diff --git a/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc b/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc
index 28a1903e5f5..34184006af4 100644
--- a/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc
+++ b/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ This lets the expected CSRF token outlive the session.
 +
 One might ask why the expected CSRF token is not stored in a cookie by default.
 This is because there are known exploits in which headers (for example, to specify the cookies) can be set by another domain.
-This is the same reason Ruby on Rails https://weblog.rubyonrails.org/2011/2/8/csrf-protection-bypass-in-ruby-on-rails/[no longer skips a CSRF checks when the header X-Requested-With is present].
+This is the same reason Ruby on Rails https://rubyonrails.org/2011/2/8/csrf-protection-bypass-in-ruby-on-rails[no longer skips a CSRF checks when the header X-Requested-With is present].
 See https://web.archive.org/web/20210221120355/https://lists.webappsec.org/pipermail/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org/2011-February/007533.html[this webappsec.org thread] for details on how to perform the exploit.
 Another disadvantage is that by removing the state (that is, the timeout), you lose the ability to forcibly invalidate the token if it is compromised.