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bpftool: Allow to select sections and filter probes #1

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merged 4 commits into from
Feb 12, 2020

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@vadorovsky vadorovsky commented Feb 10, 2020

This pull request introduces two changes in bpftool feature syntax:

  • ability to select a specific section of probes to execute and print
  • ability to filter in and filter out probes with regular expressions to execute and print

The only exception in terms of executing is the syscall_config probe, which is always executed, but if the other section was provided as an argument, syscall_config check will perform silently without printing and exit bpftool if the bpf() syscall is not available (because in that case running any probe has no sense).

Syntax of the bpftool feature after this change is:

bpftool feature probe [COMPONENT] section [SECTION] [filter_in PATTERN] [filter_out PATTERN] [macros [prefix PREFIX]]
COMPONENT := { kernel | dev NAME }
SECTION := { all | system_config | syscall_config | program_types | map_types | helpers | misc }

Please review per commit.

Fixes cilium/cilium#10048

@vadorovsky vadorovsky force-pushed the bpftool-feature-subcommands branch from cc69568 to 2c35d52 Compare February 10, 2020 13:57
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The only problem with this PR and the reason why it's WIP - glibc regex library works weird for me. Filtering out those two patterns separately (bpftool feature kernel filter_out trace and bpftool feature kernel filter_out perf) works perfect. Trying to filter them out all together (I tried bpftool feature kernel filter_out "trace|perf", bpftool feature kernel filter_out "(trace|perf)", bpftool feature kernel filter_out ".*(trace|perf).*) doesn't work at all and none of patterns get filtered out.

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Looks good overall. There are some minor improvements to bring here and there, see the comments.

I had not thought of the prog types probes being required for probing the helpers. It is unfortunate because it complicates things for the helpers, and makes the code less readable by passing print_program_types everywhere. Your approach is good I think, although we can have some weird stuff like bpftool feature probe filter_out prog which says that no helper is supported whatsoever. Maybe we should still probe for the prog types internally even if they are filtered out?

Two additional generic comments, not sure if worth addressing, mostly recommendations for the future:

  • I would keep the most important arguments at the beginning of the function definitions when adding new ones (e.g. probe_prog_type(type, print_program_types) instead of probe_prog_type(print_program_types, type).
  • I would try to use verbs in function names (thinking of section_program_types and similar).

Regarding the regex library, I managed to get multiple matches with e.g.:

bpftool feature probe filter_in "\(trace\|perf\)"

Also don't forget bash completion along with the man page :)

@vadorovsky vadorovsky force-pushed the bpftool-feature-subcommands branch from 2c35d52 to 709112a Compare February 10, 2020 22:46
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Maybe we should still probe for the prog types internally even if they are filtered out?

I will try that. If it will not generate any unwanted dmesg entries, then that's a good idea.

@vadorovsky vadorovsky force-pushed the bpftool-feature-subcommands branch from 709112a to ea52912 Compare February 11, 2020 19:39
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Its not possible to call the kernel_(s|g)etsockopt functions here,
the address points to user memory:

General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5352 at arch/x86/mm/extable.c:77 ex_handler_uaccess+0xba/0xe0 arch/x86/mm/extable.c:77
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
[..]
Call Trace:
 fixup_exception+0x9d/0xcd arch/x86/mm/extable.c:178
 general_protection+0x2d/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1202
 do_ip_getsockopt+0x1f6/0x1860 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1323
 ip_getsockopt+0x87/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1561
 tcp_getsockopt net/ipv4/tcp.c:3691 [inline]
 tcp_getsockopt+0x8c/0xd0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3685
 kernel_getsockopt+0x121/0x1f0 net/socket.c:3736
 mptcp_getsockopt+0x69/0x90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:830
 __sys_getsockopt+0x13a/0x220 net/socket.c:2175

We can call tcp_get/setsockopt functions instead.  Doing so fixes
crashing, but still leaves rtnl related lockdep splat:

     WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
     5.5.0-rc6 #2 Not tainted
     ------------------------------------------------------
     syz-executor.0/16334 is trying to acquire lock:
     ffffffff84f7a080 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x277/0x3820 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:644
     but task is already holding lock:
     ffff888116503b90 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1516 [inline]
     ffff888116503b90 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}, at: mptcp_setsockopt+0x28/0x90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1284

     which lock already depends on the new lock.
     the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

     -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}:
            lock_sock_nested+0xca/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2944
            lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1516 [inline]
            do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x281/0x3820 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:645
            ip_setsockopt+0x44/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1248
            udp_setsockopt+0x5d/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2639
            __sys_setsockopt+0x152/0x240 net/socket.c:2130
            __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2146 [inline]
            __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2143 [inline]
            __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2143
            do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x5b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
            entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

     -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}:
            check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2475 [inline]
            check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2580 [inline]
            validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2970 [inline]
            __lock_acquire+0x1fb2/0x4680 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3954
            lock_acquire+0x127/0x330 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4484
            __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
            __mutex_lock+0x158/0x1340 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
            do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x277/0x3820 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:644
            ip_setsockopt+0x44/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1248
            tcp_setsockopt net/ipv4/tcp.c:3159 [inline]
            tcp_setsockopt+0x8c/0xd0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3153
            kernel_setsockopt+0x121/0x1f0 net/socket.c:3767
            mptcp_setsockopt+0x69/0x90 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1288
            __sys_setsockopt+0x152/0x240 net/socket.c:2130
            __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2146 [inline]
            __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2143 [inline]
            __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2143
            do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x5b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
            entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

     other info that might help us debug this:

      Possible unsafe locking scenario:

            CPU0                    CPU1
            ----                    ----
       lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
                                    lock(rtnl_mutex);
                                    lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
       lock(rtnl_mutex);

The lockdep complaint is because we hold mptcp socket lock when calling
the sk_prot get/setsockopt handler, and those might need to acquire the
rtnl mutex.  Normally, order is:

rtnl_lock(sk) -> lock_sock

Whereas for mptcp the order is

lock_sock(mptcp_sk) rtnl_lock -> lock_sock(subflow_sk)

We can avoid this by releasing the mptcp socket lock early, but, as Paolo
points out, we need to get/put the subflow socket refcount before doing so
to avoid race with concurrent close().

Fixes: 717e79c ("mptcp: Add setsockopt()/getsockopt() socket operations")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
syzbot triggered following lockdep splat:

ffffffff82d2cd40 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: ip_mc_drop_socket+0x52/0x180
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881187a2310 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}, at: mptcp_close+0x18/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}:
       lock_acquire+0xee/0x230
       lock_sock_nested+0x89/0xc0
       do_ip_setsockopt.isra.0+0x335/0x22f0
       ip_setsockopt+0x35/0x60
       tcp_setsockopt+0x5d/0x90
       __sys_setsockopt+0xf3/0x190
       __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x61/0x70
       do_syscall_64+0x72/0x300
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
-> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}:
       check_prevs_add+0x2b7/0x1210
       __lock_acquire+0x10b6/0x1400
       lock_acquire+0xee/0x230
       __mutex_lock+0x120/0xc70
       ip_mc_drop_socket+0x52/0x180
       inet_release+0x36/0xe0
       __sock_release+0xfd/0x130
       __mptcp_close+0xa8/0x1f0
       inet_release+0x7f/0xe0
       __sock_release+0x69/0x130
       sock_close+0x18/0x20
       __fput+0x179/0x400
       task_work_run+0xd5/0x110
       do_exit+0x685/0x1510
       do_group_exit+0x7e/0x170
       __x64_sys_exit_group+0x28/0x30
       do_syscall_64+0x72/0x300
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The trigger is:
  socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0x106 /* IPPROTO_MPTCP */) = 4
  setsockopt(4, SOL_IP, MCAST_JOIN_GROUP, {gr_interface=7, gr_group={sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(20003), sin_addr=inet_addr("224.0.0.2")}}, 136) = 0
  exit(0)

Which results in a call to rtnl_lock while we are holding
the parent mptcp socket lock via
mptcp_close -> lock_sock(msk) -> inet_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock().

>From lockdep point of view we thus have both
'rtnl_lock; lock_sock' and 'lock_sock; rtnl_lock'.

Fix this by stealing the msk conn_list and doing the subflow close
without holding the msk lock.

Fixes: cec37a6 ("mptcp: Handle MP_CAPABLE options for outgoing connections")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
…nodes

There is a race between adding and removing elements to the tree mod log
list and rbtree that can lead to use-after-free problems.

Consider the following example that explains how/why the problems happens:

1) Task A has mod log element with sequence number 200. It currently is
   the only element in the mod log list;

2) Task A calls btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() because it no longer needs to
   access the tree mod log. When it enters the function, it initializes
   'min_seq' to (u64)-1. Then it acquires the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock'
   before checking if there are other elements in the mod seq list.
   Since the list it empty, 'min_seq' remains set to (u64)-1. Then it
   unlocks the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock';

3) Before task A acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', task B adds
   itself to the mod seq list through btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq() and gets a
   sequence number of 201;

4) Some other task, name it task C, modifies a btree and because there
   elements in the mod seq list, it adds a tree mod elem to the tree
   mod log rbtree. That node added to the mod log rbtree is assigned
   a sequence number of 202;

5) Task B, which is doing fiemap and resolving indirect back references,
   calls btrfs get_old_root(), with 'time_seq' == 201, which in turn
   calls tree_mod_log_search() - the search returns the mod log node
   from the rbtree with sequence number 202, created by task C;

6) Task A now acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', starts iterating
   the mod log rbtree and finds the node with sequence number 202. Since
   202 is less than the previously computed 'min_seq', (u64)-1, it
   removes the node and frees it;

7) Task B still has a pointer to the node with sequence number 202, and
   it dereferences the pointer itself and through the call to
   __tree_mod_log_rewind(), resulting in a use-after-free problem.

This issue can be triggered sporadically with the test case generic/561
from fstests, and it happens more frequently with a higher number of
duperemove processes. When it happens to me, it either freezes the VM or
it produces a trace like the following before crashing:

  [ 1245.321140] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  [ 1245.321200] CPU: 1 PID: 26997 Comm: pool Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-52 #1
  [ 1245.321235] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 1245.321287] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x16/0x50
  [ 1245.321307] Code: ....
  [ 1245.321372] RSP: 0018:ffffa151c4d039b0 EFLAGS: 00010202
  [ 1245.321388] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8ae221363c80 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  [ 1245.321409] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ae221363c80
  [ 1245.321439] RBP: ffff8ae20fcc4688 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321475] R10: ffff8ae20b120910 R11: 00000000243f8bb1 R12: 0000000000000038
  [ 1245.321506] R13: ffff8ae221363c80 R14: 000000000000075f R15: ffff8ae223f762b8
  [ 1245.321539] FS:  00007fdee1ec7700(0000) GS:ffff8ae236c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321591] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 1245.321614] CR2: 00007fded4030c48 CR3: 000000021da16003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  [ 1245.321642] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321668] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [ 1245.321706] Call Trace:
  [ 1245.321798]  __tree_mod_log_rewind+0xbf/0x280 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321841]  btrfs_search_old_slot+0x105/0xd00 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321877]  resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc60 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321912]  find_parent_nodes+0x3dc/0x11b0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321947]  btrfs_check_shared+0x115/0x1c0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321980]  ? extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.322029]  extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.322066]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x750
  [ 1245.322081]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
  [ 1245.322092]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [ 1245.322113]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  [ 1245.322126]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280
  [ 1245.322139]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [ 1245.322155] RIP: 0033:0x7fdee3942dd7
  [ 1245.322177] Code: ....
  [ 1245.322258] RSP: 002b:00007fdee1ec6c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [ 1245.322294] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fded40210d8 RCX: 00007fdee3942dd7
  [ 1245.322314] RDX: 00007fded40210d8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000004
  [ 1245.322337] RBP: 0000562aa89e7510 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fdee1ec6d44
  [ 1245.322369] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdee1ec6d48
  [ 1245.322390] R13: 00007fdee1ec6d40 R14: 00007fded40210d0 R15: 00007fdee1ec6d50
  [ 1245.322423] Modules linked in: ....
  [ 1245.323443] ---[ end trace 01de1e9ec5dff3cd ]---

Fix this by ensuring that btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() computes the minimum
sequence number and iterates the rbtree while holding the lock
'tree_mod_log_lock' in write mode. Also get rid of the 'tree_mod_seq_lock'
lock, since it is now redundant.

Fixes: bd989ba ("Btrfs: add tree modification log functions")
Fixes: 097b8a7 ("Btrfs: join tree mod log code with the code holding back delayed refs")
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever.  If
we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer
who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on
a page in our bio to be written out.  The task traces are as follows

  PID: 1329874  TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800  CPU: 33  COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5"
   #0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
   #1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
   #2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
   #3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b
   #4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502
   #5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684
   #6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff
   #7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0
   #8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2
   #9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd

  PID: 2167901  TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00  CPU: 14  COMMAND:
  "aio-dio-invalid"
   #0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
   #1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
   #2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
   #3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6
   #4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7
   #5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359
   #6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933
   #7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8
   #8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d
   #9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032

I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on

page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901
page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874

As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index
7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index
8148.  aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the
following

  crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0
  struct extent_page_data {
    bio = 0xffff889f747ed830,
    tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448,
    extent_locked = 0,
    sync_io = 0
  }

Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the
page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()).

Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page
0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on

  bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830)
  for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()):
      bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i]
      if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500:
	  print("FOUND IT")

which validated what I suspected.

The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to
the beginning of the file during writeout.

Fixes: b293f02 ("Btrfs: Add writepages support")
CC: [email protected] # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Raviu reported that running his regular fs_trim segfaulted with the
following backtrace:

[  237.525947] assertion failed: prev, in ../fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1595
[  237.525984] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  237.525985] kernel BUG at ../fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3117!
[  237.525992] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  237.525998] CPU: 4 PID: 4423 Comm: fstrim Tainted: G     U     OE     5.4.14-8-vanilla #1
[  237.526001] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
[  237.526044] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.58+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
[  237.526079] Call Trace:
[  237.526120]  find_first_clear_extent_bit+0x13d/0x150 [btrfs]
[  237.526148]  btrfs_trim_fs+0x211/0x3f0 [btrfs]
[  237.526184]  btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0x103/0x170 [btrfs]
[  237.526219]  btrfs_ioctl+0x129a/0x2ed0 [btrfs]
[  237.526227]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x190/0x3d0
[  237.526232]  ? do_filp_open+0xaf/0x110
[  237.526238]  ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[  237.526242]  ? cp_new_stat+0x150/0x180
[  237.526247]  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x640
[  237.526278]  ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs]
[  237.526283]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x640
[  237.526288]  ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x3c/0x60
[  237.526292]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[  237.526297]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[  237.526303]  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x1c0
[  237.526310]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

That was due to btrfs_fs_device::aloc_tree being empty. Initially I
thought this wasn't possible and as a percaution have put the assert in
find_first_clear_extent_bit. Turns out this is indeed possible and could
happen when a file system with SINGLE data/metadata profile has a 2nd
device added. Until balance is run or a new chunk is allocated on this
device it will be completely empty.

In this case find_first_clear_extent_bit should return the full range
[0, -1ULL] and let the caller handle this i.e for trim the end will be
capped at the size of actual device.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/izW2WNyvy1dEDweBICizKnd2KDwDiDyY2EYQr4YCwk7pkuIpthx-JRn65MPBde00ND6V0_Lh8mW0kZwzDiLDv25pUYWxkskWNJnVP0kgdMA=@protonmail.com/
Fixes: 45bfcfc ("btrfs: Implement find_first_clear_extent_bit")
CC: [email protected] # 5.2+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
The daxctl unit test for the dax_kmem driver currently triggers the
(false positive) lockdep splat below.  It results from the fact that
remove_memory_block_devices() is invoked under the mem_hotplug_lock()
causing lockdep entanglements with cpu_hotplug_lock() and sysfs (kernfs
active state tracking).  It is a false positive because the sysfs
attribute path triggering the memory remove is not the same attribute
path associated with memory-block device.

sysfs_break_active_protection() is not applicable since there is no real
deadlock conflict, instead move memory-block device removal outside the
lock.  The mem_hotplug_lock() is not needed to synchronize the
memory-block device removal vs the page online state, that is already
handled by lock_device_hotplug().  Specifically, lock_device_hotplug()
is sufficient to allow try_remove_memory() to check the offline state of
the memblocks and be assured that any in progress online attempts are
flushed / blocked by kernfs_drain() / attribute removal.

The add_memory() path safely creates memblock devices under the
mem_hotplug_lock().  There is no kernfs active state synchronization in
the memblock device_register() path, so nothing to fix there.

This change is only possible thanks to the recent change that refactored
memory block device removal out of arch_remove_memory() (commit
4c4b7f9 "mm/memory_hotplug: remove memory block devices before
arch_remove_memory()"), and David's due diligence tracking down the
guarantees afforded by kernfs_drain().  Not flagged for -stable since
this only impacts ongoing development and lockdep validation, not a
runtime issue.

    ======================================================
    WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
    5.5.0-rc3+ torvalds#230 Tainted: G           OE
    ------------------------------------------------------
    lt-daxctl/6459 is trying to acquire lock:
    ffff99c7f0003510 (kn->count#241){++++}, at: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x41/0x80

    but task is already holding lock:
    ffffffffa76a5450 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: percpu_down_write+0x20/0xe0

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -> #2 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
           __lock_acquire+0x39c/0x790
           lock_acquire+0xa2/0x1b0
           get_online_mems+0x3e/0xb0
           kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x2e/0x260
           kmem_cache_create+0x12/0x20
           ptlock_cache_init+0x20/0x28
           start_kernel+0x243/0x547
           secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0

    -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
           __lock_acquire+0x39c/0x790
           lock_acquire+0xa2/0x1b0
           cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xb0
           online_pages+0x37/0x300
           memory_subsys_online+0x17d/0x1c0
           device_online+0x60/0x80
           state_store+0x65/0xd0
           kernfs_fop_write+0xcf/0x1c0
           vfs_write+0xdb/0x1d0
           ksys_write+0x65/0xe0
           do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

    -> #0 (kn->count#241){++++}:
           check_prev_add+0x98/0xa40
           validate_chain+0x576/0x860
           __lock_acquire+0x39c/0x790
           lock_acquire+0xa2/0x1b0
           __kernfs_remove+0x25f/0x2e0
           kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x41/0x80
           remove_files.isra.0+0x30/0x70
           sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0x80
           sysfs_remove_groups+0x29/0x40
           device_remove_attrs+0x39/0x70
           device_del+0x16a/0x3f0
           device_unregister+0x16/0x60
           remove_memory_block_devices+0x82/0xb0
           try_remove_memory+0xb5/0x130
           remove_memory+0x26/0x40
           dev_dax_kmem_remove+0x44/0x6a [kmem]
           device_release_driver_internal+0xe4/0x1c0
           unbind_store+0xef/0x120
           kernfs_fop_write+0xcf/0x1c0
           vfs_write+0xdb/0x1d0
           ksys_write+0x65/0xe0
           do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xa0
           entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

    other info that might help us debug this:

    Chain exists of:
      kn->count#241 --> cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem --> mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem

     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0                    CPU1
           ----                    ----
      lock(mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
                                   lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
                                   lock(mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
      lock(kn->count#241);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

No fixes tag as this has been a long standing issue that predated the
addition of kernfs lockdep annotations.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/157991441887.2763922.4770790047389427325.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
…ync_trans()

I found a NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans(),
handle->h_transaction may be NULL in this situation:

ocfs2_file_write_iter
  ->__generic_file_write_iter
      ->generic_perform_write
        ->ocfs2_write_begin
          ->ocfs2_write_begin_nolock
            ->ocfs2_write_cluster_by_desc
              ->ocfs2_write_cluster
                ->ocfs2_mark_extent_written
                  ->ocfs2_change_extent_flag
                    ->ocfs2_split_extent
                      ->ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent
                        ->ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction
                          ->ocfs2_extend_trans
                            ->jbd2_journal_restart
                              ->jbd2__journal_restart
                                // handle->h_transaction is NULL here
                                ->handle->h_transaction = NULL;
                                ->start_this_handle
                                  /* journal aborted due to storage
                                     network disconnection, return error */
                                  ->return -EROFS;
                         /* line 3806 in ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent (),
                            it will ignore ret error. */
                        ->ret = 0;
        ->...
        ->ocfs2_write_end
          ->ocfs2_write_end_nolock
            ->ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans
              // NULL pointer dereference
              ->oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;

The information of NULL pointer dereference as follows:
    JBD2: Detected IO errors while flushing file data on dm-11-45
    Aborting journal on device dm-11-45.
    JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-11-45.
    (dd,22081,3):ocfs2_extend_trans:474 ERROR: status = -30
    (dd,22081,3):ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent:3877 ERROR: status = -30
    Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
    virtual address 0000000000000008
    Mem abort info:
      ESR = 0x96000004
      Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
      SET = 0, FnV = 0
      EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
    Data abort info:
      ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
      CM = 0, WnR = 0
    user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000e74e1338
    [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000
    Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
    Process dd (pid: 22081, stack limit = 0x00000000584f35a9)
    CPU: 3 PID: 22081 Comm: dd Kdump: loaded
    Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDD, BIOS 0.98 08/25/2019
    pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
    pc : ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2b8/0x550 [ocfs2]
    lr : ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2a0/0x550 [ocfs2]
    sp : ffff0000459fba70
    x29: ffff0000459fba70 x28: 0000000000000000
    x27: ffff807ccf7f1000 x26: 0000000000000001
    x25: ffff807bdff57970 x24: ffff807caf1d4000
    x23: ffff807cc79e9000 x22: 0000000000001000
    x21: 000000006c6cd000 x20: ffff0000091d9000
    x19: ffff807ccb239db0 x18: ffffffffffffffff
    x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000007
    x15: ffff807c5e15bd78 x14: 0000000000000000
    x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
    x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001
    x9 : 0000000000000228 x8 : 000000000000000c
    x7 : 0000000000000fff x6 : ffff807a308ed6b0
    x5 : ffff7e01f10967c0 x4 : 0000000000000018
    x3 : d0bc661572445600 x2 : 0000000000000000
    x1 : 000000001b2e0200 x0 : 0000000000000000
    Call trace:
     ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2b8/0x550 [ocfs2]
     ocfs2_write_end+0x4c/0x80 [ocfs2]
     generic_perform_write+0x108/0x1a8
     __generic_file_write_iter+0x158/0x1c8
     ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x668/0x950 [ocfs2]
     __vfs_write+0x11c/0x190
     vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0
     ksys_write+0x6c/0xd8
     __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
     el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
     el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
     el0_svc+0x8/0xc

To prevent NULL pointer dereference in this situation, we use
is_handle_aborted() before using handle->h_transaction->t_tid.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
It is not that hard to trigger lockdep splats by calling printk from
under zone->lock.  Most of them are false positives caused by lock
chains introduced early in the boot process and they do not cause any
real problems (although most of the early boot lock dependencies could
happen after boot as well).  There are some console drivers which do
allocate from the printk context as well and those should be fixed.  In
any case, false positives are not that trivial to workaround and it is
far from optimal to lose lockdep functionality for something that is a
non-issue.

So change has_unmovable_pages() so that it no longer calls dump_page()
itself - instead it returns a "struct page *" of the unmovable page back
to the caller so that in the case of a has_unmovable_pages() failure,
the caller can call dump_page() after releasing zone->lock.  Also, make
dump_page() is able to report a CMA page as well, so the reason string
from has_unmovable_pages() can be removed.

Even though has_unmovable_pages doesn't hold any reference to the
returned page this should be reasonably safe for the purpose of
reporting the page (dump_page) because it cannot be hotremoved in the
context of memory unplug.  The state of the page might change but that
is the case even with the existing code as zone->lock only plays role
for free pages.

While at it, remove a similar but unnecessary debug-only printk() as
well.  A sample of one of those lockdep splats is,

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  ------------------------------------------------------
  test.sh/8653 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffffff865a4460 (console_owner){-.-.}, at:
  console_unlock+0x207/0x750

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88883fff3c58 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at:
  __offline_isolated_pages+0x179/0x3e0

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){-.-.}:
         __lock_acquire+0x5b3/0xb40
         lock_acquire+0x126/0x280
         _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
         rmqueue_bulk.constprop.21+0xb6/0x1160
         get_page_from_freelist+0x898/0x22c0
         __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2f3/0x1cd0
         alloc_pages_current+0x9c/0x110
         allocate_slab+0x4c6/0x19c0
         new_slab+0x46/0x70
         ___slab_alloc+0x58b/0x960
         __slab_alloc+0x43/0x70
         __kmalloc+0x3ad/0x4b0
         __tty_buffer_request_room+0x100/0x250
         tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag+0x67/0x110
         pty_write+0xa2/0xf0
         n_tty_write+0x36b/0x7b0
         tty_write+0x284/0x4c0
         __vfs_write+0x50/0xa0
         vfs_write+0x105/0x290
         redirected_tty_write+0x6a/0xc0
         do_iter_write+0x248/0x2a0
         vfs_writev+0x106/0x1e0
         do_writev+0xd4/0x180
         __x64_sys_writev+0x45/0x50
         do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x76c
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

  -> #2 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-.-.}:
         __lock_acquire+0x5b3/0xb40
         lock_acquire+0x126/0x280
         _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50
         tty_port_tty_get+0x20/0x60
         tty_port_default_wakeup+0xf/0x30
         tty_port_tty_wakeup+0x39/0x40
         uart_write_wakeup+0x2a/0x40
         serial8250_tx_chars+0x22e/0x440
         serial8250_handle_irq.part.8+0x14a/0x170
         serial8250_default_handle_irq+0x5c/0x90
         serial8250_interrupt+0xa6/0x130
         __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x78/0x4f0
         handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x100
         handle_irq_event+0x5a/0x8b
         handle_edge_irq+0x117/0x370
         do_IRQ+0x9e/0x1e0
         ret_from_intr+0x0/0x2a
         cpuidle_enter_state+0x156/0x8e0
         cpuidle_enter+0x41/0x70
         call_cpuidle+0x5e/0x90
         do_idle+0x333/0x370
         cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x1f
         start_secondary+0x290/0x330
         secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0

  -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}:
         __lock_acquire+0x5b3/0xb40
         lock_acquire+0x126/0x280
         _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50
         serial8250_console_write+0x3e4/0x450
         univ8250_console_write+0x4b/0x60
         console_unlock+0x501/0x750
         vprintk_emit+0x10d/0x340
         vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
         vprintk_func+0x44/0xd4
         printk+0x9f/0xc5

  -> #0 (console_owner){-.-.}:
         check_prev_add+0x107/0xea0
         validate_chain+0x8fc/0x1200
         __lock_acquire+0x5b3/0xb40
         lock_acquire+0x126/0x280
         console_unlock+0x269/0x750
         vprintk_emit+0x10d/0x340
         vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
         vprintk_func+0x44/0xd4
         printk+0x9f/0xc5
         __offline_isolated_pages.cold.52+0x2f/0x30a
         offline_isolated_pages_cb+0x17/0x30
         walk_system_ram_range+0xda/0x160
         __offline_pages+0x79c/0xa10
         offline_pages+0x11/0x20
         memory_subsys_offline+0x7e/0xc0
         device_offline+0xd5/0x110
         state_store+0xc6/0xe0
         dev_attr_store+0x3f/0x60
         sysfs_kf_write+0x89/0xb0
         kernfs_fop_write+0x188/0x240
         __vfs_write+0x50/0xa0
         vfs_write+0x105/0x290
         ksys_write+0xc6/0x160
         __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50
         do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x76c
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    console_owner --> &(&port->lock)->rlock --> &(&zone->lock)->rlock

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(&(&zone->lock)->rlock);
                                 lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock);
                                 lock(&(&zone->lock)->rlock);
    lock(console_owner);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  9 locks held by test.sh/8653:
   #0: ffff88839ba7d408 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}, at:
  vfs_write+0x25f/0x290
   #1: ffff888277618880 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at:
  kernfs_fop_write+0x128/0x240
   #2: ffff8898131fc218 (kn->count#115){.+.+}, at:
  kernfs_fop_write+0x138/0x240
   #3: ffffffff86962a80 (device_hotplug_lock){+.+.}, at:
  lock_device_hotplug_sysfs+0x16/0x50
   #4: ffff8884374f4990 (&dev->mutex){....}, at:
  device_offline+0x70/0x110
   #5: ffffffff86515250 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at:
  __offline_pages+0xbf/0xa10
   #6: ffffffff867405f0 (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at:
  percpu_down_write+0x87/0x2f0
   #7: ffff88883fff3c58 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at:
  __offline_isolated_pages+0x179/0x3e0
   #8: ffffffff865a4920 (console_lock){+.+.}, at:
  vprintk_emit+0x100/0x340

  stack backtrace:
  Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL560 Gen10/ProLiant DL560 Gen10,
  BIOS U34 05/21/2019
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x86/0xca
   print_circular_bug.cold.31+0x243/0x26e
   check_noncircular+0x29e/0x2e0
   check_prev_add+0x107/0xea0
   validate_chain+0x8fc/0x1200
   __lock_acquire+0x5b3/0xb40
   lock_acquire+0x126/0x280
   console_unlock+0x269/0x750
   vprintk_emit+0x10d/0x340
   vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
   vprintk_func+0x44/0xd4
   printk+0x9f/0xc5
   __offline_isolated_pages.cold.52+0x2f/0x30a
   offline_isolated_pages_cb+0x17/0x30
   walk_system_ram_range+0xda/0x160
   __offline_pages+0x79c/0xa10
   offline_pages+0x11/0x20
   memory_subsys_offline+0x7e/0xc0
   device_offline+0xd5/0x110
   state_store+0xc6/0xe0
   dev_attr_store+0x3f/0x60
   sysfs_kf_write+0x89/0xb0
   kernfs_fop_write+0x188/0x240
   __vfs_write+0x50/0xa0
   vfs_write+0x105/0x290
   ksys_write+0xc6/0x160
   __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50
   do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x76c
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Commit 83ff931 ("bcache: not use hard coded memset size in
bch_cache_accounting_clear()") tries to make the code more easy to
understand by removing the hard coded number with following change,
	void bch_cache_accounting_clear(...)
	{
		memset(&acc->total.cache_hits,
			0,
	-		sizeof(unsigned long) * 7);
	+		sizeof(struct cache_stats));
	}

Unfortunately the change was wrong (it also tells us the original code
was not easy to correctly understand). The hard coded number 7 is used
because in struct cache_stats,
 15 struct cache_stats {
 16         struct kobject          kobj;
 17
 18         unsigned long cache_hits;
 19         unsigned long cache_misses;
 20         unsigned long cache_bypass_hits;
 21         unsigned long cache_bypass_misses;
 22         unsigned long cache_readaheads;
 23         unsigned long cache_miss_collisions;
 24         unsigned long sectors_bypassed;
 25
 26         unsigned int            rescale;
 27 };
only members in LINE 18-24 want to be set to 0. It is wrong to use
'sizeof(struct cache_stats)' to replace 'sizeof(unsigned long) * 7), the
memory objects behind acc->total is staled by this change.

Сорокин Артем Сергеевич reports that by the following steps, kernel
panic will be triggered,
1. Create new set: make-bcache -B /dev/nvme1n1 -C /dev/sda --wipe-bcache
2. Run in /sys/fs/bcache/<uuid>:
   echo 1 > clear_stats && cat stats_five_minute/cache_bypass_hits

I can reproduce the panic and get following dmesg with KASAN enabled,
[22613.172742] ==================================================================
[22613.172862] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.172864] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task cat/6753

[22613.172870] CPU: 1 PID: 6753 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.5.0-rc7-lp151.28.16-default+ #11
[22613.172872] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019
[22613.172873] Call Trace:
[22613.172964]  dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb
[22613.172968]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.172970]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173031]  __kasan_report+0x176/0x192
[22613.173064]  ? pr_cont_kernfs_name+0x40/0x60
[22613.173067]  ? sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173070]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[22613.173072]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.173105]  seq_read+0x199/0x6d0
[22613.173110]  vfs_read+0xa5/0x1a0
[22613.173113]  ksys_read+0x110/0x160
[22613.173115]  ? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0
[22613.173177]  do_syscall_64+0x77/0x290
[22613.173238]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[22613.173241] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2c886ac61
[22613.173244] Code: fe ff ff 48 8d 3d c7 a0 09 00 48 83 ec 08 e8 46 03 02 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 ca fb 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89
[22613.173245] RSP: 002b:00007ffebe776d68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[22613.173248] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2c886ac61
[22613.173249] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2c8cca000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[22613.173250] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[22613.173251] R10: 000000000000038c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2c8cca000
[22613.173253] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007fc2c8cca00f R15: 0000000000020000
[22613.173255] ==================================================================
[22613.173256] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[22613.173350] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[22613.178380] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[22613.180959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[22613.183444] PGD 0 P4D 0
[22613.184867] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[22613.186797] CPU: 1 PID: 6753 Comm: cat Tainted: G    B             5.5.0-rc7-lp151.28.16-default+ #11
[22613.191253] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/29/2019
[22613.196706] RIP: 0010:sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.199097] Code: ff 48 8b 0b 48 8b 44 24 08 48 01 e9 eb a6 31 f6 48 89 cf ba 00 10 00 00 48 89 4c 24 10 e8 b1 e6 e9 ff 4c 89 ff e8 19 07 ea ff <49> 8b 07 48 85 c0 48 89 44 24 08 0f 84 91 00 00 00 49 8b 6d 00 48
[22613.208016] RSP: 0018:ffff8881d4f8fd78 EFLAGS: 00010246
[22613.210448] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881eb99b180 RCX: ffffffff810d9ef6
[22613.213691] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[22613.216893] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: fffffbfff072ddcd R09: fffffbfff072ddcd
[22613.220075] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff072ddcc R12: ffff8881de5c0200
[22613.223256] R13: ffff8881ed175500 R14: ffff8881eb99b198 R15: 0000000000000000
[22613.226290] FS:  00007fc2c8d3d500(0000) GS:ffff8881f2a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[22613.229637] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[22613.231993] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001ec89a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[22613.234909] Call Trace:
[22613.235931]  seq_read+0x199/0x6d0
[22613.237259]  vfs_read+0xa5/0x1a0
[22613.239229]  ksys_read+0x110/0x160
[22613.240590]  ? kernel_write+0xb0/0xb0
[22613.242040]  do_syscall_64+0x77/0x290
[22613.243625]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[22613.245450] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2c886ac61
[22613.246706] Code: fe ff ff 48 8d 3d c7 a0 09 00 48 83 ec 08 e8 46 03 02 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 8b 05 ca fb 2c 00 48 63 ff 85 c0 75 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 89 d5 48 89
[22613.253296] RSP: 002b:00007ffebe776d68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[22613.255835] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2c886ac61
[22613.258472] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2c8cca000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[22613.260807] RBP: 0000000000020000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[22613.263188] R10: 000000000000038c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc2c8cca000
[22613.265598] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007fc2c8cca00f R15: 0000000000020000
[22613.268729] Modules linked in: scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock fuse bnep kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus bcache snd_pcm btusb btrtl btbcm btintel crc64 aesni_intel glue_helper crypto_simd vmw_balloon cryptd bluetooth snd_timer snd_rawmidi snd joydev pcspkr e1000 rfkill vmw_vmci soundcore ecdh_generic ecc gameport i2c_piix4 mptctl ac button hid_generic usbhid sr_mod cdrom ata_generic ehci_pci vmwgfx uhci_hcd drm_kms_helper syscopyarea serio_raw sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm ehci_hcd mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih ata_piix mptbase ahci usbcore libahci drm sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua
[22613.292429] CR2: 0000000000000000
[22613.293563] ---[ end trace a074b26a8508f378 ]---
[22613.295138] RIP: 0010:sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x117/0x230
[22613.296769] Code: ff 48 8b 0b 48 8b 44 24 08 48 01 e9 eb a6 31 f6 48 89 cf ba 00 10 00 00 48 89 4c 24 10 e8 b1 e6 e9 ff 4c 89 ff e8 19 07 ea ff <49> 8b 07 48 85 c0 48 89 44 24 08 0f 84 91 00 00 00 49 8b 6d 00 48
[22613.303553] RSP: 0018:ffff8881d4f8fd78 EFLAGS: 00010246
[22613.305280] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881eb99b180 RCX: ffffffff810d9ef6
[22613.307924] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[22613.310272] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: fffffbfff072ddcd R09: fffffbfff072ddcd
[22613.312685] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff072ddcc R12: ffff8881de5c0200
[22613.315076] R13: ffff8881ed175500 R14: ffff8881eb99b198 R15: 0000000000000000
[22613.318116] FS:  00007fc2c8d3d500(0000) GS:ffff8881f2a80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[22613.320743] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[22613.322628] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000001ec89a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0

Here this patch fixes the following problem by explicity set all the 7
members to 0 in bch_cache_accounting_clear().

Reported-by: Сорокин Артем Сергеевич <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
devlink reload destroys resources and allocates resources again.
So, when devices and ports resources are being used, devlink reload
function should not be executed. In order to avoid this race, a new
lock is added and new_port() and del_port() call devlink_reload_disable()
and devlink_reload_enable().

Thread0                      Thread1
{new/del}_port()             {new/del}_port()
devlink_reload_disable()
                             devlink_reload_disable()
devlink_reload_enable()
                             //here
                             devlink_reload_enable()

Before Thread1's devlink_reload_enable(), the devlink is already allowed
to execute reload because Thread0 allows it. devlink reload disable/enable
variable type is bool. So the above case would exist.
So, disable/enable should be executed atomically.
In order to do that, a new lock is used.

Test commands:
    modprobe netdevsim
    echo 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
    while :
    do
        echo 1 > /sys/devices/netdevsim1/new_port &
        echo 1 > /sys/devices/netdevsim1/del_port &
        devlink dev reload netdevsim/netdevsim1 &
    done

Splat looks like:
[   23.342145][  T932] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(mutex_is_locked(lock))
[   23.342159][  T932] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 932 at kernel/locking/mutex-debug.c:103 mutex_destroy+0xc7/0xf0
[   23.344182][  T932] Modules linked in: netdevsim openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_dx
[   23.346485][  T932] CPU: 0 PID: 932 Comm: devlink Not tainted 5.5.0+ torvalds#322
[   23.347696][  T932] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   23.348893][  T932] RIP: 0010:mutex_destroy+0xc7/0xf0
[   23.349505][  T932] Code: e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 2e 8b 05 00 ac b0 02 85 c0 75 8b 48 c7 c6 00 5e 07 96 40
[   23.351887][  T932] RSP: 0018:ffff88806208f810 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   23.353963][  T932] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff888067f6f2c0 RCX: ffffffff942c4bd4
[   23.355222][  T932] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff96dac5b4
[   23.356169][  T932] RBP: ffff888067f6f000 R08: fffffbfff2d235a5 R09: fffffbfff2d235a5
[   23.357160][  T932] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff2d235a4 R12: ffff888067f6f208
[   23.358288][  T932] R13: ffff88806208fa70 R14: ffff888067f6f000 R15: ffff888069ce3800
[   23.359307][  T932] FS:  00007fe2a3876740(0000) GS:ffff88806c000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.360473][  T932] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.361319][  T932] CR2: 00005561357aa000 CR3: 000000005227a006 CR4: 00000000000606f0
[   23.362323][  T932] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   23.363417][  T932] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   23.364414][  T932] Call Trace:
[   23.364828][  T932]  nsim_dev_reload_destroy+0x77/0xb0 [netdevsim]
[   23.365655][  T932]  nsim_dev_reload_down+0x84/0xb0 [netdevsim]
[   23.366433][  T932]  devlink_reload+0xb1/0x350
[   23.367010][  T932]  genl_rcv_msg+0x580/0xe90

[ ...]

[   23.531729][ T1305] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:53!
[   23.532523][ T1305] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[   23.533467][ T1305] CPU: 2 PID: 1305 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W         5.5.0+ torvalds#322
[   23.534962][ T1305] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   23.536503][ T1305] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0xe6/0x150
[   23.538346][ T1305] Code: 89 ea 48 c7 c7 00 73 1e 96 e8 df f7 4c ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c7 60 73 1e 96 e8 d1 f7 4c ff 0f 0b 44
[   23.541068][ T1305] RSP: 0018:ffff888047c27b58 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   23.542001][ T1305] RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff888067f6f318 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   23.543051][ T1305] RDX: 0000000000000054 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1008f84f61
[   23.544072][ T1305] RBP: ffff88804aa0fca0 R08: ffffed100d940539 R09: ffffed100d940539
[   23.545085][ T1305] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100d940538 R12: ffff888047c27cb0
[   23.546422][ T1305] R13: ffff88806208b840 R14: ffffffff981976c0 R15: ffff888067f6f2c0
[   23.547406][ T1305] FS:  00007f76c0431740(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.548527][ T1305] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.549389][ T1305] CR2: 00007f5048f1a2f8 CR3: 000000004b310006 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[   23.550636][ T1305] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   23.551578][ T1305] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   23.552597][ T1305] Call Trace:
[   23.553004][ T1305]  mutex_remove_waiter+0x101/0x520
[   23.553646][ T1305]  __mutex_lock+0xac7/0x14b0
[   23.554218][ T1305]  ? nsim_dev_port_del+0x4e/0x140 [netdevsim]
[   23.554908][ T1305]  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380
[   23.555570][ T1305]  ? _parse_integer+0xf0/0xf0
[   23.556043][ T1305]  ? kstrtouint+0x86/0x110
[   23.556504][ T1305]  ? nsim_dev_port_del+0x4e/0x140 [netdevsim]
[   23.557133][ T1305]  nsim_dev_port_del+0x4e/0x140 [netdevsim]
[   23.558024][ T1305]  del_port_store+0xcc/0xf0 [netdevsim]
[ ... ]

Fixes: 75ba029 ("netdevsim: implement proper devlink reload")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write() uses nsim_dev and nsim_dev->dummy_region.
So, during this function, these data shouldn't be removed.
But there is no protecting stuff in this function.

There are two similar cases.
1. reload case
reload could be called during nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write().
When reload is being executed, nsim_dev_reload_down() is called and it
calls nsim_dev_reload_destroy(). nsim_dev_reload_destroy() calls
devlink_region_destroy() to destroy nsim_dev->dummy_region.
So, during nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write(), nsim_dev->dummy_region()
would be removed.
At this point, snapshot_write() would access freed pointer.
In order to fix this case, take_snapshot file will be removed before
devlink_region_destroy().
The take_snapshot file will be re-created by ->reload_up().

2. del_device_store case
del_device_store() also could call nsim_dev_reload_destroy()
during nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write(). If so, panic would occur.
This problem is actually the same problem with the first case.
So, this problem will be fixed by the first case's solution.

Test commands:
    modprobe netdevsim
    while :
    do
        echo 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device &
        echo 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device &
	devlink dev reload netdevsim/netdevsim1 &
	echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim1/take_snapshot &
    done

Splat looks like:
[   45.564513][  T975] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000003a: 0000 [#1] SMP DEI
[   45.566131][  T975] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001d0-0x00000000000001d7]
[   45.566135][  T975] CPU: 1 PID: 975 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.5.0+ torvalds#322
[   45.569020][  T975] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[   45.569026][  T975] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x10a/0x14b0
[   45.570518][  T975] Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 7f 12 00 00 44 8b 0d 10 23 65 02 45 85 c9 75 29 49 8d 7f 68 48 b8 00 00 00 0f
[   45.570522][  T975] RSP: 0018:ffff888046ccfbf0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[   45.572305][  T975] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   45.572308][  T975] RDX: 000000000000003a RSI: ffffffffac926440 RDI: 00000000000001d0
[   45.576843][  T975] RBP: ffff888046ccfd70 R08: ffffffffab610645 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.576847][  T975] R10: ffff888046ccfd90 R11: ffffed100d6360ad R12: 0000000000000000
[   45.578471][  T975] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffffae1976c0 R15: 0000000000000168
[   45.578475][  T975] FS:  00007f614d6e7740(0000) GS:ffff88806c400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   45.581492][  T975] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   45.582942][  T975] CR2: 00005618677d1cf0 CR3: 000000005fb9c002 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[   45.584543][  T975] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   45.586633][  T975] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   45.589889][  T975] Call Trace:
[   45.591445][  T975]  ? devlink_region_snapshot_create+0x55/0x4a0
[   45.601250][  T975]  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380
[   45.602817][  T975]  ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1380/0x1380
[   45.603875][  T975]  ? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xe0
[   45.604769][  T975]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x50
[   45.606147][  T975]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xd0/0x670
[   45.607723][  T975]  ? crng_backtrack_protect+0x80/0x80
[   45.613530][  T975]  ? wait_for_completion+0x390/0x390
[   45.615152][  T975]  ? devlink_region_snapshot_create+0x55/0x4a0
[   45.616834][  T975]  devlink_region_snapshot_create+0x55/0x4a0
[ ... ]

Fixes: 4418f86 ("netdevsim: implement support for devlink region and snapshots")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Writing a cloned file triggers a kernel oops and the user-space command
process is also killed by the system.  The bug can be reproduced stably
via:

1) create a file under ocfs2 file system directory.

  journalctl -b > aa.txt

2) create a cloned file for this file.

  reflink aa.txt bb.txt

3) write the cloned file with dd command.

  dd if=/dev/zero of=bb.txt bs=512 count=1 conv=notrunc

The dd command is killed by the kernel, then you can see the oops message
via dmesg command.

[  463.875404] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
[  463.875413] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  463.875416] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  463.875418] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  463.875425] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  463.875431] CPU: 1 PID: 2291 Comm: dd Tainted: G           OE     5.3.16-2-default
[  463.875433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  463.875500] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_refcount_cow+0xa4/0x5d0 [ocfs2]
[  463.875505] Code: 06 89 6c 24 38 89 eb f6 44 24 3c 02 74 be 49 8b 47 28
[  463.875508] RSP: 0018:ffffa2cb409dfce8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  463.875512] RAX: ffff8b1ebdca8000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff8b1eb73a9df0
[  463.875515] RDX: 0000000000056a01 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  463.875517] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff8b1eb73a9de0 R09: 0000000000000000
[  463.875520] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  463.875522] R13: ffff8b1eb922f048 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b1eb922f048
[  463.875526] FS:  00007f8f44d15540(0000) GS:ffff8b1ebeb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  463.875529] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  463.875532] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000003c17a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  463.875546] Call Trace:
[  463.875596]  ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x18b/0x960 [ocfs2]
[  463.875648]  ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xaf8/0xc70 [ocfs2]
[  463.875672]  new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0
[  463.875688]  vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
[  463.875697]  ksys_write+0xa1/0xe0
[  463.875710]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
[  463.875743]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  463.875758] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f4482ed44
[  463.875762] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  463.875765] RSP: 002b:00007fff300a79d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  463.875769] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f8f4482ed44
[  463.875771] RDX: 0000000000000200 RSI: 000055f771b5c000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  463.875774] RBP: 0000000000000200 R08: 00007f8f44af9c78 R09: 0000000000000003
[  463.875776] R10: 000000000000089f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055f771b5c000
[  463.875779] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055f771b5c000

This regression problem was introduced by commit e74540b ("ocfs2:
protect extent tree in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write()").

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: e74540b ("ocfs2: protect extent tree in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write()").
Signed-off-by: Gang He <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Aneesh reported that:

	tlb_flush_mmu()
	  tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly()
	    tlb_flush()			<-- #1
	  tlb_flush_mmu_free()
	    tlb_table_flush()
	      tlb_table_invalidate()
		tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly()
		  tlb_flush()		<-- #2

does two TLBIs when tlb->fullmm, because __tlb_reset_range() will not
clear tlb->end in that case.

Observe that any caller to __tlb_adjust_range() also sets at least one of
the tlb->freed_tables || tlb->cleared_p* bits, and those are
unconditionally cleared by __tlb_reset_range().

Change the condition for actually issuing TLBI to having one of those bits
set, as opposed to having tlb->end != 0.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Reported-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
hsr_port_get_rcu() can return NULL, so we need to be careful.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 1 PID: 10249 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:hsr_addr_is_self+0x86/0x330 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:44
Code: 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 6b ff 94 f9 4c 89 f2 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 75 02 00 00 48 8b 43 30 49 39 c6 49 89 47 c0 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000da8a90 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff87e0cc33
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff87e035d5 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90000da8b20 R08: ffff88808e7de040 R09: ffffed1015d2707c
R10: ffffed1015d2707b R11: ffff8880ae9383db R12: ffff8880a689bc5e
R13: 1ffff920001b5153 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: ffffc90000da8af8
FS:  00007fd7a42be700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32338000 CR3: 00000000a928c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 hsr_handle_frame+0x1c5/0x630 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c:31
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xfbc/0x30b0 net/core/dev.c:5099
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa8/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5196
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5312
 process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6144
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6582 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6650
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
 do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1082
 </IRQ>

Fixes: c5a7591 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Our static-static calculation returns a failure if the public key is of
low order. We check for this when peers are added, and don't allow them
to be added if they're low order, except in the case where we haven't
yet been given a private key. In that case, we would defer the removal
of the peer until we're given a private key, since at that point we're
doing new static-static calculations which incur failures we can act on.
This meant, however, that we wound up removing peers rather late in the
configuration flow.

Syzkaller points out that peer_remove calls flush_workqueue, which in
turn might then wait for sending a handshake initiation to complete.
Since handshake initiation needs the static identity lock, holding the
static identity lock while calling peer_remove can result in a rare
deadlock. We have precisely this case in this situation of late-stage
peer removal based on an invalid public key. We can't drop the lock when
removing, because then incoming handshakes might interact with a bogus
static-static calculation.

While the band-aid patch for this would involve breaking up the peer
removal into two steps like wg_peer_remove_all does, in order to solve
the locking issue, there's actually a much more elegant way of fixing
this:

If the static-static calculation succeeds with one private key, it
*must* succeed with all others, because all 32-byte strings map to valid
private keys, thanks to clamping. That means we can get rid of this
silly dance and locking headaches of removing peers late in the
configuration flow, and instead just reject them early on, regardless of
whether the device has yet been assigned a private key. For the case
where the device doesn't yet have a private key, we safely use zeros
just for the purposes of checking for low order points by way of
checking the output of the calculation.

The following PoC will trigger the deadlock:

ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev wg0
ip link set wg0 up
ping -f 10.0.0.2 &
while true; do
        wg set wg0 private-key /dev/null peer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA= allowed-ips 10.0.0.0/24 endpoint 10.0.0.3:1234
        wg set wg0 private-key <(echo AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=)
done

[    0.949105] ======================================================
[    0.949550] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[    0.950143] 5.5.0-debug+ torvalds#18 Not tainted
[    0.950431] ------------------------------------------------------
[    0.950959] wg/89 is trying to acquire lock:
[    0.951252] ffff8880333e2128 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[    0.951865]
[    0.951865] but task is already holding lock:
[    0.952280] ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[    0.953011]
[    0.953011] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[    0.953011]
[    0.953651]
[    0.953651] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[    0.954292]
[    0.954292] -> #2 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}:
[    0.954804]        lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[    0.955133]        down_read+0x83/0x410
[    0.955428]        wg_noise_handshake_create_initiation+0x97/0x700
[    0.955885]        wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x13a/0x280
[    0.956401]        wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x10/0x20
[    0.956841]        process_one_work+0x806/0x1500
[    0.957167]        worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[    0.957549]        kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[    0.957792]        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[    0.958234]
[    0.958234] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work)){+.+.}:
[    0.958808]        lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[    0.959075]        process_one_work+0x7ab/0x1500
[    0.959369]        worker_thread+0x8c/0xcb0
[    0.959639]        kthread+0x2ee/0x3b0
[    0.959896]        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
[    0.960346]
[    0.960346] -> #0 ((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0){+.+.}:
[    0.960945]        check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[    0.961351]        __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[    0.961725]        lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[    0.961990]        flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[    0.962280]        peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[    0.962600]        wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[    0.962994]        genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[    0.963298]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[    0.963618]        genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[    0.963853]        netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[    0.964245]        netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[    0.964586]        __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[    0.964854]        __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[    0.965141]        do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[    0.965408]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[    0.965769]
[    0.965769] other info that might help us debug this:
[    0.965769]
[    0.966337] Chain exists of:
[    0.966337]   (wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0 --> (work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work) --> &wg->static_identity.lock
[    0.966337]
[    0.967417]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[    0.967417]
[    0.967836]        CPU0                    CPU1
[    0.968155]        ----                    ----
[    0.968497]   lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[    0.968779]                                lock((work_completion)(&peer->transmit_handshake_work));
[    0.969345]                                lock(&wg->static_identity.lock);
[    0.969809]   lock((wq_completion)wg-kex-wg0);
[    0.970146]
[    0.970146]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[    0.970146]
[    0.970531] 5 locks held by wg/89:
[    0.970908]  #0: ffffffff827433c8 (cb_lock){++++}, at: genl_rcv+0x10/0x30
[    0.971400]  #1: ffffffff82743480 (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x642/0xe90
[    0.971924]  #2: ffffffff827160c0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0x9f/0xcc0
[    0.972488]  #3: ffff888032819de0 (&wg->device_update_lock){+.+.}, at: wg_set_device+0xb0/0xcc0
[    0.973095]  #4: ffff888032819bc0 (&wg->static_identity.lock){++++}, at: wg_set_device+0x95d/0xcc0
[    0.973653]
[    0.973653] stack backtrace:
[    0.973932] CPU: 1 PID: 89 Comm: wg Not tainted 5.5.0-debug+ torvalds#18
[    0.974476] Call Trace:
[    0.974638]  dump_stack+0x97/0xe0
[    0.974869]  check_noncircular+0x312/0x3e0
[    0.975132]  ? print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x1f0
[    0.975410]  ? __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30
[    0.975727]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x51/0x90
[    0.976024]  check_prev_add+0x167/0x1e20
[    0.976367]  ? graph_lock+0x70/0x160
[    0.976682]  __lock_acquire+0x2012/0x3170
[    0.976998]  ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[    0.977323]  lock_acquire+0x127/0x350
[    0.977627]  ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[    0.977890]  flush_workqueue+0x106/0x12f0
[    0.978147]  ? flush_workqueue+0xe3/0x12f0
[    0.978410]  ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[    0.978662]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
[    0.978919]  ? queue_rcu_work+0x60/0x60
[    0.979166]  ? netif_napi_del+0x151/0x3b0
[    0.979501]  ? peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[    0.979871]  peer_remove_after_dead+0x160/0x220
[    0.980232]  wg_set_device+0xa24/0xcc0
[    0.980516]  ? deref_stack_reg+0x8e/0xc0
[    0.980801]  ? set_peer+0xe10/0xe10
[    0.981040]  ? __ww_mutex_check_waiters+0x150/0x150
[    0.981430]  ? __nla_validate_parse+0x163/0x270
[    0.981719]  ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x13f/0x310
[    0.982078]  genl_rcv_msg+0x52f/0xe90
[    0.982348]  ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[    0.982690]  ? register_lock_class+0x1140/0x1140
[    0.983049]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x111/0x320
[    0.983298]  ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse+0x310/0x310
[    0.983645]  ? netlink_ack+0x880/0x880
[    0.983888]  genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
[    0.984168]  netlink_unicast+0x3f6/0x610
[    0.984443]  ? netlink_detachskb+0x60/0x60
[    0.984729]  ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[    0.984976]  netlink_sendmsg+0x700/0xb80
[    0.985220]  ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xa60/0xa60
[    0.985533]  __sys_sendto+0x1dd/0x2c0
[    0.985763]  ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0
[    0.986039]  ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x17/0x160
[    0.986397]  ? __sys_recvmsg+0x8c/0xf0
[    0.986711]  ? __sys_recvmsg_sock+0xd0/0xd0
[    0.987018]  __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[    0.987283]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39b/0x5a0
[    0.987666]  do_syscall_64+0x90/0xd9a
[    0.987903]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[    0.988223] RIP: 0033:0x7fe77c12003e
[    0.988508] Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 4
[    0.989666] RSP: 002b:00007fffada2ed58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[    0.990137] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe77c159d48 RCX: 00007fe77c12003e
[    0.990583] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000055fd1d38e020 RDI: 0000000000000004
[    0.991091] RBP: 000055fd1d38e020 R08: 000055fd1cb63358 R09: 000000000000000c
[    0.991568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000002c
[    0.992014] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 000055fd1d38e020 R15: 0000000000000001

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
free_match_list could be called when the flow table is already
locked. We need to pass this notation to tree_put_node.

It fixes the following lockdep warnning:

[ 1797.268537] ============================================
[ 1797.276837] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 1797.285101] 5.5.0-rc5+ #10 Not tainted
[ 1797.291641] --------------------------------------------
[ 1797.299917] handler10/9296 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1797.307885] ffff889ad399a0a0 (&node->lock){++++}, at:
tree_put_node+0x1d5/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.319694]
[ 1797.319694] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1797.330904] ffff889ad399a0a0 (&node->lock){++++}, at:
nested_down_write_ref_node.part.33+0x1a/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.344707]
[ 1797.344707] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1797.356952]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1797.356952]
[ 1797.368333]        CPU0
[ 1797.373357]        ----
[ 1797.378364]   lock(&node->lock);
[ 1797.384222]   lock(&node->lock);
[ 1797.390031]
[ 1797.390031]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1797.390031]
[ 1797.403003]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 1797.403003]
[ 1797.414691] 3 locks held by handler10/9296:
[ 1797.421465]  #0: ffff889cf2c5a110 (&block->cb_lock){++++}, at:
tc_setup_cb_add+0x70/0x250
[ 1797.432810]  #1: ffff88a030081490 (&comp->sem){++++}, at:
mlx5_devcom_get_peer_data+0x4c/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.445829]  #2: ffff889ad399a0a0 (&node->lock){++++}, at:
nested_down_write_ref_node.part.33+0x1a/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.459913]
[ 1797.459913] stack backtrace:
[ 1797.469436] CPU: 1 PID: 9296 Comm: handler10 Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 5.5.0-rc5+ #10
[ 1797.480643] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS
2.4.3 01/17/2017
[ 1797.491480] Call Trace:
[ 1797.496701]  dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
[ 1797.502864]  __lock_acquire.cold.63+0xf8/0x212
[ 1797.510301]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x250/0x250
[ 1797.517701]  ? mark_held_locks+0x55/0xa0
[ 1797.524547]  ? quarantine_put+0xb7/0x160
[ 1797.531422]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x17d/0x250
[ 1797.538913]  lock_acquire+0xd6/0x1f0
[ 1797.545529]  ? tree_put_node+0x1d5/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.553701]  down_write+0x94/0x140
[ 1797.560206]  ? tree_put_node+0x1d5/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.568464]  ? down_write_killable_nested+0x170/0x170
[ 1797.576925]  ? del_hw_flow_group+0xde/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.585629]  tree_put_node+0x1d5/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.593891]  ? free_match_list.part.25+0x147/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.603389]  free_match_list.part.25+0xe0/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.612654]  _mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x17e2/0x20b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.621838]  ? lock_acquire+0xd6/0x1f0
[ 1797.629028]  ? esw_get_prio_table+0xb0/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.637981]  ? alloc_insert_flow_group+0x420/0x420 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.647459]  ? try_to_wake_up+0x4c7/0xc70
[ 1797.654881]  ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350
[ 1797.662271]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xb1/0x3f0
[ 1797.670396]  ? find_held_lock+0xac/0xd0
[ 1797.677540]  ? mlx5_add_flow_rules+0xdc/0x360 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.686467]  mlx5_add_flow_rules+0xdc/0x360 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.695134]  ? _mlx5_add_flow_rules+0x20b0/0x20b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.704270]  ? irq_exit+0xa5/0x170
[ 1797.710764]  ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
[ 1797.717698]  ? mlx5_eswitch_set_rule_source_port.isra.9+0x122/0x230
[mlx5_core]
[ 1797.728708]  mlx5_eswitch_add_offloaded_rule+0x465/0x6d0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.738713]  ? mlx5_eswitch_get_prio_range+0x30/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.748384]  ? mlx5_fc_stats_work+0x670/0x670 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.757400]  mlx5e_tc_offload_fdb_rules.isra.27+0x24/0x90 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.767665]  mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0xaf8/0xd40 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.776886]  ? mlx5e_encap_put+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.785562]  ? mlx5e_alloc_flow.isra.43+0x18c/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.795353]  __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x2e2/0x440 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.804558]  ? mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value+0x8c0/0x8c0
[mlx5_core]
[ 1797.815093]  ? wait_for_completion+0x260/0x260
[ 1797.823272]  mlx5e_configure_flower+0xe94/0x1620 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.832792]  ? __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x440/0x440 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.842096]  ? down_read+0x11a/0x2e0
[ 1797.849090]  ? down_write+0x140/0x140
[ 1797.856142]  ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_block_cb+0xc0/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1797.866027]  tc_setup_cb_add+0x11a/0x250
[ 1797.873339]  fl_hw_replace_filter+0x25e/0x320 [cls_flower]
[ 1797.882385]  ? fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1c0/0x1c0 [cls_flower]
[ 1797.891607]  fl_change+0x1d54/0x1fb6 [cls_flower]
[ 1797.899772]  ? __rhashtable_insert_fast.constprop.50+0x9f0/0x9f0
[cls_flower]
[ 1797.910728]  ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350
[ 1797.918187]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0xa5/0x130
[ 1797.926046]  ? fl_set_key+0x1590/0x1590 [cls_flower]
[ 1797.934611]  ? __rhashtable_insert_fast.constprop.50+0x9f0/0x9f0
[cls_flower]
[ 1797.945673]  tc_new_tfilter+0xcd1/0x1240
[ 1797.953138]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0xb10/0xb10
[ 1797.960688]  ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x92/0x320
[ 1797.968721]  ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x1df/0x320
[ 1797.976816]  ? avc_has_extended_perms+0x990/0x990
[ 1797.985090]  ? mark_lock+0xaa/0x9e0
[ 1797.991988]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 1797.999457]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 1798.006859]  ? find_held_lock+0xac/0xd0
[ 1798.014045]  ? symbol_put_addr+0x40/0x40
[ 1798.021317]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xd0/0xd0
[ 1798.029460]  ? tc_del_tfilter+0xb10/0xb10
[ 1798.036810]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4d5/0x620
[ 1798.044236]  ? rtnl_bridge_getlink+0x460/0x460
[ 1798.052034]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x250/0x250
[ 1798.059837]  ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 1798.067146]  ? find_held_lock+0xac/0xd0
[ 1798.074246]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0
[ 1798.081339]  ? rtnl_bridge_getlink+0x460/0x460
[ 1798.089104]  ? netlink_ack+0x440/0x440
[ 1798.096061]  netlink_unicast+0x2d4/0x3b0
[ 1798.103189]  ? netlink_attachskb+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 1798.110724]  ? _copy_from_iter_full+0xda/0x370
[ 1798.118415]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3ba/0x6a0
[ 1798.125478]  ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 1798.132705]  ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 1798.139880]  sock_sendmsg+0x94/0xa0
[ 1798.146332]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x3f0
[ 1798.153251]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x165/0x230
[ 1798.160941]  ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30
[ 1798.167738]  ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x150
[ 1798.174411]  ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x30/0x30
[ 1798.181649]  ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350
[ 1798.188559]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xd0/0xd0
[ 1798.196239]  ? __fget+0x21d/0x320
[ 1798.202335]  ? do_dup2+0x2a0/0x2a0
[ 1798.208499]  ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350
[ 1798.215366]  ? __fget_light+0xd6/0xf0
[ 1798.221808]  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x369/0x5d0
[ 1798.229112]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x160
[ 1798.235511]  ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x60/0x60
[ 1798.242478]  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x233/0x5d0
[ 1798.249721]  ? syscall_slow_exit_work+0x280/0x280
[ 1798.257211]  ? do_syscall_64+0x1e/0x2e0
[ 1798.263680]  do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2e0
[ 1798.269950]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: bd71b08 ("net/mlx5: Support multiple updates of steering rules in parallel")
Signed-off-by: Maor Gottlieb <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
__in6_dev_get(dev) called from inet6_set_link_af() can return NULL.

The needed check has been recently removed, let's add it back.

While do_setlink() does call validate_linkmsg() :
...
err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb); /* OK at this point */
...

It is possible that the following call happening before the
->set_link_af() removes IPv6 if MTU is less than 1280 :

if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {
    err = dev_set_mtu_ext(dev, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_MTU]), extack);
    if (err < 0)
          goto errout;
    status |= DO_SETLINK_MODIFIED;
}
...

if (tb[IFLA_AF_SPEC]) {
   ...
   err = af_ops->set_link_af(dev, af);
      ->inet6_set_link_af() // CRASH because idev is NULL

Please note that IPv4 is immune to the bug since inet_set_link_af() does :

struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
if (!in_dev)
    return -EAFNOSUPPORT;

This problem has been mentioned in commit cf7afbf ("rtnl: make
link af-specific updates atomic") changelog :

    This method is not fail proof, while it is currently sufficient
    to make set_link_af() inerrable and thus 100% atomic, the
    validation function method will not be able to detect all error
    scenarios in the future, there will likely always be errors
    depending on states which are f.e. not protected by rtnl_mutex
    and thus may change between validation and setting.

IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): lo: link becomes ready
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000056: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000002b0-0x00000000000002b7]
CPU: 0 PID: 9698 Comm: syz-executor712 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:inet6_set_link_af+0x66e/0xae0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5733
Code: 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 20 03 00 00 48 8d bb b0 02 00 00 45 0f b6 64 24 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 44 89 a3 b0 02 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005b06d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff86df39a6
RDX: 0000000000000056 RSI: ffffffff86df3e74 RDI: 00000000000002b0
RBP: ffffc90005b06e70 R08: ffff8880a2ac0380 R09: ffffc90005b06db0
R10: fffff52000b60dbe R11: ffffc90005b06df7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880a1fcc424 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  0000000000c46880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f0494ca0d0 CR3: 000000009e4ac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 do_setlink+0x2a9f/0x3720 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2754
 rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3103 [inline]
 __rtnl_newlink+0xdd1/0x1790 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3257
 rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3377
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x45e/0xaf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5438
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5456
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x59e/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x91c/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x753/0x880 net/socket.c:2343
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2397
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2430
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2437 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2437
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4402e9
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffd62fbcf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004402e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401b70
R13: 0000000000401c00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace cfa7664b8fdcdff3 ]---
RIP: 0010:inet6_set_link_af+0x66e/0xae0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5733
Code: 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 20 03 00 00 48 8d bb b0 02 00 00 45 0f b6 64 24 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 44 89 a3 b0 02 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90005b06d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff86df39a6
RDX: 0000000000000056 RSI: ffffffff86df3e74 RDI: 00000000000002b0
RBP: ffffc90005b06e70 R08: ffff8880a2ac0380 R09: ffffc90005b06db0
R10: fffff52000b60dbe R11: ffffc90005b06df7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880a1fcc424 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  0000000000c46880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000004 CR3: 000000009e4ac000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 7dc2bcc ("Validate required parameters in inet6_validate_link_af")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Bisected-and-reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Various fixes

This patch set contains various fixes for the mlxsw driver.

Patch #1 fixes an issue introduced in 5.6 in which a route in the main
table can replace an identical route in the local table despite the
local table having an higher precedence.

Patch #2 contains a test case for the bug fixed in patch #1.

Patch #3 also fixes an issue introduced in 5.6 in which the driver
failed to clear the offload indication from IPv6 nexthops upon abort.

Patch #4 fixes an issue that prevents the driver from loading on
Spectrum-3 systems. The problem and solution are explained in detail in
the commit message.

Patch #5 adds a missing error path. Discovered using smatch.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
rcu_read_lock is needed to protect access to psock inside sock_map_unref
when tearing down the map. However, we can't afford to sleep in lock_sock
while in RCU read-side critical section. Grab the RCU lock only after we
have locked the socket.

This fixes RCU warnings triggerable on a VM with 1 vCPU when free'ing a
sockmap/sockhash that contains at least one socket:

| =============================
| WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
| 5.5.0-04005-g8fc91b972b73 torvalds#450 Not tainted
| -----------------------------
| include/linux/rcupdate.h:272 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!
|
| other info that might help us debug this:
|
|
| rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
| 4 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
|  #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #2: ffffffff82065d20 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: sock_map_free+0x5/0x170
|  #3: ffff8881368c5df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x64/0x170
|
| stack backtrace:
| CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.5.0-04005-g8fc91b972b73 torvalds#450
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
| Call Trace:
|  dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
|  ___might_sleep+0x105/0x190
|  lock_sock_nested+0x28/0x90
|  sock_map_free+0x95/0x170
|  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
|  process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
|  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
|  kthread+0x108/0x140
|  ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
|  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
|  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

| =============================
| WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
| 5.5.0-04005-g8fc91b972b73-dirty torvalds#452 Not tainted
| -----------------------------
| include/linux/rcupdate.h:272 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!
|
| other info that might help us debug this:
|
|
| rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
| 4 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
|  #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #2: ffffffff82065d20 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: sock_hash_free+0x5/0x1d0
|  #3: ffff888139966e00 (&htab->buckets[i].lock){+...}, at: sock_hash_free+0x92/0x1d0
|
| stack backtrace:
| CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.5.0-04005-g8fc91b972b73-dirty torvalds#452
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
| Call Trace:
|  dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
|  ___might_sleep+0x105/0x190
|  lock_sock_nested+0x28/0x90
|  sock_hash_free+0xec/0x1d0
|  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
|  process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
|  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
|  kthread+0x108/0x140
|  ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
|  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
|  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Fixes: 7e81a35 ("bpf: Sockmap, ensure sock lock held during tear down")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
vadorovsky pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2020
The early versions of our kernel user access prevention (KUAP) were
written by Russell and Christophe, and didn't have separate
read/write access.

At some point I picked up the series and added the read/write access,
but I failed to update the usages in futex.h to correctly allow read
and write.

However we didn't notice because of another bug which was causing the
low-level code to always enable read and write. That bug was fixed
recently in commit 1d8f739 ("powerpc/kuap: Fix set direction in
allow/prevent_user_access()").

futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() is passed the user address as %3 and
does:

  1:     lwarx   %1,  0, %3
         cmpw    0,  %1, %4
         bne-    3f
  2:     stwcx.  %5,  0, %3

Which clearly loads and stores from/to %3. The logic in
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() is similar, so fix both of them to use
allow_read_write_user().

Without this fix, and with PPC_KUAP_DEBUG=y, we see eg:

  Bug: Read fault blocked by AMR!
  WARNING: CPU: 94 PID: 149215 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:126 __do_page_fault+0x600/0xf30
  CPU: 94 PID: 149215 Comm: futex_requeue_p Tainted: G        W         5.5.0-rc7-gcc9x-g4c25df5640ae #1
  ...
  NIP [c000000000070680] __do_page_fault+0x600/0xf30
  LR [c00000000007067c] __do_page_fault+0x5fc/0xf30
  Call Trace:
  [c00020138e5637e0] [c00000000007067c] __do_page_fault+0x5fc/0xf30 (unreliable)
  [c00020138e5638c0] [c00000000000ada8] handle_page_fault+0x10/0x30
  --- interrupt: 301 at cmpxchg_futex_value_locked+0x68/0xd0
      LR = futex_lock_pi_atomic+0xe0/0x1f0
  [c00020138e563bc0] [c000000000217b50] futex_lock_pi_atomic+0x80/0x1f0 (unreliable)
  [c00020138e563c30] [c00000000021b668] futex_requeue+0x438/0xb60
  [c00020138e563d60] [c00000000021c6cc] do_futex+0x1ec/0x2b0
  [c00020138e563d90] [c00000000021c8b8] sys_futex+0x128/0x200
  [c00020138e563e20] [c00000000000b7ac] system_call+0x5c/0x68

Fixes: de78a9c ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.2+
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
A GISA cannot be destroyed as long it is linked in the GIB alert list
as this would break the alert list. Just waiting for its removal from
the list triggered by another vm is not sufficient as it might be the
only vm. The below shown cpu stall situation might occur when GIB alerts
are delayed and is fixed by calling process_gib_alert_list() instead of
waiting.

At this time the vcpus of the vm are already destroyed and thus
no vcpu can be kicked to enter the SIE again if for some reason an
interrupt is pending for that vm.

Additionally the IAM restore value is set to 0x00. That would be a bug
introduced by incomplete device de-registration, i.e. missing
kvm_s390_gisc_unregister() call.

Setting this value and the IAM in the GISA to 0x00 guarantees that late
interrupts don't bring the GISA back into the alert list.

CPU stall caused by kvm_s390_gisa_destroy():

 [ 4915.311372] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected expedited stalls on CPUs/tasks: { 14-.... } 24533 jiffies s: 5269 root: 0x1/.
 [ 4915.311390] rcu: blocking rcu_node structures (internal RCU debug): l=1:0-15:0x4000/.
 [ 4915.311394] Task dump for CPU 14:
 [ 4915.311395] task:qemu-system-s39 state:R  running task     stack:0     pid:217198 ppid:1      flags:0x00000045
 [ 4915.311399] Call Trace:
 [ 4915.311401]  [<0000038003a33a10>] 0x38003a33a10
 [ 4933.861321] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 [ 4933.861332] rcu: 	14-....: (42008 ticks this GP) idle=53f4/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=61530/61530 fqs=14031
 [ 4933.861353] rcu: 	(t=42008 jiffies g=238109 q=100360 ncpus=18)
 [ 4933.861357] CPU: 14 PID: 217198 Comm: qemu-system-s39 Not tainted 6.5.0-20230816.rc6.git26.a9d17c5d8813.300.fc38.s390x #1
 [ 4933.861360] Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR)
 [ 4933.861361] Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000003ff804bfc66 (kvm_s390_gisa_destroy+0x3e/0xe0 [kvm])
 [ 4933.861414]            R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
 [ 4933.861416] Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000000 00000372000000fc 00000002134f8000 000000000d5f5900
 [ 4933.861419]            00000002f5ea1d18 00000002f5ea1d18 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
 [ 4933.861420]            00000002134fa890 00000002134f8958 000000000d5f5900 00000002134f8000
 [ 4933.861422]            000003ffa06acf98 000003ffa06858b0 0000038003a33c20 0000038003a33bc8
 [ 4933.861430] Krnl Code: 000003ff804bfc58: ec66002b007e	cij	%r6,0,6,000003ff804bfcae
                           000003ff804bfc5e: b904003a		lgr	%r3,%r10
                          #000003ff804bfc62: a7f40005		brc	15,000003ff804bfc6c
                          >000003ff804bfc66: e330b7300204	lg	%r3,10032(%r11)
                           000003ff804bfc6c: 58003000		l	%r0,0(%r3)
                           000003ff804bfc70: ec03fffb6076	crj	%r0,%r3,6,000003ff804bfc66
                           000003ff804bfc76: e320b7600271	lay	%r2,10080(%r11)
                           000003ff804bfc7c: c0e5fffea339	brasl	%r14,000003ff804942ee
 [ 4933.861444] Call Trace:
 [ 4933.861445]  [<000003ff804bfc66>] kvm_s390_gisa_destroy+0x3e/0xe0 [kvm]
 [ 4933.861460] ([<00000002623523de>] free_unref_page+0xee/0x148)
 [ 4933.861507]  [<000003ff804aea98>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x50/0x120 [kvm]
 [ 4933.861521]  [<000003ff8049d374>] kvm_destroy_vm+0x174/0x288 [kvm]
 [ 4933.861532]  [<000003ff8049d4fe>] kvm_vm_release+0x36/0x48 [kvm]
 [ 4933.861542]  [<00000002623cd04a>] __fput+0xea/0x2a8
 [ 4933.861547]  [<00000002620d5bf8>] task_work_run+0x88/0xf0
 [ 4933.861551]  [<00000002620b0aa6>] do_exit+0x2c6/0x528
 [ 4933.861556]  [<00000002620b0f00>] do_group_exit+0x40/0xb8
 [ 4933.861557]  [<00000002620b0fa6>] __s390x_sys_exit_group+0x2e/0x30
 [ 4933.861559]  [<0000000262d481f4>] __do_syscall+0x1d4/0x200
 [ 4933.861563]  [<0000000262d59028>] system_call+0x70/0x98
 [ 4933.861565] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
 [ 4933.861566]  [<0000038003a33b60>] 0x38003a33b60

Fixes: 9f30f62 ("KVM: s390: add gib_alert_irq_handler()")
Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Rosato <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Use atomic readl_poll_timeout_atomic, because msdc_reset_hw
may be invoked in IRQ handler in the following context:

  msdc_irq() -> msdc_cmd_done() -> msdc_reset_hw()

The following kernel BUG stack trace can be observed on
Genio 1200 EVK after initializing MSDC1 hardware during kernel boot:

[    1.187441] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/0/0/0x00010002
[    1.189157] Modules linked in:
[    1.204633] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W         5.15.42-mtk+modified #1
[    1.205713] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio 1200 EVK-P1V2-EMMC (DT)
[    1.206484] Call trace:
[    1.206796]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac
[    1.207266]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
[    1.207692]  dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[    1.208162]  dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
[    1.208587]  __schedule_bug+0x68/0x80
[    1.209056]  __schedule+0x6ec/0x7c0
[    1.209502]  schedule+0x7c/0x110
[    1.209915]  schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock+0xc4/0x1f0
[    1.210569]  schedule_hrtimeout_range+0x20/0x30
[    1.211148]  usleep_range_state+0x84/0xc0
[    1.211661]  msdc_reset_hw+0xc8/0x1b0
[    1.212134]  msdc_cmd_done.isra.0+0x4ac/0x5f0
[    1.212693]  msdc_irq+0x104/0x2d4
[    1.213121]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x68/0x280
[    1.213725]  handle_irq_event+0x70/0x15c
[    1.214230]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb0/0x1a4
[    1.214755]  handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x9c
[    1.215260]  gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x180
[    1.215741]  call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x54
[    1.216245]  do_interrupt_handler+0x5c/0x70
[    1.216782]  el1_interrupt+0x30/0x80
[    1.217242]  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x1c/0x2c
[    1.217769]  el1h_64_irq+0x78/0x7c
[    1.218206]  cpuidle_enter_state+0xc8/0x600
[    1.218744]  cpuidle_enter+0x44/0x5c
[    1.219205]  do_idle+0x224/0x2d0
[    1.219624]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x80
[    1.220129]  rest_init+0x108/0x134
[    1.220568]  arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
[    1.221094]  start_kernel+0x6c0/0x700
[    1.221564]  __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8

Fixes: ffaea6e ("mmc: mtk-sd: Use readl_poll_timeout instead of open-coded polling")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Sun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
In powerpc pseries system, below behaviour is observed while
enabling tracing on hcall:
  # cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
  # cat events/powerpc/hcall_exit/enable
  0
  # echo 1 > events/powerpc/hcall_exit/enable

  # ls
  -bash: fork: Bad address

Above is from power9 lpar with latest kernel. Past this, softlockup
is observed. Initially while attempting via perf_event_open to
use "PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT", kernel panic was observed.

perf config used:
================
  memset(&pe[1],0,sizeof(struct perf_event_attr));
  pe[1].type=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT;
  pe[1].size=96;
  pe[1].config=0x26ULL; /* 38 raw_syscalls/sys_exit */
  pe[1].sample_type=0; /* 0 */
  pe[1].read_format=PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED|PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING|PERF_FORMAT_ID|PERF_FORMAT_GROUP|0x10ULL; /* 1f */
  pe[1].inherit=1;
  pe[1].precise_ip=0; /* arbitrary skid */
  pe[1].wakeup_events=0;
  pe[1].bp_type=HW_BREAKPOINT_EMPTY;
  pe[1].config1=0x1ULL;

Kernel panic logs:
==================

  Kernel attempted to read user page (8) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004c2814
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: nfnetlink bonding tls rfkill sunrpc dm_service_time dm_multipath pseries_rng xts vmx_crypto xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 sg ibmvfc scsi_transport_fc ibmveth dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
  CPU: 0 PID: 1431 Comm: login Not tainted 6.4.0+ #1
  Hardware name: IBM,8375-42A POWER9 (raw) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.30 (VL950_892) hv:phyp pSeries
  NIP page_remove_rmap+0x44/0x320
  LR  wp_page_copy+0x384/0xec0
  Call Trace:
    0xc00000001416e400 (unreliable)
    wp_page_copy+0x384/0xec0
    __handle_mm_fault+0x9d4/0xfb0
    handle_mm_fault+0xf0/0x350
    ___do_page_fault+0x48c/0xc90
    hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x70
    do_hash_fault+0x1a4/0x330
    data_access_common_virt+0x198/0x1f0
   --- interrupt: 300 at 0x7fffae971abc

git bisect tracked this down to below commit:
'commit baa49d8 ("powerpc/pseries: hvcall stack frame overhead")'

This commit changed STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD (112 ) to
STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE (32 ) since 32 bytes is the minimum size
for ELFv2 stack. With the latest kernel, when running on ELFv2,
STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE is used to allocate stack size.

During plpar_hcall_trace, first call is made to HCALL_INST_PRECALL
which saves the registers and allocates new stack frame. In the
plpar_hcall_trace code, STK_PARAM is accessed at two places.
  1. To save r4: std     r4,STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)
  2. To access r4 back: ld      r12,STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

HCALL_INST_PRECALL precall allocates a new stack frame. So all
the stack parameter access after the precall, needs to be accessed
with +STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE. So the store instruction should be:
  std     r4,STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE+STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

If the "std" is not updated with STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE, we will
end up with overwriting stack contents and cause corruption.
But instead of updating 'std', we can instead remove it since
HCALL_INST_PRECALL already saves it to the correct location.

similarly load instruction should be:
  ld      r12,STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE+STK_PARAM(R4)(r1)

Fix the load instruction to correctly access the stack parameter
with +STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE and remove the store of r4 since the
precall saves it correctly.

Cc: [email protected] # v6.2+
Fixes: baa49d8 ("powerpc/pseries: hvcall stack frame overhead")
Co-developed-by: Naveen N Rao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Many functions in drivers/usb/core/hub.c and drivers/usb/core/hub.h
access fields inside udev->bos without checking if it was allocated and
initialized. If usb_get_bos_descriptor() fails for whatever
reason, udev->bos will be NULL and those accesses will result in a
crash:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 17818 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G W 5.15.108-18910-gab0e1cb584e1 #1 <HASH:1f9e 1>
Hardware name: Google Kindred/Kindred, BIOS Google_Kindred.12672.413.0 02/03/2021
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:hub_port_reset+0x193/0x788
Code: 89 f7 e8 20 f7 15 00 48 8b 43 08 80 b8 96 03 00 00 03 75 36 0f b7 88 92 03 00 00 81 f9 10 03 00 00 72 27 48 8b 80 a8 03 00 00 <48> 83 78 18 00 74 19 48 89 df 48 8b 75 b0 ba 02 00 00 00 4c 89 e9
RSP: 0018:ffffab740c53fcf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa1bc5f678000 RCX: 0000000000000310
RDX: fffffffffffffdff RSI: 0000000000000286 RDI: ffffa1be9655b840
RBP: ffffab740c53fd70 R08: 00001b7d5edaa20c R09: ffffffffb005e060
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffab740c53fd3e R14: 0000000000000032 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa1be96540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000022e80c005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
hub_event+0x73f/0x156e
? hub_activate+0x5b7/0x68f
process_one_work+0x1a2/0x487
worker_thread+0x11a/0x288
kthread+0x13a/0x152
? process_one_work+0x487/0x487
? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Fall back to a default behavior if the BOS descriptor isn't accessible
and skip all the functionalities that depend on it: LPM support checks,
Super Speed capabilitiy checks, U1/U2 states setup.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
For ARM processor, unaligned access to device memory is not allowed.
Method memcpy does not take care of alignment.

USB detection failure with the unalingned address of memory, with
below kernel crash. To fix the unalingned address kernel panic,
replace memcpy with memcpy_toio method.

Kernel crash:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80000c05008a
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x96000061
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000061
  CM = 0, WnR = 1
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000143b000
[ffff80000c05008a] pgd=100000087ffff003, p4d=100000087ffff003,
pud=100000087fffe003, pmd=1000000800bcc003, pte=00680000a0010713
Internal error: Oops: 96000061 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.19-xilinx-v2022.1 #1
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.0 (DT)
pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __memcpy+0x30/0x260
lr : __xudc_ep0_queue+0xf0/0x110
sp : ffff800008003d00
x29: ffff800008003d00 x28: ffff800009474e80 x27: 00000000000000a0
x26: 0000000000000100 x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff000800bc8080
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000012 x21: ffff000800bc8080
x20: 0000000000000012 x19: ffff000800bc8080 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: ffff800876482000 x16: ffff800008004000 x15: 0000000000004000
x14: 00001f09785d0400 x13: 0103020101005567 x12: 0781400000000200
x11: 00000000c5672a10 x10: 00000000000008d0 x9 : ffff800009463cf0
x8 : ffff8000094757b0 x7 : 0201010055670781 x6 : 4000000002000112
x5 : ffff80000c05009a x4 : ffff000800a15012 x3 : ffff00080362ad80
x2 : 0000000000000012 x1 : ffff000800a15000 x0 : ffff80000c050088
Call trace:
 __memcpy+0x30/0x260
 xudc_ep0_queue+0x3c/0x60
 usb_ep_queue+0x38/0x44
 composite_ep0_queue.constprop.0+0x2c/0xc0
 composite_setup+0x8d0/0x185c
 configfs_composite_setup+0x74/0xb0
 xudc_irq+0x570/0xa40
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x170
 handle_irq_event+0x60/0x120
 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc0/0x220
 handle_domain_irq+0x60/0x90
 gic_handle_irq+0x74/0xa0
 call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x60
 do_interrupt_handler+0x54/0x60
 el1_interrupt+0x30/0x50
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
 el1h_64_irq+0x78/0x7c
 arch_cpu_idle+0x18/0x2c
 do_idle+0xdc/0x15c
 cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x60
 rest_init+0xc8/0xe0
 arch_call_rest_init+0x10/0x1c
 start_kernel+0x694/0x6d4
 __primary_switched+0xa4/0xac

Fixes: 1f7c516 ("usb: gadget: Add xilinx usb2 device support")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Piyush Mehta <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
As talked about in commit d66d24a ("ath10k: Keep track of which
interrupts fired, don't poll them"), if we access the copy engine
register at a bad time then ath10k can go boom. However, it's not
necessarily easy to know when it's safe to access them.

The ChromeOS test labs saw a crash that looked like this at
shutdown/reboot time (on a chromeos-5.15 kernel, but likely the
problem could also reproduce upstream):

Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
CPU: 4 PID: 6168 Comm: reboot Not tainted 5.15.111-lockdep-19350-g1d624fe6758f #1 010b9b233ab055c27c6dc88efb0be2f4e9e86f51
Hardware name: Google Kingoftown (DT)
...
pc : ath10k_snoc_read32+0x50/0x74 [ath10k_snoc]
lr : ath10k_snoc_read32+0x24/0x74 [ath10k_snoc]
...
Call trace:
ath10k_snoc_read32+0x50/0x74 [ath10k_snoc ...]
ath10k_ce_disable_interrupt+0x190/0x65c [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_ce_disable_interrupts+0x8c/0x120 [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_snoc_hif_stop+0x78/0x660 [ath10k_snoc ...]
ath10k_core_stop+0x13c/0x1ec [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_halt+0x398/0x5b0 [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_stop+0xfc/0x1a8 [ath10k_core ...]
drv_stop+0x148/0x6b4 [mac80211 ...]
ieee80211_stop_device+0x70/0x80 [mac80211 ...]
ieee80211_do_stop+0x10d8/0x15b0 [mac80211 ...]
ieee80211_stop+0x144/0x1a0 [mac80211 ...]
__dev_close_many+0x1e8/0x2c0
dev_close_many+0x198/0x33c
dev_close+0x140/0x210
cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0xc8/0x1e0 [cfg80211 ...]
ieee80211_remove_interfaces+0x118/0x5c4 [mac80211 ...]
ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x64/0x1f4 [mac80211 ...]
ath10k_mac_unregister+0x4c/0xf0 [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_core_unregister+0x80/0xb0 [ath10k_core ...]
ath10k_snoc_free_resources+0xb8/0x1ec [ath10k_snoc ...]
ath10k_snoc_shutdown+0x98/0xd0 [ath10k_snoc ...]
platform_shutdown+0x7c/0xa0
device_shutdown+0x3e0/0x58c
kernel_restart_prepare+0x68/0xa0
kernel_restart+0x28/0x7c

Though there's no known way to reproduce the problem, it makes sense
that it would be the same issue where we're trying to access copy
engine registers when it's not allowed.

Let's fix this by changing how we "disable" the interrupts. Instead of
tweaking the copy engine registers we'll just use disable_irq() and
enable_irq(). Then we'll configure the interrupts once at power up
time.

Tested-on: WCN3990 hw1.0 SNOC WLAN.HL.3.2.2.c10-00754-QCAHLSWMTPL-1

Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230630151842.1.If764ede23c4e09a43a842771c2ddf99608f25f8e@changeid
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Surfaces can be backed (i.e. stored in) memory objects (mob's) which
are created and managed by the userspace as GEM buffers. Surfaces
grab only a ttm reference which means that the gem object can
be deleted underneath us, especially in cases where prime buffer
export is used.

Make sure that all userspace surfaces which are backed by gem objects
hold a gem reference to make sure they're not deleted before vmw
surfaces are done with them, which fixes:
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2632 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
Modules linked in: overlay vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm gameport>
CPU: 2 PID: 2632 Comm: vmw_ref_count Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-vmwgfx #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
Code: eb 9e 0f b6 1d 8b 5b a6 01 80 fb 01 0f 87 ba e4 80 00 83 e3 01 75 89 48 c7 c7 c0 3c f9 a3 c6 05 6f 5b a6 01 01 e8 15 81 98 ff <0f> 0b e9 6f ff ff ff 0f b>
RSP: 0018:ffffbdc34344bba0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff960475ea1548 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff960475ea1540
RBP: ffffbdc34344bba8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 65646e75203a745f
R10: ffffffffa5b32b20 R11: 72657466612d6573 R12: ffff96037d6a6400
R13: ffff9603484805b0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff9603bed06060
FS:  00007f5fd8520c40(0000) GS:ffff960475e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5fda755000 CR3: 000000010d012005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 ? __warn+0x91/0x150
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150
 drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xba/0x110 [drm]
 drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x6e/0x80 [drm]
 drm_gem_handle_delete+0x6a/0xc0 [drm]
 ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx]
 vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x33/0x40 [vmwgfx]
 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x160 [drm]
 drm_ioctl+0x2d2/0x580 [drm]
 ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx]
 ? do_vmi_munmap+0xee/0x180
 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xbd/0x180 [vmwgfx]
 vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x19/0x20 [vmwgfx]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x99/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2a/0x50
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
 ? handle_mm_fault+0x16e/0x2f0
 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x34/0x170
 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20
 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50
 ? exc_page_fault+0x8e/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7f5fda51aaff
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 7>
RSP: 002b:00007ffd536a4d30 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RCX: 00007f5fda51aaff
RDX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RSI: 0000000040086442 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000040086442 R08: 000055fa603ada50 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd536a51b8
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055fa5ebb4c80 R15: 00007f5fda90f040
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

A lot of the analyis on the bug was done by Murray McAllister and
Ian Forbes.

Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Forbes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <[email protected]>
Fixes: a950b98 ("drm/vmwgfx: Do not drop the reference to the handle too soon")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.2+
Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Eddie reported that newer kernels were crashing during boot on his 476
FSP2 system:

  kernel tried to execute user page (b7ee2000) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
  BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
  Faulting instruction address: 0xb7ee2000
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
  BE PAGE_SIZE=4K FSP-2
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 61 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.55-d23900f.ppcnf-fsp2 #1
  Hardware name: ibm,fsp2 476fpe 0x7ff520c0 FSP-2
  NIP:  b7ee2000 LR: 8c008000 CTR: 00000000
  REGS: bffebd83 TRAP: 0400   Not tainted (6.1.55-d23900f.ppcnf-fs p2)
  MSR:  00000030 <IR,DR>  CR: 00001000  XER: 20000000
  GPR00: c00110ac bffebe63 bffebe7e bffebe88 8c008000 00001000 00000d12 b7ee2000
  GPR08: 00000033 00000000 00000000 c139df10 48224824 1016c314 10160000 00000000
  GPR16: 10160000 10160000 00000008 00000000 10160000 00000000 10160000 1017f5b0
  GPR24: 1017fa50 1017f4f0 1017fa50 1017f740 1017f630 00000000 00000000 1017f4f0
  NIP [b7ee2000] 0xb7ee2000
  LR [8c008000] 0x8c008000
  Call Trace:
  Instruction dump:
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The problem is in ret_from_syscall where the check for
icache_44x_need_flush is done. When the flush is needed the code jumps
out-of-line to do the flush, and then intends to jump back to continue
the syscall return.

However the branch back to label 1b doesn't return to the correct
location, instead branching back just prior to the return to userspace,
causing bogus register values to be used by the rfi.

The breakage was introduced by commit 6f76a01
("powerpc/syscall: implement system call entry/exit logic in C for PPC32") which
inadvertently removed the "1" label and reused it elsewhere.

Fix it by adding named local labels in the correct locations. Note that
the return label needs to be outside the ifdef so that CONFIG_PPC_47x=n
compiles.

Fixes: 6f76a01 ("powerpc/syscall: implement system call entry/exit logic in C for PPC32")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.12+
Reported-by: Eddie James <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Eddie James <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Link: https://msgid.link/[email protected]
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
The cited patch change mlx5 driver so that during probe DMA
operations were performed before pci_enable_device(), and during
teardown DMA operations were performed after pci_disable_device().
DMA operations require PCI to be enabled. Hence, The above leads to
the following oops in PPC systems[1].

On s390x systems, as reported by Niklas Schnelle, this is a problem
because mlx5_pci_init() is where the DMA and coherent mask is set but
mlx5_cmd_init() already does a dma_alloc_coherent(). Thus a DMA
allocation is done during probe before the correct mask is set. This
causes probe to fail initialization of the cmdif SW structs on s390x
after that is converted to the common dma-iommu code. This is because on
s390x DMA addresses below 4 GiB are reserved on current machines and
unlike the old s390x specific DMA API implementation common code
enforces DMA masks.

Fix it by performing the DMA operations during probe after
pci_enable_device() and after the dma mask is set,
and during teardown before pci_disable_device().

[1]
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink
nfnetlink xfrm_user iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat
nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 netconsole rpcsec_gss_krb5
auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser ib_umad
rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_cm ib_uverbs
ib_core mlx5_core(-) ptp pps_core fuse vmx_crypto crc32c_vpmsum [last
unloaded: mlx5_ib]
CPU: 1 PID: 8937 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_07_31_16_02 #1
Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
NIP:  c000000000423388 LR: c0000000001e733c CTR: c0000000001e4720
REGS: c0000000055636d0 TRAP: 0380   Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_07_31_16_02)
MSR:  8000000000009033  CR: 24008884  XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000001e7338 IRQMASK: 0
NIP [c000000000423388] __free_pages+0x28/0x160
LR [c0000000001e733c] dma_direct_free+0xac/0x190
Call Trace:
[c000000005563970] [5deadbeef0000100] 0x5deadbeef0000100 (unreliable)
[c0000000055639b0] [c0000000003d46cc] kfree+0x7c/0x150
[c000000005563a40] [c0000000001e47c8] dma_free_attrs+0xa8/0x1a0
[c000000005563aa0] [c008000000d0064c] mlx5_cmd_cleanup+0xa4/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[c000000005563ad0] [c008000000cf629c] mlx5_mdev_uninit+0xf4/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[c000000005563b00] [c008000000cf6448] remove_one+0x160/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
[c000000005563b40] [c000000000958540] pci_device_remove+0x60/0x110
[c000000005563b80] [c000000000a35e80] device_remove+0x70/0xd0
[c000000005563bb0] [c000000000a37a38] device_release_driver_internal+0x2a8/0x330
[c000000005563c00] [c000000000a37b8c] driver_detach+0x8c/0x160
[c000000005563c40] [c000000000a35350] bus_remove_driver+0x90/0x110
[c000000005563c80] [c000000000a38948] driver_unregister+0x48/0x90
[c000000005563cf0] [c000000000957e38] pci_unregister_driver+0x38/0x150
[c000000005563d40] [c008000000eb6140] mlx5_cleanup+0x38/0x90 [mlx5_core]

Fixes: 06cd555 ("net/mlx5: split mlx5_cmd_init() to probe and reload routines")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Niklas Schnelle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Hold RTNL lock when calling xdp_set_features() with a registered netdev,
as the call triggers the netdev notifiers. This could happen when
switching from nic profile to uplink representor for example.

Similar logic which fixed a similar scenario was previously introduced in
the following commit:
commit 72cc654 net/mlx5e: Take RTNL lock when needed before calling
xdp_set_features().

This fixes the following assertion and warning call trace:

RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (1961)
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2529 at net/core/dev.c:1961
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi
scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib
ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink
nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5
auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay mlx5_core zram zsmalloc fuse
CPU: 13 PID: 2529 Comm: devlink Not tainted
6.5.0_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_09_07_20_04 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
Code: 8f ff 80 3d 77 0d 16 01 00 75 c5 ba a9 07 00 00 48
c7 c6 c4 bb 0d 82 48 c7 c7 18 c8 06 82 c6 05 5b 0d 16 01 01 e8 44 f6 8c
ff <0f> 0b eb a2 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 48 83 e4 f0 48 83 ec
RSP: 0018:ffff88819930f7f0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8309f740 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88885fb5b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88885fb5b5c0
RBP: 0000000000000028 R08: ffff88887ffabaa8 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffff88887fecbac0 R11: ffff88887ff7bac0 R12: ffff88819930f810
R13: ffff88810b7fea40 R14: ffff8881154e8fd8 R15: ffff888107e881a0
FS:  00007f3ad248f800(0000) GS:ffff88885fb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000563b85f164e0 CR3: 0000000113b5c006 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __warn+0x79/0x120
 ? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
 ? report_bug+0x17c/0x190
 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7c/0x80
 call_netdevice_notifiers+0x2e/0x50
 mlx5e_set_xdp_feature+0x21/0x50 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_build_rep_params+0x97/0x130 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_init_ul_rep+0x9f/0x100 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_netdev_init_profile+0x76/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile+0x1f/0x90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x92/0x160 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x329/0x4a0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x9e/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
 esw_offloads_enable+0x4bc/0xe90 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x3c8/0x570 [mlx5_core]
 ? kmalloc_trace+0x25/0x80
 mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x224/0x680 [mlx5_core]
 ? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x9e/0x110
 devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_set_doit+0x60/0xe0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
 genl_rcv_msg+0x180/0x2b0
 ? devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x110/0x110
 ? devlink_nl_cmd_eswitch_get_doit+0x290/0x290
 ? devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0xf0/0xf0
 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
 netlink_unicast+0x1fc/0x2c0
 netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0
 sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
 ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x60
 __sys_sendto+0x110/0x160
 ? handle_mm_fault+0x161/0x260
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x276/0x620
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad231340a
Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3
0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f
05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffd70aad4b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000c36b00 RCX:00007f3ad231340a
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 0000000000c36b00 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000c36910 R08: 00007f3ad2625200 R09: 000000000000000c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------

Fixes: 4d5ab0a ("net/mlx5e: take into account device reconfiguration for xdp_features flag")
Signed-off-by: Lama Kayal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
When testing on risc-v QEMU environment with "crashkernel="
parameter enabled, a problem occurred with the following
message:

[    0.000000] crashkernel low memory reserved: 0xf8000000 - 0x100000000 (128 MB)
[    0.000000] crashkernel reserved: 0x0000000177e00000 - 0x0000000277e00000 (4096 MB)
[    0.000000] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/resource.c:779 __insert_resource+0x8e/0xd0
[    0.000000] Modules linked in:
[    0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2-next-20230920 #1
[    0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[    0.000000] epc : __insert_resource+0x8e/0xd0
[    0.000000]  ra : insert_resource+0x28/0x4e
[    0.000000] epc : ffffffff80017344 ra : ffffffff8001742e sp : ffffffff81203db0
[    0.000000]  gp : ffffffff812ece98 tp : ffffffff8120dac0 t0 : ff600001f7ff2b00
[    0.000000]  t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 3428203030303030 s0 : ffffffff81203dc0
[    0.000000]  s1 : ffffffff81211e18 a0 : ffffffff81211e18 a1 : ffffffff81289380
[    0.000000]  a2 : 0000000277dfffff a3 : 0000000177e00000 a4 : 0000000177e00000
[    0.000000]  a5 : ffffffff81289380 a6 : 0000000277dfffff a7 : 0000000000000078
[    0.000000]  s2 : ffffffff81289380 s3 : ffffffff80a0bac8 s4 : ff600001f7ff2880
[    0.000000]  s5 : 0000000000000280 s6 : 8000000a00006800 s7 : 000000000000007f
[    0.000000]  s8 : 0000000080017038 s9 : 0000000080038ea0 s10: 0000000000000000
[    0.000000]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff80a0bc00 t4 : ffffffff80a0bc00
[    0.000000]  t5 : ffffffff80a0bbd0 t6 : ffffffff80a0bc00
[    0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[    0.000000] [<ffffffff80017344>] __insert_resource+0x8e/0xd0
[    0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    0.000000] Failed to add a Crash kernel resource at 177e00000

The crashkernel memory has been allocated successfully, whereas
it failed to insert into iomem_resource. This is due to the
unique reserving logic in risc-v arch specific code, i.e.
crashk_res/crashk_low_res will be added into iomem_resource
later in init_resources(), which is not aligned with current
unified reserving logic in reserve_crashkernel_{generic,low}()
and therefore leads to the failure of crashkernel reservation.

Removing the arch specific code within #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
in init_resources() to fix above problem.

Fixes: 3154915 ("riscv: kdump: use generic interface to simplify crashkernel reservation")
Signed-off-by: Chen Jiahao <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
On driver load, scsi_add_host() can fail. This triggers the free path to
call qla2x00_mem_free() multiple times. This causes NULL pointer access of
ha->base_qpair. Add check before access.

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
 IP: [<ffffffffc118f73c>] qla2x00_mem_free+0x51c/0xcb0 [qla2xxx]
 PGD 8000001fcfe4a067 PUD 1fc8f0a067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc118f73c>]  [<ffffffffc118f73c>] qla2x00_mem_free+0x51c/0xcb0 [qla2xxx]
 RSP: 0018:ffff8ace97a93a30  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ace8efd0000 RCX: 000000000000488f
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: ffff8ace97a93a60 R08: 000000000001f040 R09: ffffffff8678209b
 R10: ffff8acf7d6df040 R11: ffffc591c0fcc980 R12: ffffffff87034800
 R13: ffff8acf0e3cc740 R14: ffff8ace8efd0000 R15: 00000000fffffff4
 FS:  00007f4cf5449740(0000) GS:ffff8acf7d6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000001fc2f6c000 CR4: 00000000007607e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff86781f18>] ? kobject_put+0x28/0x60
  [<ffffffffc119a59c>] qla2x00_probe_one+0x19fc/0x3040 [qla2xxx]

Fixes: efeda3b ("scsi: qla2xxx: Move resource to allow code reuse")
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Lockdep reports following issue:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
devlink/8191 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88813f32c250 (&devlink->lock_key#14){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_rel_devlink_handle_put+0x11e/0x2d0

                           but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8511eca8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unregister_netdev+0xe/0x20

                           which lock already depends on the new lock.

                           the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

                           -> #3 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       register_netdevice_notifier_net+0x13/0x30
       mlx5_lag_add_mdev+0x51c/0xa00 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_load+0x222/0xc70 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x4a0/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one+0x3b/0x60 [mlx5_core]
       probe_one+0x786/0xd00 [mlx5_core]
       local_pci_probe+0xd7/0x180
       pci_device_probe+0x231/0x720
       really_probe+0x1e4/0xb60
       __driver_probe_device+0x261/0x470
       driver_probe_device+0x49/0x130
       __driver_attach+0x215/0x4c0
       bus_for_each_dev+0xf0/0x170
       bus_add_driver+0x21d/0x590
       driver_register+0x133/0x460
       vdpa_match_remove+0x89/0xc0 [vdpa]
       do_one_initcall+0xc4/0x360
       do_init_module+0x22d/0x760
       load_module+0x51d7/0x6750
       init_module_from_file+0xd2/0x130
       idempotent_init_module+0x326/0x5a0
       __x64_sys_finit_module+0xc1/0x130
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #2 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       mlx5_register_device+0x3e/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x8fa/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_reload_up+0x147/0x170 [mlx5_core]
       devlink_reload+0x203/0x380
       devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xb84/0x10e0
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #1 (&dev->lock_key#8){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       mlx5_init_one_devl_locked+0x45/0x1310 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_reload_up+0x147/0x170 [mlx5_core]
       devlink_reload+0x203/0x380
       devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xb84/0x10e0
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           -> #0 (&devlink->lock_key#14){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add+0x1af/0x2300
       __lock_acquire+0x31d7/0x4eb0
       lock_acquire+0x1c3/0x500
       __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x1b20
       devlink_rel_devlink_handle_put+0x11e/0x2d0
       devlink_nl_port_fill+0xddf/0x1b00
       devlink_port_notify+0xb5/0x220
       __devlink_port_type_set+0x151/0x510
       devlink_port_netdevice_event+0x17c/0x220
       notifier_call_chain+0x97/0x240
       unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x876/0x1790
       unregister_netdevice_queue+0x274/0x350
       unregister_netdev+0x18/0x20
       mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0xc5/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
       __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xd8/0x130 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_unload+0x52/0x70 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x85/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_eswitch_unload_sf_vport+0x41/0x90 [mlx5_core]
       mlx5_devlink_sf_port_del+0x120/0x280 [mlx5_core]
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0
       genl_rcv_msg+0x3c9/0x670
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
       netlink_unicast+0x435/0x6f0
       netlink_sendmsg+0x7a0/0xc70
       sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190
       __sys_sendto+0x1c8/0x290
       __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0
       do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

                           other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
                             &devlink->lock_key#14 --> mlx5_intf_mutex --> rtnl_mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(mlx5_intf_mutex);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
  lock(&devlink->lock_key#14);

Problem is taking the devlink instance lock of nested instance when RTNL
is already held.

To fix this, don't take the devlink instance lock when putting nested
handle. Instead, rely on the preparations done by previous two patches
to be able to access device pointer and obtain netns id without devlink
instance lock held.

Fixes: c137743 ("devlink: introduce object and nested devlink relationship infra")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Jiri Pirko says:

====================
devlink: fix a deadlock when taking devlink instance lock while holding RTNL lock

devlink_port_fill() may be called sometimes with RTNL lock held.
When putting the nested port function devlink instance attrs,
current code takes nested devlink instance lock. In that case lock
ordering is wrong.

Patch #1 is a dependency of patch #2.
Patch #2 converts the peernet2id_alloc() call to rely in RCU so it could
         called without devlink instance lock.
Patch #3 takes device reference for devlink instance making sure that
         device does not disappear before devlink_release() is called.
Patch #4 benefits from the preparations done in patches #2 and #3 and
         removes the problematic nested devlink lock aquisition.
Patched #5-#7 improve documentation to reflect this issue so it is
              avoided in the future.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
…ress

If we specify a valid CQ ring address but an invalid SQ ring address,
we'll correctly spot this and free the allocated pages and clear them
to NULL. However, we don't clear the ring page count, and hence will
attempt to free the pages again. We've already cleared the address of
the page array when freeing them, but we don't check for that. This
causes the following crash:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-dirty torvalds#56
Hardware name: ucbbar,riscvemu-bare (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
epc : io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 ra : io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 epc : ffffffff808811a2 ra : ffffffff80881406 sp : ffff8f80000c3cd0
 status: 0000000200000121 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000d
 [<ffffffff808811a2>] io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 [<ffffffff80881406>] io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 [<ffffffff80882176>] io_ring_exit_work+0x37e/0x424
 [<ffffffff80027234>] process_one_work+0x10c/0x1f4
 [<ffffffff8002756e>] worker_thread+0x252/0x31c
 [<ffffffff8002f5e4>] kthread+0xc4/0xe0
 [<ffffffff8000332a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x1c

Check for a NULL array in io_pages_free(), but also clear the page counts
when we free them to be on the safer side.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 03d89a2 ("io_uring: support for user allocated memory for rings/sqes")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table.  Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops.  Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:

[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
    pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty torvalds#43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.

The generic kasan also has similar oops.

It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.

Commit 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.

This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 2f004ee("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Haibo Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Christoph Paasch reported a panic in TCP stack [1]

Indeed, we should not call sk_dst_reset() without holding
the socket lock, as __sk_dst_get() callers do not all rely
on bare RCU.

[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 12bad6067 P4D 12bad6067 PUD 12bad5067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 2750 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc4-g7a5720a344e7 torvalds#49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tcp_get_metrics+0x118/0x8f0 net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c:321
Code: c7 44 24 70 02 00 8b 03 89 44 24 48 c7 44 24 4c 00 00 00 00 66 c7 44 24 58 02 00 66 ba 02 00 b1 01 89 4c 24 04 4c 89 7c 24 10 <49> 8b 0f 48 8b 89 50 05 00 00 48 89 4c 24 30 33 81 00 02 00 00 69
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000af79b8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 000000000100007f RBX: ffff88812ae8f500 RCX: ffff88812b5f8f01
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff8300f080 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: ffffffff8205eca0
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88812b5f8f00 R12: ffff88812a9e0580
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88812ae8fbd2 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f70a006b640(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000012bad7003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tcp_fastopen_cache_get+0x32/0x140 net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c:567
tcp_fastopen_cookie_check+0x28/0x180 net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c:419
tcp_connect+0x9c8/0x12a0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3839
tcp_v4_connect+0x645/0x6e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:323
__inet_stream_connect+0x120/0x590 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:676
tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x2d6/0x3a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1021
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1957/0x1b00 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1073
tcp_sendmsg+0x30/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1336
__sock_sendmsg+0x83/0xd0 net/socket.c:730
__sys_sendto+0x20a/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2194
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2206 [inline]

Fixes: e08d0b3 ("inet: implement lockless IP_TOS")
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
We currently push everyone to use padding to align 64b values
in netlink. Un-padded nla_put_u64() doesn't even exist any more.

The story behind this possibly start with this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
where DaveM was concerned about the alignment of a structure
containing 64b stats. If user space tries to access such struct
directly:

	struct some_stats *stats = nla_data(attr);
	printf("A: %llu", stats->a);

lack of alignment may become problematic for some architectures.
These days we most often put every single member in a separate
attribute, meaning that the code above would use a helper like
nla_get_u64(), which can deal with alignment internally.
Even for arches which don't have good unaligned access - access
aligned to 4B should be pretty efficient.
Kernel and well known libraries deal with unaligned input already.

Padded 64b is quite space-inefficient (64b + pad means at worst 16B
per attr vs 32b which takes 8B). It is also more typing:

    if (nla_put_u64_pad(rsp, NETDEV_A_SOMETHING_SOMETHING,
                        value, NETDEV_A_SOMETHING_PAD))

Create a new attribute type which will use 32 bits at netlink
level if value is small enough (probably most of the time?),
and (4B-aligned) 64 bits otherwise. Kernel API is just:

    if (nla_put_uint(rsp, NETDEV_A_SOMETHING_SOMETHING, value))

Calling this new type "just" sint / uint with no specific size
will hopefully also make people more comfortable with using it.
Currently telling people "don't use u8, you may need the bits,
and netlink will round up to 4B, anyway" is the #1 comment
we give to newcomers.

In terms of netlink layout it looks like this:

         0       4       8       12      16
32b:     [nlattr][ u32  ]
64b:     [  pad ][nlattr][     u64      ]
uint(32) [nlattr][ u32  ]
uint(64) [nlattr][     u64      ]

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Petr Machata says:

====================
mlxsw: Move allocation of LAG table to the driver

PGT is an in-HW table that maps addresses to sets of ports. Then when some
HW process needs a set of ports as an argument, instead of embedding the
actual set in the dynamic configuration, what gets configured is the
address referencing the set. The HW then works with the appropriate PGT
entry.

Within the PGT is placed a LAG table. That is a contiguous block of PGT
memory where each entry describes which ports are members of the
corresponding LAG port.

The PGT is split to two parts: one managed by the FW, and one managed by
the driver. Historically, the FW part included also the LAG table, referred
to as FW LAG mode. Giving the responsibility for placement of the LAG table
to the driver, referred to as SW LAG mode, makes the whole system more
flexible. The FW currently supports both FW and SW LAG modes. To shed
complexity, the FW should in the future only support SW LAG mode.

Hence this patchset, where support for placement of LAG is added to mlxsw.

There are FW versions out there that do not support SW LAG mode, and on
Spectrum-1 in particular, there is no plan to support it at all. mlxsw will
therefore have to support both modes of operation.

Another aspect is that at least on Spectrum-1, there are FW versions out
there that claim to support driver-placed LAG table, but then reject or
ignore configurations enabling the same. The driver thus has to have a say
in whether an attempt to configure SW LAG mode should even be done.

The feature is therefore expressed in terms of "does the driver prefer SW
LAG mode?", and "what LAG mode the PCI module managed to configure the FW
with". This is unlike current flood mode configuration, where the driver
can give a strict value, and that's what gets configured. But it gives a
chance to the driver to determine whether LAG mode should be enabled at
all.

The "does the driver prefer SW LAG mode?" bit is expressed as a boolean
lag_mode_prefer_sw. The reason for this is largely another feature that
will be introduced in a follow-up patchset: support for CFF flood mode. The
driver currently requires that the FW be configured with what is called
controlled flood mode. But on capable systems, CFF would be preferred. So
there are two values in flight: the preferred flood mode, and the fallback.
This could be expressed with an array of flood modes ordered by preference,
but that looks like an overkill in comparison. This flag/value model is
then reused for LAG mode as well, except the fallback value is absent and
implied to be FW, because there are no other values to choose from.

The patchset progresses as follows:

- Patches #1 to #5 adjust reg.h and cmd.h with new register fields,
  constants and remarks.

- Patches #6 and #7 add the ability to request SW LAG mode and to query the
  LAG mode that was actually negotiated. This is where the abovementioned
  lag_mode_prefer_sw flag is added.

- Patches #7 to #9 generalize PGT allocations to make it possible to
  allocate the LAG table, which is done in patch #10.

- In patch #11, toggle lag_mode_prefer_sw on Spectrum-2 and above, which
  makes the newly-added code live.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
…l info

When the chip not support 6GHz capability, the channels of 6GHz information
should not be updated. This caused a crash:

[   19.442078] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000014
[   19.457535] Mem abort info:
[   19.465329]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[   19.473295]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   19.482354]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   19.489143]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   19.495991]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[   19.504554] Data abort info:
[   19.511111]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   19.520269]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   19.528988]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   19.537960] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001027a9000
[   19.548014] [0000000000000014] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=000000000000
[   19.558429] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   19.568270] Modules linked in: mt7921e mt7921_common mt792x_lib
mt76_connac_lib mt76 mac80211 btusb btintel cfg80211 btmtk snd_sof_ipc_msg_
btrtl snd_sof_ipc_flood_test btbcm bluetooth snd_sof_mt8195 uvcvideo
mtk_adsp_common snd_sof_xtensa_dsp uvc snd_sof_of snd_sof videobuf2_vmalloc
ecdh_generic ecc snd_sof_utils cros_ec_lid_angle cros_ec_sensors crct10dif_
cros_ec_sensors_core cros_usbpd_logger crypto_user fuse ip_tables ipv6
[   19.614237] CPU: 1 PID: 105 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc6-next-20231017+ torvalds#324
[   19.625957] Hardware name: Acer Tomato (rev2) board (DT)
[   19.634970] Workqueue: events mt7921_init_work [mt7921_common]
[   19.644522] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTY
[   19.655182] pc : mt7921_regd_notifier+0x180/0x290 [mt7921_common]
[   19.664983] lr : mt7921_regd_notifier+0xd4/0x290 [mt7921_common]
[   19.674679] sp : ffff800080acba80
[   19.681649] x29: ffff800080acba80 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff4faf
[   19.692483] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff4faf
[   19.703294] x23: 00000000ffffe926 x22: ffff4faf16031fa0 x21: 00000000
[   19.714108] x20: 000000000000001c x19: ffff4faf16ba6f40 x18: 00000000
[   19.724928] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffac6b891c2750 x15: ffff8000
[   19.735722] x14: 0000000000000180 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000
[   19.746478] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: ffff4faf01c21780 x9 : ffffac6b
[   19.757214] x8 : 00000000006c0000 x7 : ffffac6b6b020cf0 x6 : ffffac6b
[   19.767945] x5 : ffffac6b6b020d00 x4 : ffffac6b6b020cf8 x3 : ffff4faf
[   19.778648] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 000000000000001c x0 : 00000000
[   19.789366] Call trace:
[   19.795381]  mt7921_regd_notifier+0x180/0x290 [mt7921_common]
[   19.804675]  wiphy_update_regulatory+0x2bc/0xa08 [cfg80211]
[   19.813864]  wiphy_regulatory_register+0x4c/0x88 [cfg80211]
[   19.823029]  wiphy_register+0x75c/0x8d0 [cfg80211]
[   19.831446]  ieee80211_register_hw+0x70c/0xc10 [mac80211]
[   19.840479]  mt76_register_device+0x168/0x2e8 [mt76]
[   19.849008]  mt7921_init_work+0xdc/0x250 [mt7921_common]
[   19.857817]  process_one_work+0x148/0x3c0
[   19.865292]  worker_thread+0x32c/0x450
[   19.872489]  kthread+0x11c/0x128
[   19.879173]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   19.886153] Code: f0000041 9100a021 94000aef aa0003f9 (b9401780)
[   19.895634] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Reported-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: 09382d8 ("wifi: mt76: mt7921: update the channel usage when the regd domain changed")
Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf77a58a60d81c77a28388bc8d312b87ffb48434.1697603002.git.deren.wu@mediatek.com
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
fix crash because of null pointers

[ 6104.969662] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c8
[ 6104.969667] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 6104.969668] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 6104.969670] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 6104.969673] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 6104.969684] RIP: 0010:btusb_mtk_hci_wmt_sync+0x144/0x220 [btusb]
[ 6104.969688] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d681533d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 6104.969689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8ad560bb2000 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 6104.969691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb8d681533d08 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 6104.969692] RBP: ffffb8d681533d70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969694] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000fa83b2da R12: ffff8ad461d1d7c0
[ 6104.969695] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ad459618c18 R15: ffffb8d681533d90
[ 6104.969697] FS:  00007f5a1cab9d40(0000) GS:ffff8ad578200000(0000) knlGS:00000
[ 6104.969699] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6104.969700] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 000000018620c001 CR4: 0000000000760ef0
[ 6104.969701] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6104.969702] Call Trace:
[ 6104.969708]  btusb_mtk_shutdown+0x44/0x80 [btusb]
[ 6104.969732]  hci_dev_do_close+0x470/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969748]  hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]
[ 6104.969753]  rfkill_set_block+0x92/0x160
[ 6104.969755]  rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0
[ 6104.969759]  __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
[ 6104.969761]  vfs_write+0xdf/0x1c0
[ 6104.969763]  ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0
[ 6104.969765]  __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 6104.969769]  do_syscall_64+0x51/0x180
[ 6104.969771]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 6104.969773] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.9] RSP: 002b:00007ffeefe39010 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 6104.969780] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055c10a7560a0 RCX: 00007f5a21f18fef
[ 6104.969781] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffeefe39060 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 6104.969782] RBP: 00007ffeefe39060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000017
[ 6104.969784] R10: 00007ffeefe38d97 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 6104.969785] R13: 00007ffeefe39220 R14: 00007ffeefe391a0 R15: 000055c10a72acf0

Signed-off-by: youwan Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 27, 2023
Jiri Pirko says:

====================
devlink: finish conversion to generated split_ops

This patchset converts the remaining genetlink commands to generated
split_ops and removes the existing small_ops arrays entirely
alongside with shared netlink attribute policy.

Patches #1-#6 are just small preparations and small fixes on multiple
              places. Note that couple of patches contain the "Fixes"
              tag but no need to put them into -net tree.
Patch #7 is a simple rename preparation
Patch #8 is the main one in this set and adds actual definitions of cmds
         in to yaml file.
Patches #9-#10 finalize the change removing bits that are no longer in
               use.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2023
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Add MDB get support

This patchset adds MDB get support, allowing user space to request a
single MDB entry to be retrieved instead of dumping the entire MDB.
Support is added in both the bridge and VXLAN drivers.

Patches #1-#6 are small preparations in both drivers.

Patches #7-#8 add the required uAPI attributes for the new functionality
and the MDB get net device operation (NDO), respectively.

Patches #9-#10 implement the MDB get NDO in both drivers.

Patch #11 registers a handler for RTM_GETMDB messages in rtnetlink core.
The handler derives the net device from the ifindex specified in the
ancillary header and invokes its MDB get NDO.

Patches #12-torvalds#13 add selftests by converting tests that use MDB dump with
grep to the new MDB get functionality.

iproute2 changes can be found here [1].

v2:
* Patch #7: Add a comment to describe attributes structure.
* Patch #9: Add a comment above spin_lock_bh().

[1] https://github.com/idosch/iproute2/tree/submit/mdb_get_v1
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2023
With latest sync from net-next tree, bpf-next has a bpf selftest failure:
  [root@arch-fb-vm1 bpf]# ./test_progs -t setget_sockopt
  ...
  [   76.194349] ============================================
  [   76.194682] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  [   76.195039] 6.6.0-rc7-g37884503df08-dirty torvalds#67 Tainted: G        W  OE
  [   76.195518] --------------------------------------------
  [   76.195852] new_name/154 is trying to acquire lock:
  [   76.196159] ffff8c3e06ad8d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: ip_sock_set_tos+0x19/0x30
  [   76.196669]
  [   76.196669] but task is already holding lock:
  [   76.197028] ffff8c3e06ad8d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_listen+0x21/0x70
  [   76.197517]
  [   76.197517] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   76.197919]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   76.197919]
  [   76.198287]        CPU0
  [   76.198444]        ----
  [   76.198600]   lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
  [   76.198831]   lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
  [   76.199062]
  [   76.199062]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [   76.199062]
  [   76.199420]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
  [   76.199420]
  [   76.199879] 2 locks held by new_name/154:
  [   76.200131]  #0: ffff8c3e06ad8d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_listen+0x21/0x70
  [   76.200644]  #1: ffffffff90f96a40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_ops+0x55/0x290
  [   76.201268]
  [   76.201268] stack backtrace:
  [   76.201538] CPU: 4 PID: 154 Comm: new_name Tainted: G        W  OE      6.6.0-rc7-g37884503df08-dirty torvalds#67
  [   76.202134] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  [   76.202699] Call Trace:
  [   76.202858]  <TASK>
  [   76.203002]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4b/0x80
  [   76.203239]  __lock_acquire+0x740/0x1ec0
  [   76.203503]  lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2a0
  [   76.203766]  ? ip_sock_set_tos+0x19/0x30
  [   76.204050]  ? sk_stream_write_space+0x12a/0x230
  [   76.204389]  ? lock_release+0xbe/0x260
  [   76.204661]  lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80
  [   76.204942]  ? ip_sock_set_tos+0x19/0x30
  [   76.205208]  ip_sock_set_tos+0x19/0x30
  [   76.205452]  do_ip_setsockopt+0x4b3/0x1580
  [   76.205719]  __bpf_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0
  [   76.205963]  bpf_sock_ops_setsockopt+0x11/0x20
  [   76.206247]  bpf_prog_630217292049c96e_bpf_test_sockopt_int+0xbc/0x123
  [   76.206660]  bpf_prog_493685a3bae00bbd_bpf_test_ip_sockopt+0x49/0x4b
  [   76.207055]  bpf_prog_b0bcd27f269aeea0_skops_sockopt+0x44c/0xec7
  [   76.207437]  __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sock_ops+0xda/0x290
  [   76.207829]  __inet_listen_sk+0x108/0x1b0
  [   76.208122]  inet_listen+0x48/0x70
  [   76.208373]  __sys_listen+0x74/0xb0
  [   76.208630]  __x64_sys_listen+0x16/0x20
  [   76.208911]  do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
  [   76.209174]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  ...

Both ip_sock_set_tos() and inet_listen() calls lock_sock(sk) which
caused a dead lock.

To fix the issue, use sockopt_lock_sock() in ip_sock_set_tos()
instead. sockopt_lock_sock() will avoid lock_sock() if it is in bpf
context.

Fixes: 878d951 ("inet: lock the socket in ip_sock_set_tos()")
Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
rxq contains a pointer to the device from where
the redirect happened. Currently, the BPF program
that was executed after a redirect via BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP*
does not have it set.

This is particularly bad since accessing ingress_ifindex, e.g.

SEC("xdp")
int prog(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
        return bpf_redirect_map(&dev_redirect_map, 0, 0);
}

SEC("xdp/devmap")
int prog_after_redirect(struct xdp_md *pkt)
{
        bpf_printk("ifindex %i", pkt->ingress_ifindex);
        return XDP_PASS;
}

depends on access to rxq, so a NULL pointer gets dereferenced:

<1>[  574.475170] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
<1>[  574.475188] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<1>[  574.475194] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
<6>[  574.475199] PGD 0 P4D 0
<4>[  574.475207] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[  574.475217] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-reduced-00859-g780801200300 torvalds#23
<4>[  574.475226] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC13ANHi7/NUC13ANBi7, BIOS ANRPL357.0026.2023.0314.1458 03/14/2023
<4>[  574.475231] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
<4>[  574.475247] RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[  574.475257] Code: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 55 48 89 e5 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8b 57 20 <48> 8b 52 00 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 48 bf f8 a6 d5 c4 5d a0 ff ff be 0b
<4>[  574.475263] RSP: 0018:ffffa62440280c98 EFLAGS: 00010206
<4>[  574.475269] RAX: ffffa62440280cd8 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
<4>[  574.475274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa62440549048 RDI: ffffa62440280ce0
<4>[  574.475278] RBP: ffffa62440280c98 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
<4>[  574.475281] R10: ffffa05dc8b98000 R11: ffffa05f577fca40 R12: ffffa05dcab24000
<4>[  574.475285] R13: ffffa62440280ce0 R14: ffffa62440549048 R15: ffffa62440549000
<4>[  574.475289] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa05f4f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[  574.475294] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[  574.475298] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000025522e000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
<4>[  574.475303] PKRU: 55555554
<4>[  574.475306] Call Trace:
<4>[  574.475313]  <IRQ>
<4>[  574.475318]  ? __die+0x23/0x70
<4>[  574.475329]  ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c0
<4>[  574.475339]  ? skb_pp_cow_data+0x34c/0x490
<4>[  574.475346]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x257/0x280
<4>[  574.475357]  ? exc_page_fault+0x67/0x150
<4>[  574.475368]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
<4>[  574.475381]  ? bpf_prog_5e13354d9cf5018a_prog_after_redirect+0x17/0x3c
<4>[  574.475386]  bq_xmit_all+0x158/0x420
<4>[  574.475397]  __dev_flush+0x30/0x90
<4>[  574.475407]  veth_poll+0x216/0x250 [veth]
<4>[  574.475421]  __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0
<4>[  574.475430]  net_rx_action+0x32d/0x3a0
<4>[  574.475441]  handle_softirqs+0xcb/0x2c0
<4>[  574.475451]  do_softirq+0x40/0x60
<4>[  574.475458]  </IRQ>
<4>[  574.475461]  <TASK>
<4>[  574.475464]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x66/0x70
<4>[  574.475471]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x268/0xe40
<4>[  574.475480]  ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x213/0x420
<4>[  574.475491]  ? alloc_skb_with_frags+0x4a/0x1d0
<4>[  574.475502]  ip6_finish_output2+0x2be/0x640
<4>[  574.475512]  ? nf_hook_slow+0x42/0xf0
<4>[  574.475521]  ip6_finish_output+0x194/0x300
<4>[  574.475529]  ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
<4>[  574.475538]  mld_sendpack+0x17c/0x240
<4>[  574.475548]  mld_ifc_work+0x192/0x410
<4>[  574.475557]  process_one_work+0x15d/0x380
<4>[  574.475566]  worker_thread+0x29d/0x3a0
<4>[  574.475573]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[  574.475580]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4>[  574.475587]  kthread+0xcd/0x100
<4>[  574.475597]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[  574.475606]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
<4>[  574.475615]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4>[  574.475623]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
<4>[  574.475635]  </TASK>
<4>[  574.475637] Modules linked in: veth br_netfilter bridge stp llc iwlmvm x86_pkg_temp_thermal iwlwifi efivarfs nvme nvme_core
<4>[  574.475662] CR2: 0000000000000000
<4>[  574.475668] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Therefore, provide it to the program by setting rxq properly.

Fixes: cb261b5 ("bpf: Run devmap xdp_prog on flush instead of bulk enqueue")
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Kauer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240911-devel-koalo-fix-ingress-ifindex-v4-1-5c643ae10258@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2024
When trying to repeat the btf fields for array of nested struct, it
doesn't check the remaining info_cnt. The following splat will be
reported when the value of ret * nelems is greater than BTF_FIELDS_MAX:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ../kernel/bpf/btf.c:3951:49
  index 11 is out of range for type 'btf_field_info [11]'
  CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: test_progs ...... 6.11.0-rc4+ #1
  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ...
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
   dump_stack+0x10/0x20
   ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40
   __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x6f/0x80
   ? kallsyms_lookup_name+0x48/0xb0
   btf_parse_fields+0x992/0xce0
   map_create+0x591/0x770
   __sys_bpf+0x229/0x2410
   __x64_sys_bpf+0x1f/0x30
   x64_sys_call+0x199/0x9f0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7fea56f2cc5d
  ......
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace ]---

Fix it by checking the remaining info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields() before
repeating the btf fields.

Fixes: 64e8ee8 ("bpf: look into the types of the fields of a struct type recursively.")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 16, 2024
Hou Tao says:

====================
Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields

From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>

Hi,

The patch set adds the missed check again info_cnt when flattening the
array of nested struct. The problem was spotted when developing dynptr
key support for hash map. Patch #1 adds the missed check and patch #2
adds three success test cases and one failure test case for the problem.

Comments are always welcome.

Change Log:
v2:
 * patch #1: check info_cnt in btf_repeat_fields()
 * patch #2: use a hard-coded number instead of BTF_FIELDS_MAX, because
             BTF_FIELDS_MAX is not always available in vmlinux.h (e.g.,
	     for llvm 17/18)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2024
During the migration of Soundwire runtime stream allocation from
the Qualcomm Soundwire controller to SoC's soundcard drivers the sdm845
soundcard was forgotten.

At this point any playback attempt or audio daemon startup, for instance
on sdm845-db845c (Qualcomm RB3 board), will result in stream pointer
NULL dereference:

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
 address 0000000000000020
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101ecf000
 [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: ...
 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1198 Comm: aplay
 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-qcomlt-arm64-00059-g9d78f315a362-dirty torvalds#18
 Hardware name: Thundercomm Dragonboard 845c (DT)
 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus]
 lr : sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus]
 sp : ffff80008a2035c0
 x29: ffff80008a2035c0 x28: ffff80008a203978 x27: 0000000000000000
 x26: 00000000000000c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff1676025f4800
 x23: ffff167600ff1cb8 x22: ffff167600ff1c98 x21: 0000000000000003
 x20: ffff167607316000 x19: ffff167604e64e80 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffcec265074160 x15: 0000000000000000
 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff167600ff1cec
 x5 : ffffcec22cfa2010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000003
 x2 : ffff167613f836c0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff16761feb60b8
 Call trace:
  sdw_stream_add_slave+0x44/0x380 [soundwire_bus]
  wsa881x_hw_params+0x68/0x80 [snd_soc_wsa881x]
  snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x3c/0xa4
  __soc_pcm_hw_params+0x230/0x660
  dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x1d0/0x3f8
  dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x98/0x268
  snd_pcm_hw_params+0x124/0x460
  snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x998/0x16e8
  snd_pcm_ioctl+0x34/0x58
  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf8
  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  el0_svc+0x34/0xe0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
  el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
 Code: aa0403fb f9418400 9100e000 9400102f (f8420f22)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

0000000000006108 <sdw_stream_add_slave>:
    6108:       d503233f        paciasp
    610c:       a9b97bfd        stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-112]!
    6110:       910003fd        mov     x29, sp
    6114:       a90153f3        stp     x19, x20, [sp, torvalds#16]
    6118:       a9025bf5        stp     x21, x22, [sp, torvalds#32]
    611c:       aa0103f6        mov     x22, x1
    6120:       2a0303f5        mov     w21, w3
    6124:       a90363f7        stp     x23, x24, [sp, torvalds#48]
    6128:       aa0003f8        mov     x24, x0
    612c:       aa0203f7        mov     x23, x2
    6130:       a9046bf9        stp     x25, x26, [sp, torvalds#64]
    6134:       aa0403f9        mov     x25, x4        <-- x4 copied to x25
    6138:       a90573fb        stp     x27, x28, [sp, torvalds#80]
    613c:       aa0403fb        mov     x27, x4
    6140:       f9418400        ldr     x0, [x0, torvalds#776]
    6144:       9100e000        add     x0, x0, #0x38
    6148:       94000000        bl      0 <mutex_lock>
    614c:       f8420f22        ldr     x2, [x25, torvalds#32]!  <-- offset 0x44
    ^^^
This is 0x6108 + offset 0x44 from the beginning of sdw_stream_add_slave()
where data abort happens.
wsa881x_hw_params() is called with stream = NULL and passes it further
in register x4 (5th argument) to sdw_stream_add_slave() without any checks.
Value from x4 is copied to x25 and finally it aborts on trying to load
a value from address in x25 plus offset 32 (in dec) which corresponds
to master_list member in struct sdw_stream_runtime:

struct sdw_stream_runtime {
        const char  *              name;	/*     0     8 */
        struct sdw_stream_params   params;	/*     8    12 */
        enum sdw_stream_state      state;	/*    20     4 */
        enum sdw_stream_type       type;	/*    24     4 */
        /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
 here-> struct list_head           master_list;	/*    32    16 */
        int                        m_rt_count;	/*    48     4 */
        /* size: 56, cachelines: 1, members: 6 */
        /* sum members: 48, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */
        /* padding: 4 */
        /* last cacheline: 56 bytes */

Fix this by adding required calls to qcom_snd_sdw_startup() and
sdw_release_stream() to startup and shutdown routines which restores
the previous correct behaviour when ->set_stream() method is called to
set a valid stream runtime pointer on playback startup.

Reproduced and then fix was tested on db845c RB3 board.

Reported-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 15c7fab ("ASoC: qcom: Move Soundwire runtime stream alloc to soundcards")
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Cc: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Steev Klimaszewski <[email protected]> # Lenovo Yoga C630
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2024
Since adding the PCI power control code, we may end up with a race between
the pwrctl platform device rescanning the bus and host controller probe
functions. The latter need to take the rescan lock when adding devices or
we may end up in an undefined state having two incompletely added devices
and hit the following crash when trying to remove the device over sysfs:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
  Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
  Call trace:
    __pi_strlen+0x14/0x150
    kernfs_find_ns+0x80/0x13c
    kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x54/0xf0
    sysfs_remove_bin_file+0x24/0x34
    pci_remove_resource_files+0x3c/0x84
    pci_remove_sysfs_dev_files+0x28/0x38
    pci_stop_bus_device+0x8c/0xd8
    pci_stop_bus_device+0x40/0xd8
    pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x28/0x48
    remove_store+0x70/0xb0
    dev_attr_store+0x20/0x38
    sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x78
    kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xe8/0x184
    vfs_write+0x2dc/0x308
    ksys_write+0x7c/0xec

Fixes: 4565d26 ("PCI/pwrctl: Add PCI power control core code")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konrad Dybcio <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
borkmann pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 28, 2024
…n_net

In the normal case, when we excute `echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads`, the
function `nfs4_state_destroy_net` in `nfs4_state_shutdown_net` will
release all resources related to the hashed `nfs4_client`. If the
`nfsd_client_shrinker` is running concurrently, the `expire_client`
function will first unhash this client and then destroy it. This can
lead to the following warning. Additionally, numerous use-after-free
errors may occur as well.

nfsd_client_shrinker         echo 0 > /proc/fs/nfsd/threads

expire_client                nfsd_shutdown_net
  unhash_client                ...
                               nfs4_state_shutdown_net
                                 /* won't wait shrinker exit */
  /*                             cancel_work(&nn->nfsd_shrinker_work)
   * nfsd_file for this          /* won't destroy unhashed client1 */
   * client1 still alive         nfs4_state_destroy_net
   */

                               nfsd_file_cache_shutdown
                                 /* trigger warning */
                                 kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_slab)
                                 kmem_cache_destroy(nfsd_file_mark_slab)
  /* release nfsd_file and mark */
  __destroy_client

====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file (Not tainted): Objects remaining in nfsd_file on
__kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 764 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1

 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xac/0x210 [nfsd]
 nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
 write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
 vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

====================================================================
BUG nfsd_file_mark (Tainted: G    B   W         ): Objects remaining
nfsd_file_mark on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
--------------------------------------------------------------------

 dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
 slab_err+0xb0/0xf0
 __kmem_cache_shutdown+0x15c/0x310
 kmem_cache_destroy+0x66/0x160
 nfsd_file_cache_shutdown+0xc8/0x210 [nfsd]
 nfsd_destroy_serv+0x251/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]
 write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]
 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]
 vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0
 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

To resolve this issue, cancel `nfsd_shrinker_work` using synchronous
mode in nfs4_state_shutdown_net.

Fixes: 7c24fa2 ("NFSD: replace delayed_work with work_struct for nfsd_client_shrinker")
Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
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3 participants