0000 GPR28: c0000033314689c0 c000003fe4501c00 c000003fe4501e70 c000003fe4501e90 NIP [c00800000d44fc04] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xfc/0x210 [kvm] LR [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] Call Trace: [c000003f7f993b70] [c00800000d44fc00] kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu+0xf8/0x210 [kvm] (unreliable) [c000003f7f993bd0] [c00800000d450bd4] kvmppc_xive_release+0xdc/0x1b0 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c30] [c00800000d436a98] kvm_device_release+0xb0/0x110 [kvm] [c000003f7f993c70] [c00000000046730c] __fput+0xec/0x320 [c000003f7f993cd0] [c000000000164ae0] task_work_run+0x150/0x1c0 [c000003f7f993d30] [c000000000025034] do_notify_resume+0x304/0x440 [c000003f7f993e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Instruction dump: 3bff0008 7fbfd040 419e0054 847e0004 2fa30000 419effec e93d0000 8929203c 2f890000 419effb8 4800821d e8410018 <e9230010> e9490008 9b2a0039 7c0004ac ---[ end trace b925b67a74a1d8d2 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception This affects both XIVE and XICS-on-XIVE devices since the beginning. Check the VP id instead of the vCPU id when a new vCPU is connected. The allocation of the XIVE CPU structure in kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() is moved after the check to avoid the need for rollback. Cc: [email protected] # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>

We have a test case like block/001 in blktests, which will create a scsi device by loading scsi_debug module and then try to delete the device by sysfs interface. At the same time, it may remove the scsi_debug module. And getting a invalid paging request BUG_ON as following: [ 34.625854] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa0016bb8 [ 34.629189] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 34.629618] CPU: 1 PID: 450 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#473 [ 34.632524] RIP: 0010:scsi_proc_hostdir_rm+0x5/0xa0 [ 34.643555] CR2: ffffffffa0016bb8 CR3: 000000012cd88000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 34.644545] Call Trace: [ 34.644907] scsi_host_dev_release+0x6b/0x1f0 [ 34.645511] device_release+0x74/0x110 [ 34.646046] kobject_put+0x116/0x390 [ 34.646559] put_device+0x17/0x30 [ 34.647041] scsi_target_dev_release+0x2b/0x40 [ 34.647652] device_release+0x74/0x110 [ 34.648186] kobject_put+0x116/0x390 [ 34.648691] put_device+0x17/0x30 [ 34.649157] scsi_device_dev_release_usercontext+0x2e8/0x360 [ 34.649953] execute_in_process_context+0x29/0x80 [ 34.650603] scsi_device_dev_release+0x20/0x30 [ 34.651221] device_release+0x74/0x110 [ 34.651732] kobject_put+0x116/0x390 [ 34.652230] sysfs_unbreak_active_protection+0x3f/0x50 [ 34.652935] sdev_store_delete.cold.4+0x71/0x8f [ 34.653579] dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x40 [ 34.654103] sysfs_kf_write+0x3d/0x60 [ 34.654603] kernfs_fop_write+0x174/0x250 [ 34.655165] __vfs_write+0x1f/0x60 [ 34.655639] vfs_write+0xc7/0x280 [ 34.656117] ksys_write+0x6d/0x140 [ 34.656591] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30 [ 34.657114] do_syscall_64+0xb1/0x400 [ 34.657627] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 34.658335] RIP: 0033:0x7f156f337130 During deleting scsi target, the scsi_debug module have been removed. Then, sdebug_driver_template belonged to the module cannot be accessd, resulting in scsi_proc_hostdir_rm() BUG_ON. To fix the bug, we add scsi_device_get() in sdev_store_delete() to try to increase refcount of module, avoiding the module been removed. Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

A race condition exists while initialiazing perf_trace_buf from perf_trace_init() and perf_kprobe_init(). CPU0 CPU1 perf_trace_init() mutex_lock(&event_mutex) perf_trace_event_init() perf_trace_event_reg() total_ref_count == 0 buf = alloc_percpu() perf_trace_buf[i] = buf tp_event->class->reg() //fails perf_kprobe_init() goto fail perf_trace_event_init() perf_trace_event_reg() fail: total_ref_count == 0 total_ref_count == 0 buf = alloc_percpu() perf_trace_buf[i] = buf tp_event->class->reg() total_ref_count++ free_percpu(perf_trace_buf[i]) perf_trace_buf[i] = NULL Any subsequent call to perf_trace_event_reg() will observe total_ref_count > 0, causing the perf_trace_buf to be always NULL. This can result in perf_trace_buf getting accessed from perf_trace_buf_alloc() without being initialized. Acquiring event_mutex in perf_kprobe_init() before calling perf_trace_event_init() should fix this race. The race caused the following bug: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000003106f2003c Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000045 Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045 CM = 0, WnR = 1 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = ffffffc034b9b000 [0000003106f2003c] pgd=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000045 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Process syz-executor (pid: 18393, stack limit = 0xffffffc093190000) pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO) pc : __memset+0x20/0x1ac lr : memset+0x3c/0x50 sp : ffffffc09319fc50 __memset+0x20/0x1ac perf_trace_buf_alloc+0x140/0x1a0 perf_trace_sys_enter+0x158/0x310 syscall_trace_enter+0x348/0x7c0 el0_svc_common+0x11c/0x368 el0_svc_handler+0x12c/0x198 el0_svc+0x8/0xc Ramdumps showed the following: total_ref_count = 3 perf_trace_buf = ( 0x0 -> NULL, 0x0 -> NULL, 0x0 -> NULL, 0x0 -> NULL) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: e12f03d ("perf/core: Implement the 'perf_kprobe' PMU") Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Prateek Sood <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>

Scheduled policy update work may end up racing with the freeing of the policy and unregistering the driver. One possible race is as below, where the cpufreq_driver is unregistered, but the scheduled work gets executed at later stage when, cpufreq_driver is NULL (i.e. after freeing the policy and driver). Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000001c pgd = (ptrval) [0000001c] *pgd=80000080204003, *pmd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP THUMB2 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3-00006-g67f5a8081a4b thesofproject#86 Hardware name: ARM-Versatile Express Workqueue: events handle_update PC is at cpufreq_set_policy+0x58/0x228 LR is at dev_pm_qos_read_value+0x77/0xac Control: 70c5387d Table: 80203000 DAC: fffffffd Process kworker/0:1 (pid: 34, stack limit = 0x(ptrval)) (cpufreq_set_policy) from (refresh_frequency_limits.part.24+0x37/0x48) (refresh_frequency_limits.part.24) from (handle_update+0x2f/0x38) (handle_update) from (process_one_work+0x16d/0x3cc) (process_one_work) from (worker_thread+0xff/0x414) (worker_thread) from (kthread+0xff/0x100) (kthread) from (ret_from_fork+0x11/0x28) Fixes: 67d874c ("cpufreq: Register notifiers with the PM QoS framework") Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> [ rjw: Cancel the work before dropping the QoS requests ] Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

When doing an out of tree build with O=, the nsdeps script constructs the absolute pathname of the module source file so that it can insert MODULE_IMPORT_NS statements in the right place. However, ${srctree} contains an unescaped path to the source tree, which, when used in a sed substitution, makes sed complain: ++ sed 's/[^ ]* *//home/jeyu/jeyu-linux\/&/g' sed: -e expression #1, char 12: unknown option to `s' The sed substitution command 's' ends prematurely with the forward slashes in the pathname, and sed errors out when it encounters the 'h', which is an invalid sed substitution option. To avoid escaping forward slashes ${srctree}, we can use '|' as an alternative delimiter for sed instead to avoid this error. Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]> Tested-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>

When the client hits reconnect it iterates over the mid pending queue marking entries for retry and moving them to a temporary list to issue callbacks later without holding GlobalMid_Lock. In the same time there is no guarantee that mids can't be removed from the temporary list or even freed completely by another thread. It may cause a temporary list corruption: [ 430.454897] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff98d3a8f316c0, but was 2e885cb266355469 [ 430.464668] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 430.466569] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51! [ 430.468476] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 430.470286] CPU: 0 PID: 13267 Comm: cifsd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#19 [ 430.473472] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 430.475872] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x55 ... [ 430.510426] Call Trace: [ 430.511500] cifs_reconnect+0x25e/0x610 [cifs] [ 430.513350] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x220/0x250 [cifs] [ 430.515464] cifs_read_from_socket+0x4a/0x70 [cifs] [ 430.517452] ? try_to_wake_up+0x212/0x650 [ 430.519122] ? cifs_small_buf_get+0x16/0x30 [cifs] [ 430.521086] ? allocate_buffers+0x66/0x120 [cifs] [ 430.523019] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xdc/0xc30 [cifs] [ 430.525116] kthread+0xfb/0x130 [ 430.526421] ? cifs_handle_standard+0x190/0x190 [cifs] [ 430.528514] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 430.530019] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Fix this by obtaining extra references for mids being retried and marking them as MID_DELETED which indicates that such a mid has been dequeued from the pending list. Also move mid cleanup logic from DeleteMidQEntry to _cifs_mid_q_entry_release which is called when the last reference to a particular mid is put. This allows to avoid any use-after-free of response buffers. The patch needs to be backported to stable kernels. A stable tag is not mentioned below because the patch doesn't apply cleanly to any actively maintained stable kernel. Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-and-tested-by: David Wysochanski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>

When lockdep is enabled, plugging Thunderbolt dock on Dominik's laptop triggers following splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.3.0-rc6+ #1 Tainted: G T ------------------------------------------------------ pool-/usr/lib/b/1258 is trying to acquire lock: 000000005ab0ad43 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}, at: authorized_store+0xe8/0x210 but task is already holding lock: 00000000bfb796b5 (&tb->lock){+.+.}, at: authorized_store+0x7c/0x210 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&tb->lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0xac/0x9a0 tb_domain_add+0x2d/0x130 nhi_probe+0x1dd/0x330 pci_device_probe+0xd2/0x150 really_probe+0xee/0x280 driver_probe_device+0x50/0xc0 bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0 __device_attach+0xe4/0x150 pci_bus_add_device+0x4e/0x70 pci_bus_add_devices+0x2e/0x66 pci_bus_add_devices+0x59/0x66 pci_bus_add_devices+0x59/0x66 enable_slot+0x344/0x450 acpiphp_check_bridge.part.0+0x119/0x150 acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0xaa/0x140 acpi_device_hotplug+0xa2/0x3f0 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30 process_one_work+0x234/0x580 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x10a/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 -> #0 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0xe54/0x1ac0 lock_acquire+0xb8/0x1b0 __mutex_lock+0xac/0x9a0 authorized_store+0xe8/0x210 kernfs_fop_write+0x125/0x1b0 vfs_write+0xc2/0x1d0 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&tb->lock); lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); lock(&tb->lock); lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by pool-/usr/lib/b/1258: #0: 000000003df1a1ad (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: __fdget_pos+0x4d/0x60 #1: 0000000095a40b02 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x185/0x1d0 #2: 0000000017a7d714 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xf2/0x1b0 thesofproject#3: 000000004f262981 (kn->count#208){.+.+}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0xfa/0x1b0 thesofproject#4: 00000000bfb796b5 (&tb->lock){+.+.}, at: authorized_store+0x7c/0x210 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1258 Comm: pool-/usr/lib/b Tainted: G T 5.3.0-rc6+ #1 On an system using ACPI hotplug the host router gets hotplugged first and then the firmware starts sending notifications about connected devices so the above scenario should not happen in reality. However, after taking a second look at commit a03e828 ("thunderbolt: Serialize PCIe tunnel creation with PCI rescan") that introduced the locking, I don't think it is actually correct. It may have cured the symptom but probably the real root cause was somewhere closer to PCI stack and possibly is already fixed with recent kernels. I also tried to reproduce the original issue with the commit reverted but could not. So to keep lockdep happy and the code bit less complex drop calls to pci_lock_rescan_remove()/pci_unlock_rescan_remove() in tb_switch_set_authorized() effectively reverting a03e828. Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/30/513 Fixes: a03e828 ("thunderbolt: Serialize PCIe tunnel creation with PCI rescan") Reported-by: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>

We have been calling it virtio_fs and even file name is virtio_fs.c. Module name is virtio_fs.ko but when registering file system user is supposed to specify filesystem type as "virtiofs". Masayoshi Mizuma reported that he specified filesytem type as "virtio_fs" and got this warning on console. ------------[ cut here ]------------ request_module fs-virtio_fs succeeded, but still no fs? WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1234 at fs/filesystems.c:274 get_fs_type+0x12c/0x138 Modules linked in: ... virtio_fs fuse virtio_net net_failover ... CPU: 1 PID: 1234 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1 #1 So looks like kernel could find the module virtio_fs.ko but could not find filesystem type after that. It probably is better to rename module name to virtiofs.ko so that above warning goes away in case user ends up specifying wrong fs name. Reported-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>

When timer_of_init fails, it cleans up after itself by undoing everything it did during the initialization function. mtk_syst_init and mtk_gpt_init both call timer_of_cleanup if timer_of_init fails. timer_of_cleanup try to release the resource taken. Since these resources have already been cleaned up by timer_of_init, we end up getting a few warnings printed: [ 0.001935] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at __clk_put+0xe8/0x128 [ 0.002650] Modules linked in: [ 0.003058] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.67+ #1 [ 0.003852] Hardware name: MediaTek MT8183 (DT) [ 0.004446] pstate: 20400085 (nzCv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 0.005073] pc : __clk_put+0xe8/0x128 [ 0.005555] lr : clk_put+0xc/0x14 [ 0.005988] sp : ffffff80090b3ea0 [ 0.006422] x29: ffffff80090b3ea0 x28: 0000000040e20018 [ 0.007121] x27: ffffffc07bfff780 x26: 0000000000000001 [ 0.007819] x25: ffffff80090bda80 x24: ffffff8008ec5828 [ 0.008517] x23: ffffff80090bd000 x22: ffffff8008d8b2e8 [ 0.009216] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: fffffffffffffdfb [ 0.009914] x19: ffffff8009166180 x18: 00000000002bffa8 [ 0.010612] x17: ffffffc012996980 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 0.011311] x15: ffffffbf004a6800 x14: 3536343038393334 [ 0.012009] x13: 2079726576652073 x12: 7eb9c62c5c38f100 [ 0.012707] x11: ffffff80090b3ba0 x10: ffffff80090b3ba0 [ 0.013405] x9 : 0000000000000004 x8 : 0000000000000040 [ 0.014103] x7 : ffffffc079400270 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.014801] x5 : ffffffc079400248 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.015499] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.016197] x1 : ffffff80091661c0 x0 : fffffffffffffdfb [ 0.016896] Call trace: [ 0.017218] __clk_put+0xe8/0x128 [ 0.017654] clk_put+0xc/0x14 [ 0.018048] timer_of_cleanup+0x60/0x7c [ 0.018551] mtk_syst_init+0x8c/0x9c [ 0.019020] timer_probe+0x6c/0xe0 [ 0.019469] time_init+0x14/0x44 [ 0.019893] start_kernel+0x2d0/0x46c [ 0.020378] ---[ end trace 8c1efabea1267649 ]--- [ 0.020982] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 0.021586] Trying to vfree() nonexistent vm area ((____ptrval____)) [ 0.022427] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at __vunmap+0xd0/0xd8 [ 0.023119] Modules linked in: [ 0.023524] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.19.67+ #1 [ 0.024498] Hardware name: MediaTek MT8183 (DT) [ 0.025091] pstate: 60400085 (nZCv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 0.025718] pc : __vunmap+0xd0/0xd8 [ 0.026176] lr : __vunmap+0xd0/0xd8 [ 0.026632] sp : ffffff80090b3e90 [ 0.027066] x29: ffffff80090b3e90 x28: 0000000040e20018 [ 0.027764] x27: ffffffc07bfff780 x26: 0000000000000001 [ 0.028462] x25: ffffff80090bda80 x24: ffffff8008ec5828 [ 0.029160] x23: ffffff80090bd000 x22: ffffff8008d8b2e8 [ 0.029858] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 0.030556] x19: ffffff800800d000 x18: 00000000002bffa8 [ 0.031254] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 0.031952] x15: ffffffbf004a6800 x14: 3536343038393334 [ 0.032651] x13: 2079726576652073 x12: 7eb9c62c5c38f100 [ 0.033349] x11: ffffff80090b3b40 x10: ffffff80090b3b40 [ 0.034047] x9 : 0000000000000005 x8 : 5f5f6c6176727470 [ 0.034745] x7 : 5f5f5f5f28282061 x6 : ffffff80091c86ef [ 0.035443] x5 : ffffff800852b690 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.036141] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000002 [ 0.036839] x1 : 7eb9c62c5c38f100 x0 : 7eb9c62c5c38f100 [ 0.037536] Call trace: [ 0.037859] __vunmap+0xd0/0xd8 [ 0.038271] vunmap+0x24/0x30 [ 0.038664] __iounmap+0x2c/0x34 [ 0.039088] timer_of_cleanup+0x70/0x7c [ 0.039591] mtk_syst_init+0x8c/0x9c [ 0.040060] timer_probe+0x6c/0xe0 [ 0.040507] time_init+0x14/0x44 [ 0.040932] start_kernel+0x2d0/0x46c This commit remove the calls to timer_of_cleanup when timer_of_init fails since it is unnecessary and actually cause warnings to be printed. Fixes: a0858f9 ("mediatek: Convert the driver to timer-of") Signed-off-by: Fabien Parent <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/

Original version of g920_get_config() contained two kind of actions: 1. Device specific communication to query/set some parameters which requires active communication channel with the device, or, put in other way, for the call to be sandwiched between hid_device_io_start() and hid_device_io_stop(). 2. Input subsystem specific FF controller initialization which, in order to access a valid 'struct hid_input' via 'hid->inputs.next', requires claimed hidinput which means be executed after the call to hid_hw_start() with connect_mask containing HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT. Location of g920_get_config() can only fulfill requirements for #1 and not #2, which might result in following backtrace: [ 88.312258] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:C262.0005: HID++ 4.2 device connected. [ 88.320298] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 [ 88.320304] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 88.320307] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 88.320309] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 88.320315] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 88.320320] CPU: 1 PID: 3080 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ thesofproject#31 [ 88.320322] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro11,1/Mac-189A3D4F975D5FFC, BIOS 149.0.0.0.0 09/17/2018 [ 88.320334] RIP: 0010:hidpp_probe+0x61f/0x948 [hid_logitech_hidpp] [ 88.320338] Code: 81 00 00 48 89 ef e8 f0 d6 ff ff 41 89 c6 85 c0 75 b5 0f b6 44 24 28 48 8b 5d 00 88 44 24 1e 89 44 24 0c 48 8b 83 18 1c 00 00 <48> 8b 48 18 48 8b 83 10 19 00 00 48 8b 40 40 48 89 0c 24 0f b7 80 [ 88.320341] RSP: 0018:ffffb0a6824aba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 88.320345] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93a50756e000 RCX: 0000000000010408 [ 88.320347] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff93a51f0ad0a0 RDI: 000000000002d0a0 [ 88.320350] RBP: ffff93a50416da28 R08: ffff93a50416da70 R09: ffff93a50416da70 [ 88.320352] R10: 000000148ae9e60c R11: 00000000000f1525 R12: ffff93a50756e000 [ 88.320354] R13: ffff93a50756f8d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff93a50756fc38 [ 88.320358] FS: 00007f8d8c1e0940(0000) GS:ffff93a51f080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 88.320361] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 88.320363] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000003996d8003 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 88.320366] Call Trace: [ 88.320377] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 88.320387] ? create_pinctrl+0x2f/0x3c0 [ 88.320393] ? kernfs_link_sibling+0x94/0xe0 [ 88.320398] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 88.320402] ? kernfs_activate+0x5f/0x80 [ 88.320406] ? kernfs_add_one+0xe2/0x130 [ 88.320411] hid_device_probe+0x106/0x170 [ 88.320419] really_probe+0x147/0x3c0 [ 88.320424] driver_probe_device+0xb6/0x100 [ 88.320428] device_driver_attach+0x53/0x60 [ 88.320433] __driver_attach+0x8a/0x150 [ 88.320437] ? device_driver_attach+0x60/0x60 [ 88.320440] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 88.320445] bus_add_driver+0x14d/0x1f0 [ 88.320450] driver_register+0x6c/0xc0 [ 88.320453] ? 0xffffffffc0d67000 [ 88.320457] __hid_register_driver+0x4c/0x80 [ 88.320464] do_one_initcall+0x46/0x1f4 [ 88.320469] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [ 88.320474] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x162/0x220 [ 88.320481] ? do_init_module+0x23/0x230 [ 88.320486] do_init_module+0x5c/0x230 [ 88.320491] load_module+0x26e1/0x2990 [ 88.320502] ? ima_post_read_file+0xf0/0x100 [ 88.320508] ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0x110 [ 88.320512] __do_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0x110 [ 88.320520] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [ 88.320525] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 88.320528] RIP: 0033:0x7f8d8d1f01fd [ 88.320532] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 5b 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 88.320535] RSP: 002b:00007ffefa3bb068 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 88.320539] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055922040cb40 RCX: 00007f8d8d1f01fd [ 88.320541] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f8d8ce4984d RDI: 0000000000000006 [ 88.320543] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000007 [ 88.320545] R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d8ce4984d [ 88.320547] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055922040efc0 R15: 000055922040cb40 [ 88.320551] Modules linked in: hid_logitech_hidpp(+) fuse rfcomm ccm xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE bridge stp llc nf_nat_tftp nf_conntrack_tftp nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast xt_CT ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ip6table_nat ip6table_mangle ip6table_raw ip6table_security iptable_nat nf_nat tun iptable_mangle iptable_raw iptable_security nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables cmac bnep sunrpc dm_crypt nls_utf8 hfsplus intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common ath9k_htc ath9k_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp b43 ath9k_hw coretemp snd_hda_codec_hdmi cordic kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_cirrus mac80211 snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio kvm snd_hda_intel snd_intel_nhlt irqbypass snd_hda_codec btusb btrtl snd_hda_core ath btbcm ssb snd_hwdep btintel snd_seq crct10dif_pclmul iTCO_wdt snd_seq_device crc32_pclmul bluetooth mmc_core iTCO_vendor_support joydev cfg80211 [ 88.320602] applesmc ghash_clmulni_intel ecdh_generic snd_pcm input_polldev intel_cstate ecc intel_uncore thunderbolt snd_timer i2c_i801 libarc4 rfkill intel_rapl_perf lpc_ich mei_me pcspkr bcm5974 snd bcma mei soundcore acpi_als sbs kfifo_buf sbshc industrialio apple_bl i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm uas crc32c_intel usb_storage video hid_apple [ 88.320630] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 88.320633] ---[ end trace 933491c8a4fadeb7 ]--- [ 88.320642] RIP: 0010:hidpp_probe+0x61f/0x948 [hid_logitech_hidpp] [ 88.320645] Code: 81 00 00 48 89 ef e8 f0 d6 ff ff 41 89 c6 85 c0 75 b5 0f b6 44 24 28 48 8b 5d 00 88 44 24 1e 89 44 24 0c 48 8b 83 18 1c 00 00 <48> 8b 48 18 48 8b 83 10 19 00 00 48 8b 40 40 48 89 0c 24 0f b7 80 [ 88.320647] RSP: 0018:ffffb0a6824aba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 88.320650] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93a50756e000 RCX: 0000000000010408 [ 88.320652] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff93a51f0ad0a0 RDI: 000000000002d0a0 [ 88.320655] RBP: ffff93a50416da28 R08: ffff93a50416da70 R09: ffff93a50416da70 [ 88.320657] R10: 000000148ae9e60c R11: 00000000000f1525 R12: ffff93a50756e000 [ 88.320659] R13: ffff93a50756f8d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff93a50756fc38 [ 88.320662] FS: 00007f8d8c1e0940(0000) GS:ffff93a51f080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 88.320664] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 88.320667] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000003996d8003 CR4: 00000000001606e0 To solve this issue: 1. Split g920_get_config() such that all of the device specific communication remains a part of the function and input subsystem initialization bits go to hidpp_ff_init() 2. Move call to hidpp_ff_init() from being a part of g920_get_config() to be the last step of .probe(), right after a call to hid_hw_start() with connect_mask containing HID_CONNECT_HIDINPUT. Fixes: 91cf9a9 ("HID: logitech-hidpp: make .probe usbhid capable") Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sam Bazley <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Cc: Henrik Rydberg <[email protected]> Cc: Pierre-Loup A. Griffais <[email protected]> Cc: Austin Palmer <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] # 5.2+ Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>

syzkaller managed to trigger the following crash: [...] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90001923030 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD aa551067 P4D aa551067 PUD aa552067 PMD a572b067 PTE 80000000a1173163 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 7982 Comm: syz-executor912 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_binary_hdr include/linux/filter.h:787 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:531 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:600 [inline] RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline] RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find kernel/bpf/core.c:674 [inline] RIP: 0010:is_bpf_text_address+0x184/0x3b0 kernel/bpf/core.c:709 [...] Call Trace: kernel_text_address kernel/extable.c:147 [inline] __kernel_text_address+0x9a/0x110 kernel/extable.c:102 unwind_get_return_address+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c:19 arch_stack_walk+0x98/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:26 stack_trace_save+0xb6/0x150 kernel/stacktrace.c:123 save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:69 [inline] set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x11c/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:510 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:518 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3319 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f5/0x2e0 mm/slab.c:3483 getname_flags+0xba/0x640 fs/namei.c:138 getname+0x19/0x20 fs/namei.c:209 do_sys_open+0x261/0x560 fs/open.c:1091 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1115 [inline] __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1110 [inline] __x64_sys_open+0x87/0x90 fs/open.c:1110 do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [...] After further debugging it turns out that we walk kallsyms while in parallel we tear down a BPF program which contains subprograms that have been JITed though the program itself has not been fully exposed and is eventually bailing out with error. The bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_subprogs() in bpf_prog_load()'s error path removes the symbols, however, bpf_prog_free() tears down the JIT memory too early via scheduled work. Instead, it needs to properly respect RCU grace period as the kallsyms walk for BPF is under RCU. Fix it by refactoring __bpf_prog_put()'s tear down and reuse it in our error path where we defer final destruction when we have subprogs in the program. Fixes: 7d1982b ("bpf: fix panic in prog load calls cleanup") Fixes: 1c2a088 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Tested-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/55f6367324c2d7e9583fa9ccf5385dcbba0d7a6e.1571752452.git.daniel@iogearbox.net

All bonding device has same lockdep key and subclass is initialized with nest_level. But actual nest_level value can be changed when a lower device is attached. And at this moment, the subclass should be updated but it seems to be unsafe. So this patch makes bonding use dynamic lockdep key instead of the subclass. Test commands: ip link add bond0 type bond for i in {1..5} do let A=$i-1 ip link add bond$i type bond ip link set bond$i master bond$A done ip link set bond5 master bond0 Splat looks like: [ 307.992912] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 307.993656] 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96 Tainted: G W [ 307.994367] -------------------------------------------- [ 307.995092] ip/761 is trying to acquire lock: [ 307.995710] ffff8880513aac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.997045] but task is already holding lock: [ 307.997923] ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 307.999215] other info that might help us debug this: [ 308.000251] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 308.001137] CPU0 [ 308.001533] ---- [ 308.001915] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.002609] lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2); [ 308.003302] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 308.004310] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 308.005319] 3 locks held by ip/761: [ 308.005830] #0: ffffffff9fcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0 [ 308.006894] #1: ffff88805fcbac60 (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock#2/2){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.008243] #2: ffffffff9f9219c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.009422] stack backtrace: [ 308.010124] CPU: 0 PID: 761 Comm: ip Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96 [ 308.011097] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 308.012179] Call Trace: [ 308.012601] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 308.013089] __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0 [ 308.013669] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 308.014318] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 308.014858] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.015520] _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x2e/0x60 [ 308.016129] ? bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.017215] bond_get_stats+0xb8/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.018454] ? bond_arp_rcv+0xf10/0xf10 [bonding] [ 308.019710] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x90/0xa0 [ 308.020605] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xc0/0xc0 [ 308.021286] ? bond_get_stats+0x9f/0x500 [bonding] [ 308.021953] dev_get_stats+0x1ec/0x270 [ 308.022508] bond_get_stats+0x1d1/0x500 [bonding] Fixes: d3fff6c ("net: add netdev_lockdep_set_classes() helper") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

team interface could be nested and it's lock variable could be nested too. But this lock uses static lockdep key and there is no nested locking handling code such as mutex_lock_nested() and so on. so the Lockdep would warn about the circular locking scenario that couldn't happen. In order to fix, this patch makes the team module to use dynamic lock key instead of static key. Test commands: ip link add team0 type team ip link add team1 type team ip link set team0 master team1 ip link set team0 nomaster ip link set team1 master team0 ip link set team1 nomaster Splat that looks like: [ 40.364352] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 40.364964] 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96 Not tainted [ 40.365405] -------------------------------------------- [ 40.365973] ip/750 is trying to acquire lock: [ 40.366542] ffff888060b34c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.367689] but task is already holding lock: [ 40.368729] ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team] [ 40.370280] other info that might help us debug this: [ 40.371159] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 40.371942] CPU0 [ 40.372338] ---- [ 40.372673] lock(&team->lock); [ 40.373115] lock(&team->lock); [ 40.373549] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 40.374432] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 40.375338] 2 locks held by ip/750: [ 40.375851] #0: ffffffffabcc42b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x466/0x8a0 [ 40.376927] #1: ffff888051201c40 (&team->lock){+.+.}, at: team_del_slave+0x29/0x60 [team] [ 40.377989] stack backtrace: [ 40.378650] CPU: 0 PID: 750 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ thesofproject#96 [ 40.379368] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 40.380574] Call Trace: [ 40.381208] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 40.381959] __lock_acquire+0x269d/0x3de0 [ 40.382817] ? register_lock_class+0x14d0/0x14d0 [ 40.383784] ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0 [ 40.384518] lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 40.385074] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.385805] __mutex_lock+0x14d/0x14c0 [ 40.386371] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.387038] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.387632] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380 [ 40.388245] ? team_del_slave+0x60/0x60 [team] [ 40.388752] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x90/0xc0 [ 40.389304] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0 [ 40.389819] ? lock_acquire+0x164/0x3b0 [ 40.390285] ? lockdep_rtnl_is_held+0x16/0x20 [ 40.390797] ? team_port_get_rtnl+0x90/0xe0 [team] [ 40.391353] ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140 [ 40.391886] ? team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.392547] team_set_mac_address+0x151/0x290 [team] [ 40.393111] dev_set_mac_address+0x1f0/0x3f0 [ ... ] Fixes: 3d249d4 ("net: introduce ethernet teaming device") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

syzbot found a NULL deref [1] in modify_prefix_route(), caused by one fib6_info without a fib6_table pointer set. This can happen for net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: syz-executor888 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-09567-g7eef7e306d3c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xe4/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5089 Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 15 14 00 00 44 8b 0d ca 98 f5 0e 45 85 c9 0f 84 b4 0e 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 96 2c 00 00 49 8b 04 24 48 3d a0 07 7f 93 0f 84 RSP: 0018:ffffc900035d7268 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 1ffff920006bae5f RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff90608e17 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: ffff888036334880 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000555579e90380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffc59cc4278 CR3: 0000000072b54000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] modify_prefix_route+0x30b/0x8b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4831 inet6_addr_modify net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4923 [inline] inet6_rtm_newaddr+0x12c7/0x1ab0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5055 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c7/0xea0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6920 netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2541 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:726 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2583 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2637 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fd1dcef8b79 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc59cc4378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd1dcef8b79 RDX: 0000000000040040 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000000113fd R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000006 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc59cc438c R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Fixes: 5eb902b ("net/ipv6: Remove expired routes with a separated list of routes.") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> CC: Kui-Feng Lee <[email protected]> Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

The udelay(5) is not enough, sometimes below kernel panic still be triggered: [ 4.012973] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt [ 4.012976] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 186 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-0.0.0-devel-00004-g8b1b79e88956 #1 [ 4.012982] Hardware name: Toradex Verdin iMX8M Plus WB on Dahlia Board (DT) [ 4.012985] Call trace: [...] [ 4.013029] arm64_serror_panic+0x64/0x70 [ 4.013034] do_serror+0x3c/0x70 [ 4.013039] el1h_64_error_handler+0x30/0x54 [ 4.013046] el1h_64_error+0x64/0x68 [ 4.013050] clk_imx8mp_audiomix_runtime_resume+0x38/0x48 [ 4.013059] __genpd_runtime_resume+0x30/0x80 [ 4.013066] genpd_runtime_resume+0x114/0x29c [ 4.013073] __rpm_callback+0x48/0x1e0 [ 4.013079] rpm_callback+0x68/0x80 [ 4.013084] rpm_resume+0x3bc/0x6a0 [ 4.013089] __pm_runtime_resume+0x50/0x9c [ 4.013095] pm_runtime_get_suppliers+0x60/0x8c [ 4.013101] __driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x14c [ 4.013108] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x120 [ 4.013114] __driver_attach+0xc4/0x200 [ 4.013119] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [ 4.013125] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [ 4.013130] bus_add_driver+0x110/0x240 [ 4.013135] driver_register+0x68/0x124 [ 4.013142] __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [ 4.013149] sdma_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [imx_sdma] [ 4.013163] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1e0 [ 4.013168] do_init_module+0x5c/0x21c [ 4.013175] load_module+0x1a98/0x205c [ 4.013181] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xd4 [ 4.013187] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x258/0x350 [ 4.013194] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x50/0xe0 [ 4.013202] do_el0_svc+0xa8/0xe0 [ 4.013208] el0_svc+0x3c/0x140 [ 4.013215] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 4.013222] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 4.013228] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs The correct way is to wait handshake, but it needs BUS clock of BLK-CTL be enabled, which is in separate driver. So delay is the only option here. The udelay(10) is a data got by experiment. Fixes: e8dc41a ("pmdomain: imx: gpcv2: Add delay after power up handshake") Reported-by: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241007132555.GA53279@francesco-nb/ Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>

Blamed commit forgot to change hsr_init_skb() to allocate larger skb for RedBox case. Indeed, send_hsr_supervision_frame() will add two additional components (struct hsr_sup_tlv and struct hsr_sup_payload) syzbot reported the following crash: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8afd4b0a len:34 put:6 head:ffff88802ad29e00 data:ffff88802ad29f22 tail:0x144 end:0x140 dev:gretap0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 7611 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 Code: b6 04 01 84 c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 21 8b 4b 70 41 56 45 89 e8 48 c7 c7 a0 7d 9b 8c 41 57 56 48 89 ee 52 4c 89 e2 e8 9a 76 79 f8 90 <0f> 0b 4c 89 4c 24 10 48 89 54 24 08 48 89 34 24 e8 94 76 fb f8 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90000858ab8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: ffff8880598c08c0 RCX: ffffffff816d3e69 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff816de786 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffffffff8c9b91c0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000302 R11: ffffffff961cc1d0 R12: ffffffff8afd4b0a R13: 0000000000000006 R14: ffff88804b938130 R15: 0000000000000140 FS: 000055558a3d6500(0000) GS:ffff88806a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1295974ff8 CR3: 000000002ab6e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:211 [inline] skb_put+0x174/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:2617 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x6fa/0x9e0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:342 hsr_proxy_announce+0x1a3/0x4a0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:436 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x610 kernel/time/timer.c:1794 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1845 [inline] __run_timers+0x6e8/0x930 kernel/time/timer.c:2419 __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2430 [inline] __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2423 [inline] run_timer_base+0x111/0x190 kernel/time/timer.c:2439 run_timer_softirq+0x1a/0x40 kernel/time/timer.c:2449 handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 </IRQ> Fixes: 5055ccc ("net: hsr: Provide RedBox support (HSR-SAN)") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Lukasz Majewski <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

When arm64 is configured with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, a warning is printed from the patching code because patch_map(), e.g. | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/arm64/kernel/patching.c:45 patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00002-ge1a5d6c6be55 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 800003c5 (Nzcv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | lr : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | sp : ffffa9bb312a79a0 | x29: ffffa9bb312a79a0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000001 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000402e8 | x23: ffffa9bb2c94c1c8 x22: ffffa9bb2c94c000 x21: ffffa9bb222e883c | x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffffc1ffc100ba40 x18: ffffa9bb2cf0f21c | x17: 0000000000000006 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000004 | x14: 1ffff5376625b4ac x13: ffff753766a67fb8 x12: ffff753766919cd1 | x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 1ffff5376625b4c3 x9 : 1ffff5376625b4af | x8 : ffff753766254f0a x7 : 0000000041b58ab3 x6 : ffff753766254f18 | x5 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffa9bb29bd90e4 | x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (P) | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (L) | __aarch64_insn_write+0xa8/0x120 | aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x4c/0xb8 | arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x7c/0x100 | jump_label_update+0x154/0x460 | static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0x1d8/0x280 | static_key_enable+0x2c/0x48 | early_randomize_kstack_offset+0x104/0x168 | do_early_param+0xe4/0x148 | parse_args+0x3a4/0x838 | parse_early_options+0x50/0x68 | parse_early_param+0x58/0xe0 | setup_arch+0x78/0x1f0 | start_kernel+0xa0/0x530 | __primary_switched+0x8c/0xa0 | irq event stamp: 0 | hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The warning has been produced since commit: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") ... which added a pfn_valid() check into page_to_phys(), and at this point in boot pfn_valid() will always return false because the vmemmap has not yet been initialized and there are no valid mem_sections yet. Before that commit, the arithmetic performed by page_to_phys() would give the expected physical address, though it is somewhat dubious to use vmemmap addresses before the vmemmap has been initialized. Aside from kernel image addresses, all executable code should be allocated from execmem (where all allocations will fall within the vmalloc area), and so there's no need for the fallback case when CONFIG_EXECMEM=n. Simplify patch_map() accordingly, directly converting kernel image addresses and removing the redundant fallback case. Fixes: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one. The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host() that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in machine__new_host(). Before the patch: (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1 <SNIP> Summary of events: gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% <SNIP> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL) (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 #1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673 #2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708 thesofproject#3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747 thesofproject#4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456 thesofproject#5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487 thesofproject#6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351 thesofproject#7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404 thesofproject#8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448 thesofproject#9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560 (gdb) After: root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1 <SNIP> pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68% ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82% read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15% write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39% timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47% gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40% recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12% write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29% read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53% getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82% root@number:~# Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()") Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1 Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Similar to commit 65c4c94 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Fix a missing bits to bytes conversion in ucsi_init()"), there was a missing conversion from bits to bytes. Here the outcome is worse though: since the value is lower than UCSI_MAX_DATA_LENGTH, instead of bailing out with an error, it writes past the buffer size. The error is then seen in other places like below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x891e812cd0ed968: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 110 PID: 906 Comm: prometheus-node Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-xe #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Lunar Lake Client Platform/LNL-M LP5 RVP1, BIOS LNLMFWI1.R00.3222.D84.2410171025 10/17/2024 RIP: 0010:power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 Code: 85 c0 7e 4f 4c 8b 07 89 f3 49 89 d4 49 8b 48 20 48 85 c9 74 72 49 8b 70 18 31 d2 31 c0 eb 0b 83 c2 01 48 63 c2 48 39 c8 73 5d <3b> 1c 86 75 f0 49 8b 40 28 4c 89 e2 89 de ff d0 0f 1f 00 5b 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffc900017dfa50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000011 RCX: c963b02c06092008 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0891e812cd0ed968 RDI: ffff888121dd6800 RBP: ffffc900017dfa68 R08: ffff88810a4024b8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc900017dfa78 R13: ffff888121dd6800 R14: ffff888138ad2c00 R15: ffff88810c57c528 FS: 00007713a2ffd6c0(0000) GS:ffff88846f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c0004b1000 CR3: 0000000121ce8003 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80 ? die_addr+0x37/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x440 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 power_supply_hwmon_read+0x50/0xe0 hwmon_attr_show+0x46/0x170 dev_attr_show+0x1a/0x70 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xaa/0x120 kernfs_seq_show+0x41/0x60 Just use the buffer size as argument to fix it. Fixes: 226ff2e ("usb: typec: ucsi: Convert connector specific commands to bitmaps") Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]> Reported-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ1PR11MB6129CCD82CD78D8EE6E27EF4B9362@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Suggested-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

System crash is observed with stack trace warning of use after free. There are 2 signals to tell dpc_thread to terminate (UNLOADING flag and kthread_stop). On setting the UNLOADING flag when dpc_thread happens to run at the time and sees the flag, this causes dpc_thread to exit and clean up itself. When kthread_stop is called for final cleanup, this causes use after free. Remove UNLOADING signal to terminate dpc_thread. Use the kthread_stop as the main signal to exit dpc_thread. [596663.812935] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:294! [596663.812950] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [596663.812957] CPU: 13 PID: 1475935 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- - - 4.18.0-240.el8.x86_64 #1 [596663.812960] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380p Gen8, BIOS P70 08/20/2012 [596663.812974] RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x17d/0x360 ... [596663.813008] Call Trace: [596663.813022] ? __dentry_kill+0x121/0x170 [596663.813030] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813034] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813039] ? wait_for_completion+0x35/0x190 [596663.813048] ? try_to_wake_up+0x63/0x540 [596663.813055] free_task+0x5a/0x60 [596663.813061] kthread_stop+0xf3/0x100 [596663.813103] qla2x00_remove_one+0x284/0x440 [qla2xxx] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 thesofproject#3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a thesofproject#4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 thesofproject#5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce thesofproject#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced thesofproject#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b thesofproject#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 thesofproject#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>

syzbot found [1] that after blamed commit, ub->ubsock->sk was NULL when attempting the atomic_dec() : atomic_dec(&tipc_net(sock_net(ub->ubsock->sk))->wq_count); Fix this by caching the tipc_net pointer. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5896 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-next-20241203-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:387 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:cleanup_bearer+0x1f7/0x280 net/tipc/udp_media.c:820 Code: 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 3c f7 99 f6 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 30 e8 f0 e4 60 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 1a f7 99 f6 49 83 c7 e8 48 8b 1b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000410fb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000030 RCX: ffff88802fe45a00 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc9000410f900 RBP: ffff88807e1f0908 R08: ffffc9000410f907 R09: 1ffff92000821f20 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000821f21 R12: ffff888031d19980 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88807e1f0918 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ca050b000 CR3: 0000000031c0c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 6a2fa13 ("tipc: Fix use-after-free of kernel socket in cleanup_bearer().") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…A in a MM We currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn't true. So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-reference NULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL. This fixes the report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline] RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044 RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1 R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8 FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [[email protected]: add unlikely()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3974388 ("[PATCH] Swap Migration V5: sys_migrate_pages interface") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/ Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

…imary CPU Commit 5944ce0 ("arch_topology: Build cacheinfo from primary CPU") adds functionality that architectures can use to optionally allocate and build cacheinfo early during boot. Commit 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") lets secondary CPUs correct (and reallocate memory) cacheinfo data if needed. If the early build functionality is not used and cacheinfo does not need correction, memory for cacheinfo is never allocated. x86 does not use the early build functionality. Consequently, during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback, last_level_cache_is_valid() attempts to dereference a NULL pointer: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEPMT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID 19 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2 #1 RIP: 0010: last_level_cache_is_valid+0x95/0xe0a Allocate memory for cacheinfo during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback if not done earlier. Moreover, before determining the validity of the last-level cache info, ensure that it has been allocated. Simply checking for non-zero cache_leaves() is not sufficient, as some architectures (e.g., Intel processors) have non-zero cache_leaves() before allocation. Dereferencing NULL cacheinfo can occur in update_per_cpu_data_slice_size(). This function iterates over all online CPUs. However, a CPU may have come online recently, but its cacheinfo may not have been allocated yet. While here, remove an unnecessary indentation in allocate_cache_info(). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Radu Rendec <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andreas Herrmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # 6.3+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Multiple syzbot warnings have been reported. These warnings are mainly about the lock order between trie->lock and kmalloc()'s internal lock. See report [1] as an example: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-g4376e966ecb7 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.3.2069/15008 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801544e6d8 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: get_partial_node ... but task is already holding lock: ffff88802dcc89f8 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: trie_update_elem ... which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60 trie_delete_elem+0xb0/0x820 ___bpf_prog_run+0x3e51/0xabd0 __bpf_prog_run32+0xc1/0x100 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func ...... bpf_trace_run2+0x231/0x590 __bpf_trace_contention_end+0xca/0x110 trace_contention_end.constprop.0+0xea/0x170 __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x28e/0xcc0 pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath queued_spin_lock_slowpath queued_spin_lock do_raw_spin_lock+0x210/0x2c0 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x42/0x60 __put_partials+0xc3/0x170 qlink_free qlist_free_all+0x4e/0x140 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x192/0x1e0 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90 kasan_slab_alloc slab_post_alloc_hook slab_alloc_node kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x153/0x310 __alloc_skb+0x2b1/0x380 ...... -> #0 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: check_prev_add check_prevs_add validate_chain __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 lock_acquire lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60 get_partial_node.part.0+0x20/0x350 get_partial_node get_partial ___slab_alloc+0x65b/0x1870 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0 __slab_alloc_node slab_alloc_node __do_kmalloc_node __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x35c/0x440 kmalloc_node_noprof bpf_map_kmalloc_node+0x98/0x4a0 lpm_trie_node_alloc trie_update_elem+0x1ef/0xe00 bpf_map_update_value+0x2c1/0x6c0 map_update_elem+0x623/0x910 __sys_bpf+0x90c/0x49a0 ... other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&trie->lock); lock(&n->list_lock); lock(&trie->lock); lock(&n->list_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** [1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9045c0a3d5a7f1b119f7 A bpf program attached to trace_contention_end() triggers after acquiring &n->list_lock. The program invokes trie_delete_elem(), which then acquires trie->lock. However, it is possible that another process is invoking trie_update_elem(). trie_update_elem() will acquire trie->lock first, then invoke kmalloc_node(). kmalloc_node() may invoke get_partial_node() and try to acquire &n->list_lock (not necessarily the same lock object). Therefore, lockdep warns about the circular locking dependency. Invoking kmalloc() before acquiring trie->lock could fix the warning. However, since BPF programs call be invoked from any context (e.g., through kprobe/tracepoint/fentry), there may still be lock ordering problems for internal locks in kmalloc() or trie->lock itself. To eliminate these potential lock ordering problems with kmalloc()'s internal locks, replacing kmalloc()/kfree()/kfree_rcu() with equivalent BPF memory allocator APIs that can be invoked in any context. The lock ordering problems with trie->lock (e.g., reentrance) will be handled separately. Three aspects of this change require explanation: 1. Intermediate and leaf nodes are allocated from the same allocator. Since the value size of LPM trie is usually small, using a single alocator reduces the memory overhead of the BPF memory allocator. 2. Leaf nodes are allocated before disabling IRQs. This handles cases where leaf_size is large (e.g., > 4KB - 8) and updates require intermediate node allocation. If leaf nodes were allocated in IRQ-disabled region, the free objects in BPF memory allocator would not be refilled timely and the intermediate node allocation may fail. 3. Paired migrate_{disable|enable}() calls for node alloc and free. The BPF memory allocator uses per-CPU struct internally, these paired calls are necessary to guarantee correctness. Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

Add more test cases for LPM trie in test_maps: 1) test_lpm_trie_update_flags It constructs various use cases for BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST and check whether the return value of update operation is expected. 2) test_lpm_trie_update_full_maps It tests the update operations on a full LPM trie map. Adding new node will fail and overwriting the value of existed node will succeed. 3) test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs and test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints There two test cases test whether the iteration through get_next_key is sorted and expected. These two test cases delete the minimal key after each iteration and check whether next iteration returns the second minimal key. The only difference between these two test cases is the former one saves strings in the LPM trie and the latter saves integers. Without the fix of get_next_key, these two cases will fail as shown below: test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs(1091):FAIL:iterate #2 got abc exp abS test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints(1142):FAIL:iterate #1 got 0x2 exp 0x1 Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

Hou Tao says: ==================== This patch set fixes several issues for LPM trie. These issues were found during adding new test cases or were reported by syzbot. The patch set is structured as follows: Patch #1~#2 are clean-ups for lpm_trie_update_elem(). Patch thesofproject#3 handles BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST correctly for LPM trie. Patch thesofproject#4 fixes the accounting of n_entries when doing in-place update. Patch thesofproject#5 fixes the exact match condition in trie_get_next_key() and it may skip keys when the passed key is not found in the map. Patch thesofproject#6~thesofproject#7 switch from kmalloc() to bpf memory allocator for LPM trie to fix several lock order warnings reported by syzbot. It also enables raw_spinlock_t for LPM trie again. After these changes, the LPM trie will be closer to being usable in any context (though the reentrance check of trie->lock is still missing, but it is on my todo list). Patch thesofproject#8: move test_lpm_map to map_tests to make it run regularly. Patch thesofproject#9: add test cases for the issues fixed by patch thesofproject#3~thesofproject#5. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v3: * patch #2: remove the unnecessary NULL-init for im_node * patch thesofproject#6: alloc the leaf node before disabling IRQ to low the possibility of -ENOMEM when leaf_size is large; Free these nodes outside the trie lock (Suggested by Alexei) * collect review and ack tags (Thanks for Toke & Daniel) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ * collect review tags (Thanks for Toke) * drop "Add bpf_mem_cache_is_mergeable() helper" patch * patch thesofproject#3~thesofproject#4: add fix tag * patch thesofproject#4: rename the helper to trie_check_add_elem() and increase n_entries in it. * patch thesofproject#6: use one bpf mem allocator and update commit message to clarify that using bpf mem allocator is more appropriate. * patch thesofproject#7: update commit message to add the possible max running time for update operation. * patch thesofproject#9: update commit message to specify the purpose of these test cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

If the FW log context memory is retained after FW reset, the existing code is not handling the condition correctly and zeroes out the data structures. This potentially will cause a division by zero crash when the user runs ethtool -w. The last_type is also not set correctly when the context memory is retained. This will cause errors because the last_type signals to the FW that all context memory types have been configured. Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 53 UID: 0 PID: 7019 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc7+ #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-621C-TN12R/X13DDW-A, BIOS 1.4 08/10/2023 RIP: 0010:__bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] Code: 0a 31 d2 4c 89 6c 24 10 45 8b a5 fc df ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 20 31 db 66 89 44 24 06 48 63 c5 c1 e5 09 4c 0f af e0 48 8b 44 24 30 <49> f7 f4 4c 89 64 24 08 48 63 c5 4d 89 ec 31 ed 48 89 44 24 18 49 RSP: 0018:ff480591603d78b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000100000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff23959e46740000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000100000 R09: ff23959e46740000 R10: ff480591603d7a18 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ff23959e46742008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04227c1740(0000) GS:ff2395adbf680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f04225b33a5 CR3: 000000108b9a4001 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? exc_divide_error+0x36/0x50 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0xda/0x160 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_ctx_coredump.constprop.0+0x1ed/0x390 [bnxt_en] ? __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook+0x21c/0x3c0 ? __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] ? security_file_alloc+0x74/0xe0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x78/0x120 bnxt_get_coredump_length+0x4b/0xf0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_dump_flag+0x40/0x60 [bnxt_en] __dev_ethtool+0x17e4/0x1fc0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x150 ? unmap_page_range+0x299/0x4b0 ? vma_interval_tree_remove+0x215/0x2c0 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x10a/0x300 dev_ethtool+0xa8/0x170 dev_ioctl+0x1b5/0x580 ? sk_ioctl+0x4a/0x110 sock_do_ioctl+0xab/0xf0 sock_ioctl+0x1ca/0x2e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150 Fixes: 24d694a ("bnxt_en: Allocate backing store memory for FW trace logs") Signed-off-by: Hongguang Gao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

It is unclear if net/lapb code is supposed to be ready for 8021q. We can at least avoid crashes like the following : skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8aabe1f6 len:24 put:20 head:ffff88802824a400 data:ffff88802824a3fe tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:nr0.2 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5508 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00144-g66418447d27b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216 Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 2e 9e 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 1a 6f 37 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002ddf638 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 7a24750e538ff600 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888034a86650 R08: ffffffff8174b13c R09: 1ffff920005bbe60 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520005bbe61 R12: 0000000000000140 R13: ffff88802824a400 R14: ffff88802824a3fe R15: 0000000000000016 FS: 00007f2a5990d740(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c2631fd CR3: 0000000029504000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636 nr_header+0x36/0x320 net/netrom/nr_dev.c:69 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] vlan_dev_hard_header+0x359/0x480 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1f6/0x2a0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257 lapb_data_transmit+0x91/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447 lapb_transmit_buffer+0x168/0x1f0 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149 lapb_establish_data_link+0x84/0xd0 lapb_device_event+0x4e0/0x670 notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400 dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:8922 devinet_ioctl+0xa4e/0x1aa0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1188 inet_ioctl+0x3d7/0x4f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1227 sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1346 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Move setting irq_chip.name from probe() function to the initialization of "irq_chip" struct in order to fix vGPIO driver crash during bootup. Crash was caused by unauthorized modification of irq_chip.name field where irq_chip struct was initialized as const. This behavior is a consequence of suboptimal implementation of gpio_irq_chip_set_chip(), which should be changed to avoid casting away const qualifier. Crash log: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0ba81c0 /#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode /#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 1075 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kaseyville RP/Kaseyville RP, BIOS KVLDCRB1.PGS.0026.D73.2410081258 10/08/2024 RIP: 0010:gnr_gpio_probe+0x171/0x220 [gpio_graniterapids] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash cases for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. netdev_tx_reset_queue() can actually be dropped from virtnet_open path; the device is not stopped in any case. For BQL core part, it's just like traffic nearly ceases to exist for some period. For stall detector added to BQL, even if virtnet_close could somehow lead to some TX completions delayed for long, followed by virtnet_open, we can just take it as stall as mentioned in commit 6025b91 ("net: dqs: add NIC stall detector based on BQL"). Note also that users can still reset stall_max via sysfs. So, drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from virtnet_enable_queue_pair(). This eliminates the BQL crashes. As a result, netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. This patch adds it to immediately after free_unused_bufs(), following the rule of thumb: netdev_tx_reset_queue() should follow any SKB freeing not followed by netdev_tx_completed_queue(). This seems the most consistent and streamlined approach, and now netdev_tx_reset_queue() runs whenever free_unused_bufs() is done. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x70 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits") Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.11+ Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]> [ pabeni: trimmed possibly troublesome separator ] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

…nts' Koichiro Den says: ==================== virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation points When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash scenarios for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. This patch series resolves the issue and also addresses similar existing problems: (a). Drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from open/close path. This eliminates the BQL crashes due to the problematic open/close path. (b). As a result of (a), netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. Add netdev_tx_reset_queue() immediately after free_unused_bufs() invocation. (c). Fix missing resetting in virtnet_tx_resize(). virtnet_tx_resize() has lacked proper resetting since commit c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits"). (d). Fix missing resetting in the XDP_SETUP_XSK_POOL path. Similar to (c), this path lacked proper resetting. Call netdev_tx_reset_queue() when virtqueue_reset() has actually recycled unused buffers. This patch series consists of six commits: [1/6]: Resolves (a) and (b). # also -stable 6.11.y [2/6]: Minor fix to make [4/6] streamlined. [3/6]: Prerequisite for (c). # also -stable 6.11.y [4/6]: Resolves (c) (incl. Prerequisite for (d)) # also -stable 6.11.y [5/6]: Preresuisite for (d). [6/6]: Resolves (d). Changes for v4: - move netdev_tx_reset_queue() out of free_unused_bufs() - submit to net, not net-next Changes for v3: - replace 'flushed' argument with 'recycle_done' Changes for v2: - add tx queue resetting for (b) to (d) above v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x7�[I0 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

flush_tlb_kernel_range() may use IPIs to flush the TLBs of all the cores, which triggers the following warning when the irqs are disabled: [ 3.455330] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/smp.c:815 smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.456647] Modules linked in: [ 3.457218] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00010-g91d3de7240b8 #1 [ 3.457416] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS [ 3.457633] epc : smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.457736] ra : on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.457786] epc : ffffffff800b669a ra : ffffffff800b67c2 sp : ff2000000000bb50 [ 3.457824] gp : ffffffff815212b8 tp : ff6000008014f080 t0 : 000000000000003f [ 3.457859] t1 : ffffffff815221e0 t2 : 000000000000000f s0 : ff2000000000bc10 [ 3.457920] s1 : 0000000000000040 a0 : ffffffff815221e0 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.457953] a2 : 0000000000010000 a3 : 0000000000000003 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458006] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffffffffffff a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458042] s2 : ffffffff815223be s3 : 00fffffffffff000 s4 : ff600001ffe38fc0 [ 3.458076] s5 : ff600001ff950d00 s6 : 0000000200000120 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.458109] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff60000080841ef0 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 3.458141] s11: ffffffff81524812 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : ff60000080092bc0 [ 3.458172] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ff200000000236d0 [ 3.458203] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff800b669a cause: 0000000000000003 [ 3.458373] [<ffffffff800b669a>] smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.458593] [<ffffffff800b67c2>] on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.458625] [<ffffffff8000e4ca>] __flush_tlb_range+0x118/0x1ca [ 3.458656] [<ffffffff8000e6b2>] flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x1e/0x26 [ 3.458683] [<ffffffff801ea56a>] kfence_protect+0xc0/0xce [ 3.458717] [<ffffffff801e9456>] kfence_guarded_free+0xc6/0x1c0 [ 3.458742] [<ffffffff801e9d6c>] __kfence_free+0x62/0xc6 [ 3.458764] [<ffffffff801c57d8>] kfree+0x106/0x32c [ 3.458786] [<ffffffff80588cf2>] detach_buf_split+0x188/0x1a8 [ 3.458816] [<ffffffff8058708c>] virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0xb6/0x1f6 [ 3.458839] [<ffffffff805871da>] virtqueue_get_buf+0xe/0x16 [ 3.458880] [<ffffffff80613d6a>] virtblk_done+0x5c/0xe2 [ 3.458908] [<ffffffff8058766e>] vring_interrupt+0x6a/0x74 [ 3.458930] [<ffffffff800747d8>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0xe2 [ 3.458956] [<ffffffff800748f0>] handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x86 [ 3.458978] [<ffffffff800786cc>] handle_simple_irq+0x9e/0xbe [ 3.459004] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459027] [<ffffffff804bf87c>] imsic_handle_irq+0xba/0x120 [ 3.459056] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459080] [<ffffffff804bdb76>] riscv_intc_aia_irq+0x24/0x34 [ 3.459103] [<ffffffff809d0452>] handle_riscv_irq+0x2e/0x4c [ 3.459133] [<ffffffff809d923e>] call_on_irq_stack+0x32/0x40 So only flush the local TLB and let the lazy kfence page fault handling deal with the faults which could happen when a core has an old protected pte version cached in its TLB. That leads to potential inaccuracies which can be tolerated when using kfence. Fixes: 47513f2 ("riscv: Enable KFENCE for riscv64") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

The vmemmap's, which is used for RV64 with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, page tables are populated using pmd (page middle directory) hugetables. However, the pmd allocation is not using the generic mechanism used by the VMA code (e.g. pmd_alloc()), or the RISC-V specific create_pgd_mapping()/alloc_pmd_late(). Instead, the vmemmap page table code allocates a page, and calls vmemmap_set_pmd(). This results in that the pmd ctor is *not* called, nor would it make sense to do so. Now, when tearing down a vmemmap page table pmd, the cleanup code would unconditionally, and incorrectly call the pmd dtor, which results in a crash (best case). This issue was found when running the HMM selftests: | tools/testing/selftests/mm# ./test_hmm.sh smoke | ... # when unloading the test_hmm.ko module | page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10915b | flags: 0x1000000000000000(node=0|zone=1) | raw: 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 | raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 | page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(ptdesc->pmd_huge_pte) | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:3080! | Kernel BUG [#1] | Modules linked in: test_hmm(-) sch_fq_codel fuse drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight dm_mod | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 514 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-00982-gf2a4f1682d07 #2 | Tainted: [W]=WARN | Hardware name: riscv-virtio qemu/qemu, BIOS 2024.10 10/01/2024 | epc : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | ra : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | epc : ffffffff80010a68 ra : ffffffff80010a68 sp : ff20000000a73940 | gp : ffffffff827b2d88 tp : ff6000008785da40 t0 : ffffffff80fbce04 | t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 706d756420656761 s0 : ff20000000a73a50 | s1 : ff6000008915cff8 a0 : 0000000000000039 a1 : 0000000000000008 | a2 : ff600003fff0de20 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 | a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : c0000000ffffefff a7 : ffffffff824469b8 | s2 : ff1c0000022456c0 s3 : ff1ffffffdbfffff s4 : ff6000008915c000 | s5 : ff6000008915c000 s6 : ff6000008915c000 s7 : ff1ffffffdc00000 | s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff1ffffffdc00000 s10: ffffffff819a31f0 | s11: ffffffffffffffff t3 : ffffffff8000c950 t4 : ff60000080244f00 | t5 : ff60000080244000 t6 : ff20000000a73708 | status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffff80010a68 cause: 0000000000000003 | [<ffffffff80010a68>] remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | [<ffffffff80fd238e>] vmemmap_free+0x14/0x1e | [<ffffffff8032e698>] section_deactivate+0x220/0x452 | [<ffffffff8032ef7e>] sparse_remove_section+0x4a/0x58 | [<ffffffff802f8700>] __remove_pages+0x7e/0xba | [<ffffffff803760d8>] memunmap_pages+0x2bc/0x3fe | [<ffffffff02a3ca28>] dmirror_device_remove_chunks+0x2ea/0x518 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff02a3e026>] hmm_dmirror_exit+0x3e/0x1018 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff80102c14>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x15a/0x2a6 | [<ffffffff80fd020c>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x1f2/0x266 | [<ffffffff80fde0a2>] _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xc6/0xd2 | Code: bf51 7597 0184 8593 76a5 854a 4097 0029 80e7 2c00 (9002) 7597 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Add a check to avoid calling the pmd dtor, if the calling context is vmemmap_free(). Fixes: c75a74f ("riscv: mm: Add memory hotplugging support") Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs like the bellow: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2 preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070: #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914 thesofproject#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline] thesofproject#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline] thesofproject#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915 CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline] hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline] hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 </TASK> Reported-by: [email protected] Tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614 Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock. [ 75.307983] ====================================================== [ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ thesofproject#22 Not tainted [ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock: [ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO) at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308021] but task is already holding lock: [ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock) at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308053] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 75.308054] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 75.308055] -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50 [ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60 [ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90 [ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 75.308098] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0 [ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 [ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90 [ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth] [ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth] [ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth] [ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740 [ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0 [ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120 [ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 75.308263] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1 [ 75.308265] ---- ---- [ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock- AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308270] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623: [ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740 [ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)), at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740 [ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308304] thesofproject#3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth] Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released before calling a function that locks hdev. [ 561.670344] ====================================================== [ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ thesofproject#26 Not tainted [ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock: [ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670405] but task is already holding lock: [ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670450] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 561.670452] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 561.670453] -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth] [ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth] [ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610 [ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170 [ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0 [ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0 [ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670567] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth] [ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130 [ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190 [ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670632] -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0 [ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360 [ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0 [ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240 [ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470 [ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30 [ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250 [ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 [ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0 [ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670744] other info that might help us debug this: [ 561.670745] Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH [ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1 [ 561.670754] ---- ---- [ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 561.670767] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be accessed once it is called. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82 CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150 print_report+0x131/0x780 kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0 btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01] btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 82: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360 skb_clone+0x132/0xf70 btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Freed by task 1733: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0 hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append succeeds. Fixes: 0b70151 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add MediaTek devcoredump support") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS, leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically, CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition. This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590 ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250 intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40 intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160 __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1] Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix it. Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>

The qi_batch is allocated when assigning cache tag for a domain. While for nested parent domain, it is missed. Hence, when trying to map pages to the nested parent, NULL dereference occurred. Also, there is potential memleak since there is no lock around domain->qi_batch allocation. To solve it, add a helper for qi_batch allocation, and call it in both the __cache_tag_assign_domain() and __cache_tag_assign_parent_domain(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000200 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 8104795067 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 223 UID: 0 PID: 4357 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00028-g4b50c3c3b998-dirty thesofproject#2632 Call Trace: ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x150 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x63/0x7b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x220 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range_np+0x13c/0x260 intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x1a/0x30 iommu_map+0x61/0xf0 batch_to_domain+0x188/0x250 iopt_area_fill_domains+0x125/0x320 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 iopt_map_pages+0x63/0x100 iopt_map_common.isra.0+0xa7/0x190 iopt_map_user_pages+0x6a/0x80 iommufd_ioas_map+0xcd/0x1d0 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x118/0x1c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 705c1cd ("iommu/vt-d: Introduce batched cache invalidation") Cc: [email protected] Co-developed-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>

…s_lock For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c thesofproject#20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> thesofproject#5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> thesofproject#4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> thesofproject#3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)thesofproject#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.13, take #1 - Replace csr_write() with csr_set() for HVIEN PMU overflow bit

Initialize meter_urb array before use in mixer_us16x08.c. CID 1410197: (#1 of 1): Uninitialized scalar variable (UNINIT) uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value *meter_urb when calling get_meter_levels_from_urb. Coverity Link: https://scan7.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/52849/11354?selectedIssue=1410197 Fixes: d2bb390 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Tascam US-16x08 DSP mixer quirk") Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

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2afba4e

Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]>

ranj063 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 14, 2025

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-6.13-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux

3522c41

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.13, take #1 - Replace csr_write() with csr_set() for HVIEN PMU overflow bit

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ranj063 commented Oct 20, 2019